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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

Smelser Revisited: a Critical Theory of Collective Behavior

by

Marilyn Islay Assheton-Smith

A THESIS

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Date March 30, 1987

Abstract

In 1962 Neil Smelser wrote a book called *A Theory of Collective Behavior*. Based on that version of Social Action Theory associated with the name of Talcott Parsons, it remains to this day the only attempt to "essay a complete theory (of collective behavior)" (Turner and Killian, 1972:252).

But as a theoretical statement the text was not without problems. Among other things it was widely criticized for being a theory of social control, not a theory of collective behavior or social change. There were challenges to Smelser's attempt to theorize about a whole range of phenomena under the single rubric collective behavior, and arguments that short term collective outbursts (such as panics and riots), social movements, and revolutions could not be addressed with a single theory. There was considerable hostility expressed towards Smelser's concept of "short-circuited logic" which seemed to imply that collective behavior paraticipants were irrational, and there were debates between Smelser and his critics about the actual logic of such participants. A number of other criticisms were directed at the work, virtually all of them aimed at his theoretical construction or his inferred political position. On the whole opponents did not object to the presentation of data or cases used to buttress his theoretical arguments.

In the first part of this work Collective Behavior theory is reviewed. Smelser's theory is then critiqued and comprehensively analyzed, drawing on the early criticism, changes in Social Action Theory since the time of his writing, and research into collective behavior in the last two decades. On the basis of this analysis a Critical Theory is developed which is logically more consistent than Smelser's, and which incorporates recent changes in Social Action Theory. In this section possible operational definitions are also proposed for a number of the theoretical constructs, addressing a problem which Smelser himself does not speak to in his text. Research findings and logical inference are used to develop these operational definitions.

In the second part the revised theory is applied to three cases as an initial test of its applicability and explanatory power. Each case makes it possible to reflect on a different theoretical type of collective behavior; a riot, a social movement, and revolution related to state formation (although the case used here can not be considered a revolution per se). The three cases are a small-scale riot in a student residence in the Northwest Territories, the development of the Dene Nation as a social movement in the Northwest Territories, and the development of the Northwest Territories state in Canada as a non-revolutionary process.

It is concluded that the revised theory has both considerable explanatory and interpretive power. These revisions to Smelser produce an outline for a theory of collective behavior which provides a social technology neither to control agents nor to revolutionaries. Rather it presents the social conditions and actions which make it possible for social actors (in and outside positions of authority) to identify and eventually focus on the source of "strain" in a social system (or, expressed differently, the societal source of psychological stress generated in individuals).

The predictive power of the Critical Theory remains similar to that provided by Smelser; if the specified conditions are not present or the specified actions are not taken by social actors collective behavior will be "irrational", occurring in the form of panics and riots or periods of prolonged violence which are sometimes called revolutions.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express a special thank-you to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Charles Hobart, for the exceptional support he gave me under rather trying circumstances. Without that support this work truly would never have been completed. The other committee members, Dr. Richard Jung, Dr. A.S.A. Mohsen, and Dr. Michael Asch have each been particularly helpful at different times as the work developed, and I thank them. Two other academics in the Department of Sociology also deserve mention for their timely assistance: Dr. Michael Gillespie and Dr. Gordon Fearn.

Many other people have contributed to this work in ways that they would never realize. All of my family have been important to me, but three family members have been most influential on my thinking. These were my grandmother, Freda Marie Edstrom Assheton-Smith, my mother Islay MacDonald Gillespie Assheton-Smith, and my father John Vernon (Harold) Assheton-Smith. Finally, three people from Ft. Rae, Northwest Territories were in some respects my most demanding teachers, Louis and Theresa Rabesca, and Mary Adelle Rabesca. It is a pleasure to be able to publicly acknowledge their unknowing contribution to this thesis.

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I. Introduction and Statement of the Problem

In the sociological literature, the subfield called Collective Behavior encompasses short-term events (riots, panics, mob acts), events of longer duration (social movements) and revolutions. Although there is much disagreement about the nature of the theoretical object studied under the rubric Collective Behavior, this literature addresses problems which have been central to the sociological enterprise since at least the nineteenth century. That is, it addresses issues of authority and institutionalization of social behavior, of social order, social control, and social change, and finally of the social bases of belief systems whether those belief systems are called ideology or knowledge.

Theoretical explanations of collective behavior consist primarily of work in symbolic interaction, especially Ralph Turner (1964, 1969, 1972) and Lewis Killian(1964, 1972) and work within Social Action Theory, as that phrase is used by Talcott Parsons,(Parsons, 1937; Parsons and Shils, 1951). It is generally conceded that "the only complete theory" of collective behavior (Turner and Killian, 1972:252) within these theoretical orientations is Neil Smelser's *Theory of Collective Behavior* in 1962. Since Smelser's work (and partly in response to it) a third overall category of analysis has developed. This is the resource mobilization approach taken by Zald and McCarthy and Charles Tilly among others, but like symbolic interaction the adherants of this approach make no claim to comprehensiveness. Smelser stands as the only fully elaborated theory which may provide insights into the above core concepts of sociological theory.

Although Smelser's theory was widely criticized in the years following its publication, it has never been subjected to a systematic critical analysis with a view to situating it in relation to the major theoretical problems in sociology. In spite of the fact it is partially a theory of social change (for collective behavior is defined as "...mobilization... to change a component of action....") one of the most strongly stated criticisms is that it is really a theory of social control. This criticism echoes a general

criticism of functionalism (in which Social Action Theory is embedded) that it can explain social order or social stability, but not social change. In fact, the overarching theoretical determinant in Smelser is social control.

A. Statement of the Problem

The central problem of this work can be described as the relationship between social control and social change as they are addressed in Smelser's theory of collective behavior; the goal of the analysis is clarification of the concepts and possibly modification not only of Smelser's theory but of Social Action Theory as a whole. The concept of social control is multi-faceted in Social Action Theory. Morris Janowitz (1975) argues that there are three essential meanings given to this term. The first sees social control as socialization to conformity, preparing social actors to fill niches in the social structure. The second views social control as social repression, forcing actors to follow certain patterns of action whether or not they are motivated to do so. The third "...focuses on the capacity of a social organization to regulate itself... in search of a set of goals..."(1975:84). That is, social control in this sense has to do with organizing the cleavages, strains and tensions of a society, and maintaining social order while transformation and change take place.

Within Social Action Theory, a detailed sub-theory of social control has been elaborated by Talcott Parsons, in writings covering a period from 1942 to 1968. Smelser's use of the term should, in principle, be based in this work of Parsons as he claims grounding within Parsons' theory. However, it is possible that some of the criticism and hostility directed towards Smelser's work in the late sixties and early seventies is in fact a result of different meanings being given to the phrase social control, and related different value-orientations towards the term.

In 1978, Victor and Charles Lidz make passing reference to Smelser's work in an article proposing a major change in Parsons' overall theory. They argue that Parsons

erred in including the behavioral organism as one of his four subsystems of action (along with the cultural, social, and personality systems), and that this subsystem should be renamed the behavioral system and replaced with Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development.

The implication for Smelser relates to Piaget's view of cognitive change. The Lidzs maintain that Piaget's notion of cognitive assimilation and accomodation closely parallel Parsons' notions of control and conditions in social systems, and that Smelser has in fact used these concepts in his theory of collective behavior(1978:212). No one has, to date, taken up the implicit challenge in Lidz and Lidz to work through the implications of their theoretical revisions to Social Action Theory by returning to Smelser and determining precisely what he does with "conditions" and "control" and how that could be related to changes in Social Action Theory itself.

There were a number of other criticims of Smelser; two of these are closely related to the overall issue of control and conditions. One criticism was directed at Smelser's view of collective behavior participants as utilizing a "short-circuited" logic, a logic which jumps from a generalized component of social action to a specific situation. Currie and Skolnick insists this implies "irrational action"(Currie and Skolnick, 1970). [1]. Such a characterization would suggest the need for control, as a term such as irrational gives a weighting to the legitimacy of control rather than conditions or change elements in a social structure. It is possible that some other conceptualization of the logic of collective behavior participants would not weight what should be essentially a knowledge statement in favour of one or the other set of actors.

The second major criticism of Smelser was that his theory missed the dynamic relationship between mobilization and social control. Initially made by Jung in a book

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[1]Smelser himself never uses the term irrational, and states quite specifically "...(there is no assumption) that the persons involved in an episode are irrational..."(1962:11). Nevertheless, his text was widely read as deligitimizing social actors in collective behavior, delegitimizing them because of statements such as "We shall now investigate the peculiarities of those beliefs that activate people for participation in episodes of collective behavior"(1962:80

review in 1966, this criticism has contributed to a major redirection of work in the field to the study of resource mobilization (Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Zald and McCarthy, 1979). The result is a rather large body of literature which modifies Smelser's work but the implications of that research have not been incorporated into the theory. Rather, the body of resource mobilization literature tends to stand alone, or begin to move in different theoretical directions based somewhat more in political economic analyses rather than Social Action Theory.

It is possible that this body of recent literature could be partially incorporated into Smelser and Social Action Theory in general if the relations between conditions and control could be more clearly worked out in the theory. That incorporation might, of course, require revisions to Social Action Theory itself.

B. Methodology and Limitations of the Study

The procedure which will be followed in addressing this problem includes two major elements. In the ensuing chapters the theoretical issues will be further developed through a brief review of the collective behavior literature and the major theories which seek to explain collective behavior (Symbolic Interaction Theory, Social Action Theory, and Resource Mobilization Theory). Smelser's theory will then be subjected to a detailed criticism. This critique will be partly based on logical and theoretical considerations and partly on empirical challenges to his work derived from the literature. As a result of this analysis Smelser's theory as it relates to control and change will be presented in as succinct a form as possible, and some changes will be proposed to it. The revised theory will be referred to throughout the text as a Critical Theory of collective behavior.

In the second part of this work three case studies of collective behavior events will be presented, followed by an analysis and conclusions chapter. The case studies will address three levels of events in Smelser's theory; a riot, a social movement and a revolutionary process. In each case Smelser's predictive accuracy and the predictive

accuracy of the Critical Theory will be considered, and generalizations and questions will be developed which can be discussed in the concluding chapter.

All three cases are related, occurring within imbricated [2] social systems from a student residence (hostel) to the Northwest Territories state structure in Canada. That is, although three different concrete social systems are involved (a student residence, the Dene community in the Northwest Territories, [3] and the N.W.T. state) all are related through overlapping political-administrative structures. It is anticipated that it will be possible to address issues of control and change, or control and conditions, within each system and in the final chapter to generalize to the overall theoretical system.

Beginning and ending points for each of these case studies pose some problems. In the case of the riot, they can be relatively clearly identified, as this is a short-term event. In the case of the Dene Nation movement, the beginning is reasonably clear, but the Dene Nation continues to the present and selecting an ending point may seem somewhat arbitrary. However, in fact the changes as they relate to the theory can be followed through the next case study after 1981, by which time the Dene Nation is again actively engaged in electoral politics. Consequently, that date is taken as the final date for data on the Dene Nation. The third case, the development of the Northwest Territory state structure, also has a fairly clear beginning in decisions taken by the Government of Canada, but like the Dene Nation it continues through to the present. An ending point has been taken for this work, the year 1983, as by that time the change processes occuring in the state seem to have established a pattern which does not change markedly after that date. The next significant change which may prove to be

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[2]Imbricated social systems are overlapping systems, in which it is difficult to determine where one system begins and another ends.

[3]The Dene community in the Northwest Territories of Canada may be roughly characterized as a native Indian community incorporating the various Indian bands of the Mackenzie River valley. In fact, the use of the term Dene was an attempt to overcome the limitations of the term Indian, especially divisions among native peoples created by Federal law and the creation of an identity through European colonization (see, Watkins 1977 for a series of related essays).

another turning point in state development in the North will be the division of the Territories into two or more jurisdictions, and that has not happened to the present date (1987).

Because to some degree all of Smelser's theory is being addressed in this work, case studies have been chosen as a methodological approach to "testing" or exemplifying the theory rather than quantitative analysis. Although this approach should make it possible to propose theoretical revisions, on both logical and empirical grounds, there are some limitiations.

First, simple limitations of time and space have reduced the number of case studies to three; to fully test the theory a number of other case studies should be made. An alternative strategy of multivariate analysis based on selecting a number of cases in the literature and identifying a series of relevant variables, would be possible when the most critical theoretical variables are identified.

Secondly, even within the case studies selected there are inherant limitations. Drawing cases from essentially the same population implies that similar factors may be at work in all three cases. On the one hand this is an advantage for the theoretical work for Smelser's theory precisely claims that similar factors generate different types of collective behavior in different contexts; on the other hand it reduces the full range of variation covered by the theory.

In particular in these three cases there are preexisting cultural conditions which partially shape the collective behavior response, as they all involve Native peoples in the Northwest Territories of Canada. Some aspects of Smelser's theory relate specifically to the creation or generation of social groups who act back upon a social structure through collective behavior. These would be better addressed by case studies of active populations in which the members were not partially defined by a shared preexisting culture and social relationships, such as the women's movement or the farmer's movement in Canada. However, as Smelser specifically includes movements among

Native peoples in his examples, the cases selected are formally within the boundaries set by the theory.

In the following chapter the collective behavior literature will be briefly reviewed, and Smelser's theory will be located within that literature. This discussion will lead to chapter three in which Smelser's theory is critiqued in detail and a slightly modified theory, called a Critical Theory, is developed.

II. Social Theory and the Collective Behavior Literature

A. Introduction

A summary of the Collective Behavior literature in the social sciences may be conveniently divided into discussion of the object which is being studied,-- what is collective behavior and how does a researcher know that any given event should be included or excluded from this field-- and of the various theories which explain collective behavior. Although these divisions may be helpful for presenting the literature in the field, the two topics clearly interrelate as theoretical conceptions of the nature of collective behavior will not only influence explanation, but must be considered one element of any theory.

The literature on Collective Behavior in the social sciences is not a well-bounded or clearly demarcated field of enquiry. Consequently what should be included in, and excluded from, the field of study is problematic and in this sense the theoretical object of study is poorly defined. McPhail and Pickens (1975) go so far as to argue that the "explanandum" remains unknown and therefore the explanada are all of doubtful value. Gusfield(1978) argues in a similar vein that a focus on historical issues for their own sake results in a hodge-podge of objects of study, and consequently no possible theory. Hemple (1966) makes the general charge that types in the social sciences tend to be *ad hoc* rather than theoretically consistent, which implies that the Collective Behavior literature shares a general weakness with the rest of the social sciences.

The implication of these challenges to collective behavior literature is that even in a "naive" philosophical sense, as Schutz uses that concept from Kant (Grathoff, 1978:xii), the object of knowledge in collective behavior is unclear. Therefore theories of collective behavior are likely to be internally inconsistent, contradictory, and to be unable to provide either satisfactory interpretations or satisfactory explanations of these

events. It follows that even the facts of a given case, what is worthy of attention and what is true or false, may be quite different if that case is analyzed by different researchers (Schutz, 1964, Vol. 1, p.5).

Although this theoretical inadequacy generates problems on a wide scale in empirical research, it also implies problems in the development of the critical potential of collective behavior theory. As noted in the first chapter collective behavior theory ostensibly addresses fundamental issues in the social sciences, issues of order, control, change, and relations between social structure and knowledge or belief-systems. If it does so, it should provide an entry into "...the conditions for the possibility of knowlege" (Grathoff, 1978:xii, discussing Schutz and critical philosophy), and specifically into the social construction of the everyday world (Schutz, 1973) by laymen or ordinary actors as opposed to social scientists.

On the other hand, it can be argued that there is a core of agreement on the object of collective behavior analysis (in spite of major disagreement on terminology), and that there is a core theory grounded in naive empiricism. From this theory has developed one elaborated theoretical structure (based in Social Action Theory) and this elaborated theory presents the possibility of critical analysis. To identify this core theory, this chapter will define the concept "collective behavior", and will present the major explanations or theories of collective behavior. Collective behavior is initially taken as a term which includes short term events such as riots, longer-term events called social movements, and major social confrontations called revolutions. The basis for categorizing these three types of events together, as one field of study, will be elaborated in the course of analyzing these concepts.

B. Survey of the Collective Behavior Literature

Collective Behavior as Concept:Collective Action

Collective behavior, as a term, is used to refer both to a total set of events from riots to revolutions and specifically to short-term events such as panics. The introduction of the term is generally attributed to R.E.Park and E.W.Burgess in 1921. They included within the concept social unrest, the crowd, and a distinct formation called the public and types of mass movements or social movements. However, there is a significant literature which deals only with short-term events, calling them collective behavior events.

A number of writers have suggested alternative terms for the short-term phenomenon. Smelser considers the term collective outbursts (1962:3); Brown and Goldin (1977:188) attempt distinctions between collective action and collective behavior; R.W. Brown (1954) suggests mass phenomena, and 19th century writers use the term crowd or crowd behavior, or even crowd psychology, in early formulations of the field (LeBon, 1896; Taine, 1876; c.f. George Rude, 1959). Gusfield (1978:2) distinguishes collective behavior (...crowds, mobs, riots, panics, and fashion) from social movements and then recommends collective action as the generic term incorporating both.

The analysis of elementary, or short-term, collective events as part of a revolutionary process is exemplified in the work of Charles Tilly. He defines collective action as "...people acting together in pursuit of common interests" (1978:7) and for his own research focuses on "...discontinuous, contentious collective action: strikes, demonstrations, and tax rebellions rather than workaday ward politics" (1978:50). But for Tilly such action is always about power and politics, and it may be by governments or ordinary people.

Much of the work in the United States on elementary collective behavior is concerned with violent actions, such as urban riots. Tilly argues that his focus on violence is a methodological strategy, to increase the probability that there will be a historical record of any given event. For others however, it appears to be a value judgement taken in the context of contemporary American politics (*Vide*, Bienan, 1968; Connery, 1968; Graham and Gurr, 1969).

According to Quarentelli what binds these diverse contexts together is the notion of the emergence of new and temporary social groups. They are then not only intrinsically associated with social change, but with conflict "...the new or emerging groups are typically at odds or engaged in some kind of social struggle with other social groups and/or the contemporary social order" (Quarentelli, 1970:111).[4] Blumer describes such groups as "...indicative of a process of social change....(and having) the dual character of implying the disintegration of the old and the appearance of the new." (1946:196).

From these authors one can glean a definition of collective behavior as short-term collective actions, associated with the emerging of new (and temporary) groups. What distinguishes these actions from other short-term actions is either the fact that they are in some sense non-normative and therefore "strange" or the fact that they contest authority. Either of these meanings can be derived from the descriptions of such actions as "non-institutionalized".[5] Such collective actions may exist as isolated

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[4]Quarentelli presents this discussion to introduce a new category of emerging social groups, groups which he calls accomodative as opposed to conflict. These typically occur in consensus situations, such as natural disasters. His work is not further analyzed here as it remains peripheral to the field, but he has possibly identified a structure of new group formation and social change in situations not determined by structures of domination or authority.

[5] Chalmers Johnson, in discussing revolution provides a definition of violence which is close to the meaning of uninstitutionalized here. He defines a social system as social relations in which "...acting individual(s) possess stable expectations of the behavior and responses to behavior of identifiable individuals in a full range of culturally circumscribed social situations....(and therefore through mutual expectations actors can orient their behavior to each other). Violence is then defined as "...action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others" (1966:8). Perhaps violence is a poor term for such

phenomena in a social order, or they may be in some way associated with longer term collective action called social movements, or they may be part and parcel of social action aimed at overturning the state and transforming the social order. However, they represent one type of action people may take to contest authority.

Collective Behavior as Concept:Social Movements

The longer-term, related social phenomenon is generally called a social movement, although in specific circumstances it is designated a social revolution. Social movements may initially be viewed as alternative organized means of contesting authority, but they are defined in various ways.

The coining of the term social movement is generally attributed to Lorenz von Stein in 1850 (Heberle, 1951:4; Roberts and Kloss, 1974:12). However von Stein was addressing a particular intellectual and social context in which there were a multitude of theories of social change. In presenting his analysis of "the" social movement he wished to emphasize that these theories were no longer significant; rather what mattered would be "...the actual movement of the proletariat... the Social Movement" (Heberle, 1951:4). In spite of von Stein's work, and his influence on the development of Marx, Heberle argues in 1951 that the conventional approach to studying social movements remains a historical study of their ideas and theories, as if they were systems of philosophy (1951:1).

Heberle then defines a social movement as a social collective which aims to bring about fundamental changes in the social order, especially in the basic institutions of property and labour relations. Although he clearly contextualizes his definition and analysis within political sociology, that is in a concern with the roles and distribution of power, influence and authority within a movement and the relationship of a movement to

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[3](cont'd) behavior, but it is in this sense that collective behavior is "strange", uninstitutionalized, or non-normative.

political parties (1951:15), he argues that von Stein's focus on proletarian movements is no longer adequate. The concept must be able to deal with fascism, nativistic movements in European colonial possessions, peasant movements in Eastern Europe, and farmers' movements in the United States (1951:6).

Within political sociology Heberle define a social movement in such a way as to make it distinguishable from political parties and interest groups. He keeps central to his definition a collective attempt to reach a visualized goal, especially a change in patterns of human relations and social institutions (1951:6) but argues that one constituent part of a social movement is its idea system. This system promotes a sense of group identity and solidarity, so that a movement resembles a social class or a nation in its sense of we-consciousness. Social movements are also groups, albeit peculiar types of groups. They are not organized groups, but they may include organized groups within them, and the carriers of social movements range from primary groups to ethnic groups and social classes (1951:4-15).

Heberle complained that there were only four "contemporary" texts of social movements in North America when he was writing in 1951 (Cantril, 1941; Davis, 1930; Laidler, 1946; and Neuman, 1942) but the situation in the present-day is much different. The explosion of interest in social movements in North America in the 1960's has resulted in a substantial number of texts. However, these can reasonably be categorized as texts which represent Herbert Blumer and "the Chicago School"; texts which represent Smelser or some version of structural-functionalism or Social Action Theory; texts which analyze social movements as strictly a political phenomenon in which interactions with governments are crucial; and finally texts which are written outside of the sociological tradition and therefore do not precisely fit any of the above three categories. There is at least one theme which cross-cuts these three distinctions and which may be of greater consequence than them: the portrayal of social movement participants as irrational or deviant in contrast to ordinary or "normal" social actors.

Scott and Scott represent the extreme version of the deviant definition; Tilly perhaps exemplifies the extreme version of the "normal" stance, while Heberle is careful to make a statement about ideologies which may be interpreted in either way. [6]

Among recent theories, the Chicago or Herbert Blumer school can be represented by citing Blumer's own definition of social movements"...collective enterprises to establish a new order of life" (1951:169). Such enterprises could be general (widespread in the society with little organized activity) or specific (goal-oriented organized movements) or expressive movements (which seek merely to release tension and unrest). Blumer's examples of general movements include the women's movement, the youth movement and the labour movement (1969:8-10) which suggests that general movements take their name from the category of the population which is expected to benefit from the movement.

Specific movements, or goal-oriented movements with organization and leadership are further categorized by Blumer as reform or revolutionary. The first seek to change a limited area of society and the second to reconstruct the entire social order. Although Blumer does not make this clear, one must assume at least the possibility of two *specific* social movements which are are quite different and perhaps even opposing, which are products of the same general social movement. The

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[6]Scott and Scott state "...the activity of right wing extremists...(or)left wing revolutionary movements....fulfill certain basic emotional needs that are not met in a mass society that permits a maximum of disassociation" (1971:8). Tilly, in commenting generally on the inevitable political position which must be taken by any analyst of collective action says "...this book is generally hostile to the collective action of governments and favourable to the collective action of ordinary people (1978:6). Heberle, in trying to emphasize the importance of a sociological approach rather than applying standards of logic, of empirical validity, and of ethics to the idea systems of social movements says:

> "Social theories (apparently unsound may)...be underrated in their power of appeal to human beings whose sentiments, desires, and interests happen to be in harmony with them, and who consequently can be aroused by those ideas. In studying the ideas of social movements we shall take them as proclamations of aim and as expressions of will, rather than as statements of economic or political truth...(that is) we shall regard them as ideologies which have definite functions within social collectives" (1951:12).

circumstances under which one of these specific movments takes on a generic character, and is, for example, called *the* Woman's Movement is not addressed by Blumer because he does not address in detail the relationship between the two sets of movements.

Although expressive movements would seem not to be related to social change, for they involve non-instrumental actions, the relationship between expressive movements and sociol change is apparently clear to Blumer. He states that expressive movements occur when "the inability to release...tension in the direction of some actual change in the social order leaves as the alternative mere expressive behavior" (1962:23).One might infer that, as with general movements, one would be interested in the population category which carries such movements, for the stated goals of expressive movements seem to be of little importance to Blumer. This would seem to lead to a theory of social structure and perhaps "oppression", but Blumer himself does not follow such a direction.

It is well-known that Blumer's basic approach to sociology, and therefore to collective behavior, is symbolic-interactionist. A key then to understanding Blumer is the central concept of "the definition of the situation" and the view of the actor as actively constructing his world (Shibutani, 1970:vi). Although Kurt and Gladys Lang (1961, 1962); Enrico Quarentelli (1969); and Michael Brown and Amy Goldin (1973), among others, may be considered within this Blumerian tradition, the best known proponents of it are Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian (1972; also see Turner, 1964, 1969a, 1969b, 1970, and Killian, 1956, 1964, 1969).[7]

[7]It could be argued that Brown and Goldin carry Blumer's basic logic much further than do Turner and Killian, for they define collective behavior as "...interaction on an occasion in which a collective construction of the situation is threatened" (1973:178) and rely heavily on recent work in "situated action" to develop their theory. They have not, however, been widely recognized in the literature, at least partly because the development of the ideas in their text is very uneven.

Turner and Killian define a social movement as "...a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part" (1972:246). By adding the notion of resisting change they make it possible to discuss counter-movements and movements which attempt to halt an ongoing societal change as well as those which seek changes. Beyond that their use of the term collectivity, their emphasis on continuity or time, and their inclusion of the notion that a social movement is internal to the social order it seeks to change seem to be intended to more clearly specify Blumer's ideas rather than modify them.

However, Turner and Killian introduce new subtypes of social movements and modify fundamentally Blumer's notion of reform and revolutionary movements. The three types which Turner and Killian identify are value-oriented movements, or those which emphasize goals; power-oriented movements, in which the emphasis is on the development of power or acquisition of control by the movement; and participation-oriented movements in which the main concern is membership gratification. Turner and Killian's main point is that these three orientations must be present in all movements for success, but in many movements one of these orientations will take precedence over others, and this will shape the actions of the movement (1972:256).[1]

Turner and Killian recognize the general distinction between revolutionary movements, defined by their challenge to the fundamental values of the sociey, and reform movements defined by the fact they seek change within the existing value scheme (1972:257). However, they deny that these distinctions have meaning in categorizing social movements. They argue that it is first of all impossible for the analyst to make such a judgment of movements and secondly that all movements claim some of the societies fundamental values. However, it does make a difference if a

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[1] Stinchcombe, in an article on formal organizations, distinguishes between those which have a goal orientation and associated authority structures from those which are voluntary and must primarily hold membership by "some social cement (other than) ...force or money" (1973:53). He then identifies, in the analysis of organizations, processes similar to Turner and Killian's value and participatory orientation: he does not address power-orientation.

society or "public" *defines* a social movement as revolutionary. Thus Turner and Killian shift the notion of definition of the situation in Blumer from the situation as defined by social movement participants to include the social movement itself as defined or perceived by publics (1972:258).

The next shift in the literature which presents a somewhat innovative definition of social movements is the work of Neil Smelser, embedded in structural-functionalism or Social Action Theory. He provides a complete theory of collective behavior, an attempt at formalization which other writers have not broached.[9] Smelser defined collective behavior initially as "...mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action" (1962:8) and then somewhat more formally as "...an uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action" (1962:71). In 1968 he modified this slightly to "...purposive, socially oriented activity by which people attempt to reconstitute their sociocultural environment" (1968:96). Social movements are those types of collective behavior which focus on changing either values or norms (rather than facilities or mobilization into roles), and as such are of two types (value and norm-oriented). These types are very close, in fact, to Blumer's revolutionary and reform movements. Further, what Smelser calls "the spread of a generalized belief", which is one element of his explanatory system, may be construed as close to Blumer's general social movement.[10]

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[9]Turner and Killian, for example, state "(t)he treatment of social movements in this book will not essay a complete theory, such as Smelsers. It will ...(rather) examine movements comprehensively and from several perspectives" (1972:252). Other recent writers, critical of Smelser, such as Oberschall,1973; Gamson, 1975; and Zald and McCarthy, 1980, make no attempt to develop fully formalized theories.

[10]Turner and Killian describe Blumer's general movement as the development of a general set of value-orientations in a society, for example the egalitarian value which underlay the woman's suffrage movement and the abolitionist movement in the United States (1972:281). Blumer himself seems to imply both this definition and a slightly different meaning as he refers to general movements as "for example, the women's movement" (1969). This latter would suggest a general movement is an expression of discontent associated with a particular population category, and in Smelser's theory this would be "the population under strain"

Smelser does not use temporal or organizational criteria to distinguish between short-term events (or collective behavior events defined earlier as collective action) and long-term events or "social movements". The defining characteristic is the generalized belief held by social movement or collective action participants: if it is hysterical the result is a panic; if it is positive and fantasy-like the result is a craze; if it is hostile the result is a hostile outburst; and if it is norm or value-oriented the result is a norm or value-oriented social movement. Thus for Smelser, even more than the other theorists discussed here, collective behavior is a single class of phenomena to be explained with a single theory.

Although Smelser provides the framework, partially or in total, for a number of social movement studies since his work (for example, see Anderson and Dynes, 1973; Gamson, 1966 and 1968; Killian, 1972; and Pinard, 1971), by the 1970s a shift began which initially drew on Smelser and then largely neglected him. This is the shift to "resource mobilization" as the key problem in social movement analyses. This shift is represented particularly in the works of Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Oberschall, 1973 and Zald and McCarthy 1979. These authors tend not to define social movements *per se* but to define social movement organizations or challenging groups. Gamson, for example, defines a challenging group as "...the carrier of a challenge to the political system.... a formal or informal organization....capable of taking action, of holding meetings, planning, issuing statements, calling demonstrations, and raising money" (1975:14). Ash and Zald (1966), noting that most social movements are carried by organizations coin the term social movement organization to refer to such groups.

This literature tends to draw on collective behavior sources in sociology but also that version of conflict theory associated with game theory (especially in the discussion of strategic interaction, from Schelling, 1963) and concepts associated with the analysis

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[10](cont'd) (1962:385) which is subject to social movement participation.

of complex organizations (Perrow, 1972). To the extent that it emphasizes social movement organizations, such organizations may be treated as having the same problems as any other organization but differentiated by their goal of social change. Although most social movement literature locates social movement activity in the population, or among "the masses", this literature subtly shifts it partially to the actions of governments in that governments provide resources to social movement organizations and employ community organizers (Zald and McCarthy, 1975).[11]

As the Gamson quotation above implies, the resource mobilization approach incorporates a shift to the third category in the literature, social movement definitions and theories which focus on the political sphere. Heberle (1951) cited above might be seen as the recent beginning-point of this direction but many contemporary authors seem not to have read Heberle. Rather the protest movements of the 1960's in the United States (as well as elsewhere in the world) have given rise to a group of scholars particularly interested in relations between the population and the state.[12] This results in definitions ranging from Gamson's (*Supra*) focussing solely on groups which challenge the state in some way, through Tilly's which defines collective action as "...people acting together in pursuit of common interests" (1978:7). For Tilly the relations with the state are most important because in 18th and 19th century conflict, nation-state building was the main event, and in all cases "the nation-state won" (1978:187).[13] Roberts and Kloss clearly recognizing a debt to Heberle, define social movements "...as attempts at changing power and income (order) in reaction to social tendencies." (1974:15). This

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[11]There is an uncritical "empirical" dimension to this shift to government involvement in social movements. It is, to Zald and McCarthy, simply a fact not adequately recognized in social movement analyses. Yet precisely the concern of early work on Fascism was that one of the processes of totalitarianism was incorporating all citizen organizations and social movements within the regime (for example, see Gaetano, 1936; Heberle, 1951:291).

[12] This seems to represent at the intellectual level precisely what Mannheim(1938) described as a "political" generation.

[13] Tilly makes the interesting observation, in passing, that this statement may not be true of the remote regions of Canada, Australia, and Brazil, but it is true of Europe (1978:187).

includes, however, not just "state" power but political power defined in a way so as to include social and economic power.

Depending on the narrowness of the definition, this approach to social movement analysis tends to locate the field within political science, or at the very least, in the sociological tradition which focuses on the power dimension of economic and social relations. Roberts and Kloss (1974), Tilly (1978), and Roberta Ash (1972), for example, all claim some basis in Marxism, although they do not use Marxist categories in a rigourous fashion. By contrast, Gamson for example, (1968; 1975) cites writers like Robert Dahl and shares with others in the resource mobilization literature an interest in economic models of action such as Mancur Olson's (1965).

Collective Behavior as Concept:Social Revolutions

This shift to treating social movements as political activity, whether narrowly or widely defined, provides the linkage between social movements and social revolutions. Eisenstadt, for example, argues that the process of revolution should be seen as the most intensive, most violent, and best articulated of all social movements (1978:2). According to Eisenstadt,the image or concept of revolution consists of five elements:

1. the violent change of the existing political regime, its bases of legitimation, and its symbols.
2. the displacement of the incumbant political elite or ruling class by another
3. far reaching changes in all major institutional spheres primarily in economic and class relations - leading to the modernization of most aspects of social life, economic development and industrialization, and to growing centralization in the political sphere
4. a radical break with the past
5. the generation of a new man, or social identity, associated with the strong ideological and millenarial orientation of revolutions (Eisenstadt, 1978:2-3).[14]

[14] Eisenstadt has missed at least one element in the concept of revolution, for his "image" presented here could equally describe European powers colonizing

Russel, in his attempt to determine more precisely the role of the armed forces in successful revolutions, distinguishes between rebellions and revolutions. He defines rebellion as "...a form of violent power struggle in which the overthrow of the regime is threatened by means that include violence" (1974:56). Revolution is defined as "...substantial (or fundamental) social changes resulting from rebellion" (1974:58). This distinction between rebellion and revolution enables Russel to categorize both rebellions and revolutions as successful or unsuccessful (important for his main empirical question) and to distinguish between "...the social unit undergoing unheaval which enters into the explanation of the upheaval...the characteristics of the upheaval itself...and the consequences (of the upheaval) real or supposed" (1974:57; citing Tilly and Rule 1965:p 2-3).

David Bell selects two other terms to define revolution - protest and resistance. Protest is a challenge to decisions taken by a political order which implicitly accepts the legitimacy of that order, wheras resistance is an uninstitutionalized attempt to limit or destroy authority. Revolution represents the polar case of resistance, and occurs when resistance aimed at changing the entire system has become highly organized, violent, and widespread in participation (1973:2 -10). Bell prefers, in any case, the more general term "internal war" coined by Eckstein (1965) and specified by Gurr (1970), and concludes that revolution is a specific type of internal war.

A general problem throughout the revolutionary literature is that quite different types of events are classified as revolution. Durkheim's lessons on type-construction[15] have been ignored and very different "objects" or phenomena are analyzed as one. Crane Brinton's (1938) classic work on revolution is also a classic example of this problem. Theda Skocpol (1979) addresses this issue partially by distinguishing between political revolutions and social revolutions. Political revolutions "... transform state structures but not social structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict.... Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society

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[14](cont'd) indigenous peoples in Canada and elsewhere. I think what is lacking is the notion of revolutions as a process internal to a society, (as implied by the concept of internal war) and possibly some notion of revolution as mass-based. This latter is usually taken as distinguishing a revolution from mere circulation of elites, or a coup d'etat.

[15] Developed by Durkheim in *The Rules of Sociological Method* and *Suicide*.

including state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (1979:4).

Each of these definitions suggests possible links between the concept of revolution and social movements, and Tilly (1978), in his analysis of collective action, makes explicit a linkage between short-term acts of political protest and the overthrow of the state. The social movement mobilization literature also claims an interest in the tactics and strategies of participants in revolutionary activity, such as Lenin and Mao (Zald and McCarthy, 1980), and the focus on violent collective behavior in the United States fits rather well into revolutionary concerns.

However, there are definitions of revolution which take a slightly different tack those those defined above. Edwards maintained the political focus by defining a revolution as "...a change brought about not necessarily by force or violence, whereby one system of legality is terminated and another originated" (1927:2). Such a definition implies at least the possiblity of "revolution by the ballot box" or something similar. The problem of massive mobilizaton then might be, for example, garnering votes rather than raising arms.

Finally, within Social Action Theory revolution is only one possible type of value-oriented social movement (Smelser, 1962), for values are the fundamental bases of a society. John Wilson, drawing on Aberle, introduces the term transformative movement for social movements which seek a total change in the social structure (1973:23) and gives it the very same definition given by Blumer to the adjective revolutionary.

Collective Behavior as Concept:Summary

What all three of these sets of definitions (that is definitions of collective behavior or collective action, social movements, and revolutions) share is some notion of contesting authority, or contesting patterned processes of interaction usually referred to in terms of norms and values. To the extent that power is viewed as an

element both of authority and pattern, all definitions imply some process of challenging power. In this sense all definitions of collective behavior imply that it is associated with political processes in societies (Smelser, 1973:vi; Parsons, 1951:126).[16] However, some analysts prefer to narrow the definition to political processes in the sense of challenging or protesting the actions of the state. Such analysts either explicitly or implicitly confine their work to contemporary western state-dominated societies. [17]

These sets of definitions also share some notion of social change. This is almost tautologocal for the description of power as an element of authority or patterned behavior implies that a challenge to power is an attempt to create change rather than accept the status quo. If we accept Chamber's definition of violence as more accurately defining uninstitutionalized behavior (See footnote,*Supra* P.11), it is also apparent that any challenge to an existing pattern of interaction will, by definition, involve collective behavior rather than normatively oriented action.[18]

At the most elementary level, small-scale collective behavior events, are seen as both a result of rapidly changing social situations and also an element in change. In contrast social movements and revolutions are defined in ways which imply primarily a difference in organization (and therefore internal group discipline) and scale, but also in ways which imply explicit social change goals and large-scale consequences. (Smelser's theory is an exception to this generalization because of his focus on norms and values.)

Finally, most of these definitions imply that the participants in collective behavior are "ordinary people," or actors who do not hold authority in institutionalized systems. As such, they imply a society dichotomized on the dimension of authority and perhaps

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[16]Smelser says, in discussing the field of sociology, "...political sociology refers to the distribution and exercise of power " (1973:vi). However Lipset, in the same volume, defines the polity as "...that part of the social system which is responsible for allocating the resources and facilities of the society" (1973:402) wheras Parsons elsewhere defines political power as "...capacity to control the relational system as a system...." (1951:126). Parsons locates allocation of facilities in the social system as a function of the economic system (1951:125).

[17]Tilly, for example, says his basic model involves governments, contenders, the polity, and coalitions. As such it focuses on the modern west, collective action in the presence of a strong state, peoples whose social relations are not organized mainly around kinship, and it does not help us to think about exotic (sic) movements such as cargo cults (1978:52;10).

[18]Turner and Killian include the notion of resisting change in their definition. This does not negate the central concern with social change but only underlines the fact that a population may actively seek change or actively avoid it, through a social movement.

power.[19] Collective behavior is thus seen as action engaged in by the powerless or less powerful in an authority system, or perhaps by people outside the authority system. However,in some recent literature governments are seen as participants in the organizing of social movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1975) and a similar position is seen in the historical analysis of Facism (Neuman, 1942). Also some theorists consider authorities as engaging in collective behavior,such as Tilly (1978). These considerations will be left for further discussion in the next chapter which analyzes Smelser's explanation of collective behavior. It should be apparent however,that Smelser's concept of "uninstitutionalized" ought to make it possible to identify illegitimate actions of authorities as well as others.

Finally, it should be noted that the literature does not resolve the terminological ambiguity associated with the word collective behavior. Although it is not fully satisfactory, I will henceforth use the term collective action to refer to short-term events, social movements for certain types of long-term events, and revolutions for other types of long-term events. The term collective behavior will be used, in accordance with convention, to refer to the total field. The next section, dealing with theories of collective behavior, will consider further the "types" of collective behavior and readdress the division into collective action, social movements, and revolutions.

C. Explanation:Collective Behavior Theories

In the discussion above (*Supra*, p. 16) it was noted that social movement texts could reasonably be categorized into those which represent or symbolic interaction approaches, those which represent some version of structural-functionalism or Social Action Theory, those which analyze social movements as phenomena associated with government/population interactions, and finally those which are written outside of the sociological tradition. When discussing explanation or theory a fifth category, those which seek Marxist or neo-Marxist explanations of collective behavior should be added to to the list.

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[19]The precise relationship of power will be examined in discussing theories or explanations of collective behavior.

However, it is necessary to remove the category which focuses on government or state/population interactions, because this is a substantive rather than theoretical focus and as such it cross-cuts all explanatory schema.[20] In one sense the state/population focus is like the previously mentioned characteristic, viewing collective behavior participants as rational or irrational which can also cross-cut theoretical differences.This is partly an issue of "levels" of explanation. Such levels are generally considered to include individual or psychological explanations, the group interaction level often treated as the developmental path or "career" of a social movement, and the societal level or analysis of the social structural conditions which generate social movements (Gusfield, 1978).[21]

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[20]This may be interpreted as an analysis of all collective behavior as action within one social institution, the state. Alternatively, within Social Action Theory, it would be analysis within the political subsystem, or power subsystem, which may be more reasonable.

[21] Perhaps commenting a little further on the issue of levels will clarify why they cannot be incorporated into a classification of theories. At the individual level the collective behavior question may be framed as "why do some individuals participate in collective behavior events wheras others do not?" Joseph Gusfield, in a 1978 review article, calls these psychological theories. They would include the work of Cantril, 1941; Feuer, 1969; Hoffer, 1951; Keniston, 1971; and Toch, 1967. However social-psychological theories might also be placed here, as Park's "marginal man", Gurr's "relatively deprived", Smelser's "people under strain", and Marxism's "exploited classes under capitalism" are all more likely to participate in collective behavior than others in the population.

At the second "level of analysis", the group interaction level, the theoretical question is why collective behavior events take one or another developmental path as they interact with other groups and organizations in the society. This could, and often does, include interaction between social movements and the state. However the focus tends to be on the internal working of the event itself: this pattern is particularly common for analyses of social movements described in terms of their careers. (Anderson and Dynes,1973; Dawson and Getty, 1934; C.Wendall King, 1956; Ash and Zald, 1966). Those aspects of the movement which are generally addressed descriptively in such literature include its organizational structure, leadership and membership, strategy and tactics, and ideology (*vide*, Feuer, 1969; Heberle, 1951; Howard, 1974; Roch and Sachs, 1965; and Selznick, 1952). In the recent literature there has been a shift to including the movement's resource moblilization in this work (*Vide*, Gamson, 1968 and 1975; *Critical Mass Bulletin*, 1980; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Oberschall, 1973; and Zald and McCarthy, 1979).

The third level of analysis is the societal level, or under what social conditions movements of any type, or specific types, occur. Although all of the social-psychological theories referred to above could be included in this category, Gusfield (1978) notes that this level is associated with a specific use of structural functionalism found in the work of Neil Smelser. Michael Useem

It could be argued that a complete theory of collective behavior would encompass all three of these levels: analysis of individual participants, including their motivation, analysis of the event or organization itself including interactions with other organizations, and analysis of the setting in which the event occurs. This point will be left until later in this chapter but it is obviously related to precisely what it is about collective behavior that theorists wish to explain. That is, it is not merely the occurance of collective behavior events that may interest the investigator, it is a myriad of social phenomenoa associated with those events.

This leaves us then with three theoretical orientations in this literature: symbolic interaction; Marxist or political economic theories, and structural-functional theories.

Symbolic Interaction Tradition

As noted earlier this view of collective behavior is associated primarily with the work of Herbert Blumer and is exemplified in current work by Turner and Killian. It is generally considered a social-psychological approach to social action, based on W.I. Thomas's (1928:572) dictum that "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." According to Stryker (1973:512-513) it includes three essential elements: a focus on interaction, or reciprocal action between two or more acting units; a view of the person as shaped by subjective orientations and objective conditions; and finally the necessity of analyzing social relationships and the structures built up of such relationships through the eyes of the participants in these relations.[22] Although the image of a social structure, or external "objective conditions" is clearly present in such theory, the tendency is to emphasize internal subjective or mental states of actors and their

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[21](cont'd) (1975) calls for analysts to use Marxist categories to deal with social movements, because they can most adequately deal with social structure, and to some degree Roberta Ash (1972) and Charles Tilley (1969, 1978) attempt to use modified Marxian theory. In the terms used above, this represents a shift to a primary focus on the field or the social setting in which collective behavior events occur, rather than on either the event itself or the participating actors.

[22]Stryker argues these characteristics are shared by role theory, symbolic interaction, and exchange theory but concedes that he is emphasizing particular views of each which enable them to more easily merge with symbolic interaction theory.

influence on interaction and the deveopment of social structures

Herbert Blumer, for example, having defined social movements as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life, locates their origin in "...conditions of unrest, (deriving) their motive power on the one hand with dissatisfaction with the current form of life; and on the other hand, from wishes and hopes for a new scheme of living" (1969:8). The discontent begins in cultural drift, as new values are formed and especially new conceptions which people have of themselves and their rights. These new conceptions do not match their actual conditions. Add to this agitation, the development of espirit de corps and morale, and finally of a group ideology and one has a specific social movement. But locate the dissatisfaction in a situation in which social change is impossible, and one gets instead an expressive social movement.

Blumer adds to this discussion distinctions between revolutionary and reform movements, and especially ways in which these distinctions influence tactics.[23] But this brief summary of his ideas provides the core of early symbolic interaction explanation: an emphasis on subjective states creating motivation and a recognition that those subjective states are based in "objective" structural factors, but with relatively little attention paid to those structural factors. From this, analysis tended to move to the internal workings of social movement organizations, to issues of leadership and membership recruitment and tactics, not to external forces impinging upon the movement. Explanation was implied by the description although Blumer was careful not to phrase his work in causal statements. For him the important question was apparently why (or how) social movements come into existance.

From this, in the two decades that followed Blumer's formulation came a concern with "mass society" (Kornhauser, 1959) as the type of society most likely to engender discontent; an interest in collective and individual identity as an element of the subjective state of the actor (Klapp, 1969); and a focus on collective responses to natural disaster as the pure type of newly formed group (Lang and Lang, 1961; Quarrentelli, 1970). But the next attempt to detail a more complete statement was Turner and Killian in 1957, modified and developed somewhat further in 1972.

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[23] For example, revolutionary movements seek converts to their cause wheras reform movements seek to influence public opinion; revolutionary movements recruit among those they wish to benefit; reform movements generally do not.

Turner and Killian's theory is usually referred to as the theory of "emergent norms".[24] That is the primary explanation of collective behavior is the genesis of a new norm which governs social action. This is defined by Turner and Killian as the development of "...a common understanding as to what sort of behavior is expected in the situation" (1975:22) amd it both justifies the behavior and sets limits upon it. In regards to social movements this normative shift is seen by Turner (1969) as primarily a change in what is regarded as just and unjust in an epoch. He argues that the eighteenth century saw lack of political participation as unjust, the nineteenth century lack of material goods, wheras recent social movements are based on the idea that lack of personal dignity and identity are unjust. In each case the demand is that the societal institutions be modified to correct the injustice.

Emergent norms are associated with the transformation of what has previously been defined as misfortune to injustice. Turner and Killian are not precisely clear on which comes first, but this change to viewing the reality as unjust is associated with the reclassification of people from a category to a group, as they develop some sense of shared identity. Six factors contribute to group formation and the sense of injustice:

1. Group identity or category membership is held with pride, not shame.
2. Groups must not be *totally* dependent on a dominant group.
3. Groups need an external source of legitimation and support in regards to their injustice.
4. 'Intellectuals' must formulate the ideas of the group.
5. A comparsion group must be selected and unfavourable comparsions must be made.
6. An oppressor needs to be identified, so the situation can be attributed to human will (1972: 260-266)

Once the new norm is formed and a social movement develops, perhaps further proselytizing the norm in the public through its actions, the possible paths taken by that movement depend partly on how the public defines it. If it is defined as a reform

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[24]This does not seem to be related to Talcott Parsons' concept of emergence in social systems. If it were, the implication would be that Turner and Killian's "emergent norms" would be the result of world social systems becoming larger and larger, so that new elements emerged from the combinations.

movement, one whose objectives are in keeping with the fundamental values of the society, it will have legitimate means of action available to it and will have little opposition. If it is defined as revolutionary, one not in keeping with basic societal values, it will be violently suppressed and must use illegitimate means of action. [25]

Turner and Killian then discuss the need for movement goals and tactics to conform to movement ideology, and the conditions under which movements emphasize value, power, or participation objectives. Within this discussion a number of subtypologies are developed, and considerable discussion is devoted to leadership, organization, and membership committment of the movement. In keeping with the symbolic interaction notion of "interacting collectivities", they also discuss the formation of countermovements and the response of "the public" to the movement.[26] There is, however, no discussion of the reaction of authorities nor state institutions to social movements,[27] nor of any other form of social control as a response to social movements.[28]

This then represents the most recent statement explaining collective behavior from a symbolic interaction perspective. Although a number of the propositions could be formalized and treated as correlation statements, the underlying structure of the argument is that groups define themselves and others in specific ways, and from that under some circumstances arise social movements. The type of movement and the action-path available to that movement depends primarily on the precise mixture of self-definition (as expressed in the ideology and orientation of the movement) and other, or "public", definitions of the movement.

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[25]Turner and Killian actually create four types of movements in their analysis, respectable-nonfactional, respectable-factional, peculiar, and revolutionary. These determine the "...type and tactics of opposition.... the circumstances under which it recruits members, the degree to which it can operate openly through legitimate means, and many other factors." (1972:258-259). The reason the public defines a movement one way or another is not discussed by Turner and Killian.

[26]A public is specifically defined in Turner and Killian as "...a dispersed group of people interested in and divided about an issue, engaged in the discussion of the issue, with a view to registering a collective opinion which is expected to effect the course of some group or individual" (1972:179).

[27]There is a discussion of police action in riots (1972:160-175).

[28]Social control is discussed only in terms of the movements capacity to control its membership (1972:343).

This focus on perceptions in the symbolic interaction tradition is also associated with a set of theoretical statements which associate collective behavior with relative deprivation. This includes work by Davies (1962), Gurr (1970), and to some degree Aberle (1966). In each case the emphasis is on the subjective state of the actor, although recognition of external factors is usually taken into account. It is perhaps an easy shift to viewing the participant in collective behavior as having unusual mental states, which accounts for his participation, and therefore accounts for the growth and development of social movements(c.f.Toch, 1967, Hoffer,1951). Although this shift is made by many writing in this tradition, it is obvious from the above description of Turner and Killian's work that this would not be an accurate description of their symbolic interaction position.

The Marxist and Political Economy Tradition

Very few analysts of collective behavior claim explicitly to use Marxist theory, perhaps because a serious academic Marxist would view the sociology of revolution (or collective behavior and social movements) as bourgeois social science. However, Roberta Ash (1972) draws on Marxism for her analytical framework and Charles Tilly (1978) claims to favour Marxian modes of analysis. Although Rudolph Heberle would not be defined as Marxist, because his use of theoretical categories is based in political economic modes of analysis, he is included in this discussion as well.

Heberle's explanation of social movements relies primarily on the notion that certain ideas are appealing to certain sections of the population. He argues that "...major social and political changes will always affect the distribution of the societal income and wealth and thereby induce changes in the relative power position of the classes one to another" (1951:14). Therefore social movements will be supported by some classes and opposed by others. But what interests him is the structure of the movement itself (the differentiation of roles and the distribution of power, influence, and authority within the movement) and the relationship of the movements to political parties. He argues that the goals of a movement closely related to its structure and tactics, and so is the composition of the supporting social groups (1951:12,16). The

consequences or functions of social movements which interests him are the formation of a common will or political group will, and its contribution to the selection and training of political elites.

Social movements then are "carried" by certain social groups; religions, status groups, ethnic or national groups, and classes. The acceptability of certain ideologies is associated with ones class position plus generational differences as defined by Mannheim (1938). But social movements are also linked to political parties because "...all social and political movements aim directly or indirectly at change in the distribution of power or in the distribution of national income, or both" (1951:162). Heberle then discusses organization, strategy and tactics, and movement ideology.

Roberta Ash (1972), partly utilizes Marx's and Shils' centre/periphery distinctions, and defines social structures as the substructure, or level of production, plus existing class relationships and the distribution of power. Three "elites" are associated with this structure, economic elites control the productive forces; political elites control the political institutions and the class structure, and ideological elites or "cultural-ecclesiastical elites" presumably control idea systems. The precise relation of these elites to each other varies, but generally they offer mutual support.

Within societies four types of social movement phenomena occur:

1. Premovement phenomena which lack any analysis of the social order.
2. Prepolitical movements analyze the social order in exclusively non-secular terms.
3. Political movements are partly secular and seek ideological and structural change, but they don't recognize the class structure. These are reform movements.
4. Class-conscious movements have a perspective which includes the relations of production. They aim to change the relations of production and the political system and as such are revolutionary movements.

The last three are close to Blumer's notion of expressive movements, reform movements, and revolutionary movements but they are incorporated into a quasi-Marxist rather than a symbolic interaction framework.

In regards to explanation, Ash states that "ultimately social movements are caused by transformation of the material substructure, but it is more useful to analyze them as reflections of transformations of the relations of production...the social structural level"

(1972:11). Cause then consists first of "...a base of objective conditions rooted in the reality of satisfying material needs...." (1972:19), and this can be categorized in terms of systems of production, class relations, and political systems. But cause has also to do with the individual structuring of his experience, and it is this which links objective conditions to movement behavior.[19] Ash identifies two key points in this process, the point at which the individual frees himself cognitively from the previous ideology and the point at which he acts as a member of the movement.

Beyond this rather cursory pattern of explanation, Ash does not develop her theory in detail. She does note that class-conscious movements share her own analysis of the situation "...etics coincides with emics" (1972:21), and that movements are less likely to succeed if their goals are broad and they threaten the central institutions of the society, including the class structure. From that point in her own work she moves to description of a number of American movements.

Tilly, as the most recent collective behavior theorist claiming a Marxist orientation, argues that collective action is "...about power and politics" (1978:5). He describes his basic model as consisting of governments, contenders (challengers and polity members), the polity, and coalitions (1978:5). To this he adds groups, as populations with a common structure and shared beliefs, and social movements which are groups of people identified by their attachment to particular sets of beliefs.

His underlying cause is large-scale societal changes, specifically in the 18th century "...the conjoint expansion of capitalism and the rise of the state" (1978:6). But his components of collective action, which make up the immediate causal nexus are:

1. Organization. From this he obtains his definition of a group as a category (people who share a characteristic) linked by social bonds (or networks).

2. Mobilization. This is the process by which a group acquires *collective* control over resources needed for action, especially the factors of production.

3. Opportunity. The relation between a group and the world around it, including
   a. power
   b. repression / facilitation
   c. opportunity / threat

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[19]Ash refers to this as the phenomenology of social movements, or mapping actions "emically", that is in terms of the categories of the actors (1972:19).

Tilly develops a variety of typologies around this basic explanatory framework and develops a unit which he can quantify for his research purposes (a community-population day and a collective violent event, 1978:93-93). He treats government action as especially important because "...governments specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action" (1978:101). He accepts Hebbs' argument that strike activity is associated with the locus of allocation decisions in regards to resources, especially national income (Tilly, 1978:165, citing Hebbs, 1976:26-27). He also argues that a change in solidarity at the local level (communal vs market-based) influences the type of collective action, but he does not further formalize his system. He is content, apparently, to "historically understand" the year about which he writes (1765) and in spite of his claim to Marxism does not express a need for greater theoretical precision.

One may well argue about the Marxism of each of these authors: Tilly especially combines the approach of a political scientist to the polity and the state (from William Gamson, 1975) with ideas that sound very close to Turner and Killian, and Neil Smelser (to be discussed next). Ash identifies key Marxian categories rather better than Tilly, but does not push her analysis. Heberle would not claim to be a Marxist, disagreeing with Marx's focus on the proletarian movement, but he does work within a political economy tradition. Nevertheless, in these three authors, a patterned focus on social structures is apparent. That is, in contrast to symbolic interaction, the central explanatory terms are related to groups in interaction and to "group" or class bases of collective behavior. Underlying this is a theory of group formation, based in economic (productive and allocative) processes. There is also a suggestion that institutions, especially the state, are problematic elements of the social structure, but that idea is not analytically developed in any of these authors.

It is apparant that one is somewhat limited theoretically in a review of the literature which draws on sources defined as collective behavior and social movement literature. In spite of the resurgence of interest in Marxist scholarship in the sixties and seventies, there is not a major analysisis of collective behavior or social movements which clearly presents and develops Marxist theory. However, one recent writer on revolutions recognizes the structural basis of Marxism as a valuable tool in her work.

Theda Skocpol, in *States and Revolutions* (1979), describes briefly the classical Marxist position before proceeding into her analysis. She says:

> Marx understood revolutions not as isolated episodes of violence or conflict but as class-based movements growing out of objective structural contradictions within historically developing and inherantly conflict ridden societies.... (T)he key to any society is its mode of production or specific combinations of...forces of production (technology and the division of labour) and class relations of property ownership and surplus appropriation.... The basic source of a revolutionary contradiction in society...is the emergence of a disjunction within a mode of production between the social forces and social relations of production....(T)his disjunction expresses itself in intensifying class conflicts... and a dynamic basis for the growth of the unity and consciousness of each proto-revolutionary class through on-going struggles with the existing dominant class (1979:7).[10]

Skocpol much prefers analytical concepts derived from Marxism, especially an emphasis on social structural change and class conflict. She explains her preference this way:

> The Marxist conception of class relations is rooted in the control of productive property and the appropriation of economic surpluses from direct producers by non-producers is... an indispensable theoretical tool for identifying one sort of basic contradiction in society (1979:13).

She also recognizes value in the resource mobilization approach, in its attempt to identify conditions under which subordinate or dominant classes may successfully fight for their goals. But she sees all of the available approaches, including Marxism, as excessively voluntaristic, as neglecting international structures and world historical processes, and as having an inaccurate conception of the state. The state must be conceived of as "(an) administrative and coercive organization...potentially autonomous from (though of course conditioned by) socioeconomic interests and structures" (1979:14).

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[10] Skocpol identifies three other major theoretical thrusts in North American sociology in regards to revolution. The first she calls aggregate-psychological theories, characterized by Tedd Gurr's work; the second she calls systems-values-consensus theories, characterized by Chalmers Johnson; and the third political conflict theories exemplified by Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution*. In the present work aggregate psychological theories are not discussed; Johnson is replaced by Smelser, and Tilly is discussed in the context of state/population interaction.

The Structual-Functional Tradition

Structural functional theory dominated North American sociology from the 1940's to the 1960's (Demereth and Petersen, 1967). The phrase is often used interchangeably with Social Action Theory and Systems Theory, as all three are associated with the name of Talcott Parsons. The central exponent of this tradition in the collective behavior literature is Neil Smelser. He defines his work as within the theory of action as explicated by Parsons and Shils, which at the level of interaction or relations among actors involves social systems (1962:24). Others, however, define Smelser's work as structural/functionalism (for example, Gusfield, 1978) and for the purpose of this work the terminological ambiguity can be permitted to stand.

Smelser will be taken as the central text here, but the modifications proposed by Oberschall (19723), Gamson (1975), and Zald and McCarthy (1975, 1980) will also be discussed. Wilson (1973) will be presented as an attempt to develop Smelser's paradigm slightly, although the changes are somewhat less significant than those added to Blumer by Turner and Killian (*Supra*, pp 19-21). This discussion is intended to introduce Smelser, to make it possible to compare his work with the other theorists described so far; his theory is described in detail and extensively analyzed in Chapter Three.

As noted above (*Supra*, p.17) Smelser's definition of collective behavior is "uninstitionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action" (1962:96). Smelser's "master proposition", or main causal statement, is that "...people under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief" (1962:385). Thus for Smelser it is structurally induced "strain" which motivates or energizes people to act to change that structure: his theory explains why they actually do or do not act given the presence of strain, and why their actions take various forms (his five types of collective behavior).

Smelser explicitly grounds his work in Social Action Theory, so that his theory formally links with Social Action Theory at almost every point. Of the theorists who have written on collective behavior, he is the only one to work systematically within a

theoretical framework in this manner, so that criticism or development of his work reflects on a much larger body of theory and not only on collective behavior theory. His explanatory system consists, then, of viewing the analytic elements of the social order as values, norms, roles, and facilities and explaining the development of collective behavior as a result of six "value-added" determinants which occur within that social order. Specific values[31] must be registered on all six determinants for collective behavior to occur: when they are registered the scheme presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for collective behavior.

The determinants, or variables, in Smelser's value-added explanation are structural conduciveness, structural strain, the spread of a generalized belief, a precipitating event, mobilization, and social control. Strain and conduciveness are characteristics of the social structure; a generalized belief provides a population with an explanation of the strain and suggests an appropriate course of action; a precipitating event confirms that belief or intensifies the social structural determinants; mobilization consists of actions taken by people to promote collective behavior and social control consists of actions taken by authorities to prevent it.

If certain values hold on each of these determinants the population under strain will attempt to change facilities (approximately equivalent to resources) through either a panic or a craze; if other values hold they will attempt to change mobilization into roles through a hostile outburst, or change the norms of the social order through a normative-oriented social movement, or change values through a value-oriented social movement. Smelser uses the term social movement only for the norm and value-orientations, but the traditional usage of the term could probably include all five of his orientations. For Smelser,[32] the typology is interpreted within a theoretical system

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[31]Values is used in three different ways in this paragraph and the reader must identify the meaning from context in each case. When Smelser speaks of a value-added explanatory system, he does so as an analogy to manufacturing in which economic value is added to an item at each stage of the manufacturing process. The reference to "values" being registered on each of the determinants uses the term in the way it is used in statistics, to refer to the different possible measurements on a variable. The term values as used in Social Action Theory, and as a component of action, refers to values as ultimate goal states or principles of action in a human group.

[32]Smelser is almost unique in this respect. Ash is the only other theorist to attempt such a typology.

and whether or not the general population calls the behavior a riot or a social movement is less important. Smelser's theoretical system could also, in principle, be applied to a social organization of any size, so it is possible to speak of a hostile outburst or a value-oriented movement in a unit as small or smaller than a family and as large or larger than a nation-state.

The analytic or conceptual framework is much more developed in Smelser than the observational framework. For example, although he refers to religious and political social movements as value-oriented, and discusses authorities (especially governments) engaging in social control, there are few places where linkages between observational and theoretical categories are detailed. Thus, although his concrete historical actors are the people under strain in a social system, his analytic categories do not make it easy to identify this population until they participate in collective behavior. In this sense he is somewhat like Blumer who hints at a theory of group relations and perhaps oppression in his work, but does not detail it.

Smelser could be described as drawing on the symbolic interaction tradition, and greatly expanding Blumer's work by adding social structural elements and an explicit recognition of forces of social control external to the social movement. In fact, Social Action Theory could well be described as the merging of the concept of social structure and a symbolic interaction focus on subjective states of the actor. However, the major criticism of Smelser's work from theorists who partially share his theoretical orientation comes from those who argue that he misses the relationship between mobilization and social control. In Stryker's terms (*Supra*,p. 26) he misses a central element of symbolic interaction which is the focus on interacting individuals or collectivities.

This criticism was first made by Jung in a book review in 1966, but apparently arrived at independently by Oberschall in 1973. It is the basis of the currently most popular direction in the collective behavior literature, the so-called "resource mobilization" approach. Oberschall says that "...(Smelser) does not have a genuinely dynamic process model... (and) does not realize that the interaction between mobilization and control processes generates the dynamic elements of conflict and collective behavior..." (1973:23,24). The solution is to view the process of mobilization and social control as one of resource management. Thus "...(m)obilization refers to the

processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals. Social control refers to the same process, but from the point of view of the incumbants being challenged" (Oberschall, 1973:78).

This perspective is now widely reflected in the collective behavior literature, and in spite of its base in Smelser is seen as an alternative to "traditional collective behavior theories" (*Critical Mass*, 1980). It is incorporated into work done by political scientists where the focus is state/population relations (Gamson, 1975) and collective vs personal goods (Fireman, 1980). For writers like McCarthy and Zald it may include access to state funds as a "resource" (1973) and for Tilly (1978) it is considered part of his "Marxist" analysis. To some degree the shift is from Smelser's implicit question (how do "we" control collective behavior) to the implicit question, how do "we" succeed in collective behavior.[33] But all of this writing remains essentially within North American structural-functionalism, and as Oberschall (1973:28) indicates continues to implicitly or explicitly use Smelser's accounting scheme.

John Wilson attempts to modify Smelser by incorporating his work into a view of societies as "...experienc(ing) the constant turmoil of dialectical change".The problem then is explaining how one social form metamorphoses into another, and explaining in lawlike terms the causes and consequences of this metamorphosis (1973:4). Wilson would seem then to be proposing an alternative to the resource mobilization literature, an alternative which nevertheless addresses the static view of society held by Smelser. However, he in fact shifts to a focus on social movements themselves, analyzing them partially within the structural/functional problems of adaptation, goal-attainment and integration, but adding other organizational issues (for example, committment and tactics). [34]

Chalmers Johnson, writing on revolution about the same time as Smelser was writing (1964, 1966) attempts to use social systems theory to explain revolutionary

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[33]It is apparent that academic concern has shifted from an interest in analyzing organizations such as fascist movements to analyzing what are called progressive political movements.

[34]Wilson does suggest a typology of strategy and goals, borrowed from Aberle, which enables one to recognize differences between attempting to change the social structure directly and attempting to change individuals through proselytizing, and attempting partial or total changes. The "types" of social movements then are transformative, reformative, redemptive, and alterative (1973:23).

events. He argues that one cannot rely on values alone for explaining the tensions which develop in a revolutionary society, but rather must understand the relationship between the value-system and the division of labour, or the environmental adaptation. The division of labour structures interests differentially in a social system. Latent interests are those which occupants of subordinate status might have if the value-system did not justify their position in the hierarchy wheras manifest interests relates to the interest in preserving or altering a structure given a status quo self-consciously perceived as part of an interstratum conflict relationship (Johnson, 1966:38).[35] When values and the social division of labour are out of synchrony, the elites may make changes to bring them back in line. If elites do not do this, they lose their authority and an "accelerator" may move the society to revolution. Salert (1976:93) suggests this causal analysis would be improved if Johnson substituted Smelser's concept of precipitating event for his term accelerator.

Structural/functional theories of collective behavior incorporate the "definition of the situation" and other elements of symbolic interaction into a model which includes social-structural conditions which contribute to collective behavior events. Social structure is initially defined analytically using Parson's categories (values, norms, roles, facilities) but there is a shift in the resource mobilization literature to redefining social structure in terms of groups contesting power and resources, and to some degree groups relating to a single social institution (the state). This leads to Charles Tilly for example, defining himself as a Marxist, although he continues to implicitly use the "value-added" explanatory schema of Smelser. This also suggest the possibility that Marxist (or other structural) categories could be used in Smelser's theory in place of his Parsonian categories and the theory might be improved. Roberta Ash's work provides some possible clues, as does Chalmers Johnson. Neither, however, addresses this possibility directly and the original strengths of Smelser, his logically consistent interpretive theoretical scheme is lost in their work.

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[35]Johnson considers these definitions of latent and manifest interests as equivalent to Marx's notion of class consciousness (1966:38).

D. Summary

The previous chapter has argued that a number of central problems in sociology are also central problems in collective behavior and has introduced them as problems of legitimacy and knowledge, social order, social control, and social change. This chapter has presented in some detail the social science literature on collective behavior, first in terms of its definition of the object of analysis and secondly in terms of the various explanations or theories available. The three theoretical approaches discussed above are the major ones drawn upon by analysts of collective behavior. In spite of the fact the variety of literature discussed (and a much wider variation could be drawn upon if the sole purpose were discussion of various approaches to collective behavior) implies there is not a single theoretical paradigm utilized by researchers, the primary methodological approach implies "normal science" as defined by T.S. Kuhn (1962). That is, the epistemology is that of positive science, the 'object' is considered 'known' and the research problem is to specify correlations and from that to develop theories.

This is particularly true of those writers who move from Smelser's theory to a political science "systems theory" of collective behavior and state interactions, but it is also true of those who follow Tilly and his Marxist claims and the resource mobilization approach in general. Pinard's 1971 study of the rise of Social Credit in Quebec, Gamson's 1975 attempt to identify the correlates of success and failure in social protest, and Tilly's 1978 attempt to account for collective action in Western Europe and North America are perhaps the clearest examples of this process. However, studies such as Russell's (1974) analysis of the role of the armed forces in revolution and Schwartz's (1976) description of agrarian protest in the southern United States also exemplify such a methodology, even though they deal much more explicitly with social structure. Further, the discussion of so-called "solidarity" vs "breakdown" theories, which draws on Tilly (Snow et al, 1980; Useem, 1980) involves a process of correlating one social structural characteristic with collective behavior occurrances.

This "normal science" methodology and epistemology is dominant in spite of the fact that many of the contemporary writers on social movements claim that their interest is fueled by their own participation in the 1960's social movements. Gamson

(1975:134) claims this as a general phenomenon for contemporary intellectuals, effectively reorienting the study of collective behavior, wheras Schwartz (1976:ix), for example, simply states it as his own experience and Russell (1974:1) expresses his concern, as a South African, with overthrowing that regime in the introduction to his work. Yet, precisely what a "normal science" approach neglects is the subjective element of knowledge development, the image of knowledge as process.

Perhaps because of this normal science methodology there is considerable agreement among the various theories. Although definitions vary somewhat, the process of orienting to "the object" of study apparently ensures that the various phenomena anaylyzed under the rubric "collective behavior" will share certain characteristics. Specifically this behavior is in some sense "unusual", not everyday behavior, and not normative behavior. Being involved for two hours in a riot is different from being involved for two hours in a baseball game; participating in a social movement is different from participating in a voluntary organization; and joining in the revolution is different from forming a new political party. The term uninstitutionalized is recognized as a term which in some sense covers this difference, although it has not yet been intensively analyzed.

Secondly, this behavior is recognized as not individual but collective. Thus, it is not indivual uninstitutionalized actions which are of interest to these theorists (they are presumably considered deviant or perhaps creative activity), but action in which a number of people participate in concert. To the extent theorists are interested in the origin of these groups they look partly to social structure - for the genesis, for example, of social classes or populations under strain -and partly to the changing consciousness of actors as they develop shared definitions of the situation. To the extent that theorists are interested in the ongoing existance, strengthening, and perhaps capacity to act of these groups, they generally focus on internal dynamics of the collectivity.

Thirdly, the acting group in collective behavior is generally seen as "acting on" the social structure. Rather than accepting the nature of institutionalized social reality and seeking goals within it, they turn upon that institutional structure and seek to change it in some way (or perhaps to stop it from changing, as in countermovements). A residual

category of collective behavior is often identified here, such as Blumer's expressive movements or Smelser's craze and panics. In these cases all the other conditions for change-oriented uninstitutionalized action are present but some process (not identified in Blumer, specific social control actions in Smelser) does not permit the full development of collective behavior. In such cases change-oriented action is blocked and the action seems purposeless or "merely expressive".

Fourth, there is a dynamic interaction implied in all of these theories, although its precise nature and the extent to which it is recognized varies from writer to writer. For some, such as Tilly, the dynamic seems to be primarily between the state and population segments. For others, the dynamic is between classes or groups with different interest-bases in a given social structure. But the basis of the dynamic is that there are social actors and collectivities who do not wish the social order to change, and who therefore support social control, wheras there are others who do wish it to change and support that. The relationship to the Lidzs' position in the first chapter(*Supra* p. 3) is apparent and it is precisely in this literature that collective actors are conceptualized as addressing the phenomenon of structure or organization in the society. There is also a "second-level" dynamic, as Janowitz's position is reflected by those who see the state as disinterestedly maintaining social order, not siding with either change or "control" (continuity of an existing social organization), but supervising the conflict which occurs between its citizens.

Finally, there is *not* agreement on how to conceptualize social structure. It is at this level the major differences in theory occur. For writers like Tilly it is conceptualized in terms of organized groups of actors, but a type of structure which includes an institutionalized state underlies his terminology and explanatory system. For symbolic interactionists it is "out there", and incorporated into theory only implicitly. For political economists it is grounded in material or economic forces and the relations of those forces to power relations. Thus Heberle can write of the allocation of power and resources. For Social Action Theory it is analytically conceived as values, norms, roles, and facilities or, at another level, cultural systems, social systems, personality systems, and adaptive systems. All of these imply somewhat different views of social change, of what must be changed before one can distinguish between change within a system and

change of a system.

However, of the theories analyzed, only Smelser's holds the possibility of being a fully interpreted theoretical system as Hempel(1966) uses that phrase. Only Smelser's typology is clearly developed as an internally (theoretically) consistent typology, although clear guidelines for interpreting it observationally are not provided. The distinction between short-term events and social movements or revolutions is unimportant in Smelser, except to the extent they incorporate differences in orientation between acting groups (norm-oriented or value-oriented, for example). This does not, of course, imply that there are no problems in Smelser's theory, but only that his work is a place to begin to address the problems raised in the introduction. In the next chapter his theory will be intensively analyzed for flaws and weaknesses and proposals will be made both for operationalizing it and transforming it.

Further of all the theories described Smelser is the only one which elevates social control to an explicit explanatory concept located outside the collective behavior event. As such Smelser provides a means of analyzing control/change relationships and the role of collective behavior and the state in each. Yet at the most general level his theory does not incorporate the state as a central theoretical construct, which gives it an advantage over the resource mobilization and narrowly defined "political" theories.[34]

Although considerable reanalysis of Smelser's work is necessary to make this clear, there is also an element in his theory which makes it possible to consider social change as a consequence of collective behavior activities, and this is the element of mobilization. But more than that, as his work is based in a social theory there is a clear definition of social change, from fundamental value transformations to shifts in norms --in fact 'change' can occur at a number of levels. In the following chapter Smelser's theory will be described in detail, then analyzed. Out of this critical work will arise possible modifications.

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[34]Smelser does shift to nation-state dominance in his own analysis, but that is not an element of his theory per se.

III. Smelser's Theory:Description and Critique

A. Introduction

As noted earlier, Neil Smelser's theory of collective behavior is firmly embedded in the 'grand theory' of Talcott Parsons. Smelser himself call this theory Action Theory, others refer to his work as structural-functional, but whatever it it called it can only be understood within the larger context of Parsons' theoretical work.

In this chapter Smelser's theory will be briefly described and linked to Parsons' work, then developed in detail in a process of analysis and criticism. The primary source is his 1962 book *The Theory of Collective Behavior* but slight modifications can be derived from *Essays in Sociological Explanation* (1968), from Smelser's response to Currie and Skolnick in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* (1970), and from his chapter in his edited introductory sociology text (1973).

The critique and elaboration of Smelser's work will be based on changes in collective behavior theory since the publication of *The Theory of Collective Behavior*, changes in Social Action Theory in the 1970's, and logical problems in the theory identified by this writer. In addition, problems related to operationalizing concepts will be noted and possible solutions proposed.

Before addressing the six determinants which form the core of Smelser's theory, we need to have a general or overall understanding of it. This understanding will be developed below in the description of a formal theory, within a social action orientation, providing an explanation of all forms of collective behavior (from short-term events to revolutions). The chapter will then turn to analyze this as a causal theory, in which six 'value-added' determinants together constitute a necessary and sufficient causal structure for the various types of collective behavior.

At the conclusion of this chapter an alternative theoretical structure will be presented, based on the preceeding discussion. It will provide an interpretive framework for the ensuing case studies, and the case studies themselves will test the explanatory power of this theory. Although I have used the term "alternative" theory here, it may well appear to be more a modification and elaboration of Smelser, for it will not stray far from Social Action Theory.

As a formal theory, Smelser is precise about his definitions, basing them in social action theory itself. The charge that collective behavior theory is ad hoc, atheoretical, and directed towards problems derived from historical events and interests (Gusfield, 1978:122-124), does not apply to Smelser, but one consequence is that many of his definitions are not fully intuitive.

Thus, the overall definition of collective behavior is "...an uninstitutionalized mobilization for action in order to modify one or more kinds of strain on the basis of a generalized reconstruction of a component of action" (1962:71). Slightly less formally Smelser also defines collective behavior as "... mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action" (1968:8), and notes that he takes the defining characteristic as "...the kind of belief under which behavior is mobilized" (1962:383). [37]

Three terms in these definitions indicate most clearly Smelser's relationship to Social Action Theory. The term uninstitutionalized implies that mobilization falls outside normatively patterned mobilization or action. This term is contrasted to institutionalized which is a core concept in Social Action Theory. Parsons describes institutionalization as "...an articulation or integration of the actions of a plurality of actors in a specific type of situation in which the various actors accept jointly a set of harmonious rules regarding goals and procedures. (That is) institutionalized action exists when each actor in the situation does, and believes he should do, what the other actors whom he confronts believe he should do" (Cited in Mayhew, 1982:117). [38]

The term strain as used in Smelser's definition means strain on, or a disjunction between, components of action, and the defining belief is also based on the components of action. These components will be described in the discussion of the six determinants, but they make up the central structure of Social Action Theory, clearly displaying Smelser's debt to Parsons.

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[37]Smelser actually presents three slightly different definitions, and states his main causal statement differently again. Collective behavior is defined as above but in 1968, in an attempt to simplify perhaps, he defines it as "...purposive, socially oriented activity by which people attempt to reconstitute their socio-cultural environment" (1968:96). Expressed causally, in what Smelser calls his master proposition, Smelser says "People under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief" (1962:385).

[38]The general critique of this concept occurs later, *infra* p.50.

Parsons' theory, as grand theory, attempts to account for social action at many levels. Initially he defined three subsystems of action, the cultural system, the social system and the personality system. He later added the behavioral organism as a fourth system, and identified each system with a specific function in the over-all system of action. These functions are latency or pattern-maintenance (the cultural system); integration (the social system); goal-attainment (the personality system); and adaptation (the behavioral organism) (Parsons, 1966:6-28).

Chandler Morse describes Parsons' theory as a theory of goal-oriented action occurring within "a system of social action". The four subsytems which make up this system are described as follows by Morse:

1. The personality system of at least two individual actors, consisting of internalized 'need-dispositions' and therefore of potential motivated commitments to various goals and patterns of behavior.
2. The social system, or structure of social organization, consisting of defined roles and their associated and institutionalized...role expectations....
3. The cultural system, consisting of knowledge, beliefs, ideas...values, norms...etc.
4. An object world or 'situation of action' which has certain properties. These properties are of two kinds, cognitive, (what the object is), and cathectic (what the object is good, or bad, for) (Morse, 1976:105).

The first three systems are seen as necessarily mutually consistent, within some degree of tolerance. But the cultural system assures that all members of an action system will "see" objects as possessing essentially the same properties, so the object-world is also consistent with the other three systems (Morse, 1976:105-106; also see Parsons, 1951:6). However, the object world is more complex for it includes culture, social action, and physical objects to the extent that all three are treated as objects of orientation (Parsons, 1951:4).[39]

The fourth subsystem initially called the behavioral organism by Parsons has been modified as a result of a proprosal by Lidz and Lidz that it be replaced by incorporating Piaget into the General Theory of Action at that point, that it be redesignated the behavioral system, and that the human organism *qua* organism be treated as environment

[39] To the extent that such objects are considered by an actor as means to an end they are termed facilities (or sometimes resources) by Parsons (1951:72, 119, 548).

to the general system of action (Lidz and Lidz, 1976:210-212). Parsons apparently agreed with this formulation (Johnson in Bourricaud, 1981:xiii; Parsons, 1978:353).

This implies a partial agreement with Morse's description of the fourth system as "the object world" (*supra*), but the focus is on a cognitive orientation to that world rather than the world itself, and there is no reference to a cathectic orientation. In particular the Lidz brothers argue for a convergence between the concepts of control and conditions in Social Action Theory (from Parsons, 1966:p 9-28) and the concepts of assimilation and accommodation in Piaget's theory of cognitive development. In Piaget's theory if the internal structure ("schemata") completely determine the shape of external images, it assimilates those images; if the schemata change to reflect those external images it accomodates them. If the schemata are simply transformed to be the same as external items, imitation has occurred (or reverse assimilation). Bringing these two sets of ideas together (Parsons and Piagets) would imply that social system "control" could be interpreted as assimilation, wheras a response to external "conditions" could be interpreted as accomodation. They also suggest the state of the system or its structure may be treated as an analogue in social systems for organization (of schemata) in Piaget (1976:211).

The Lidzs see Smelser's work in collective behavior as relevant to this development, but they do not develop the ramifications of this possibility (1976:212). The analogues, as the Lidzs clearly recognize, make it possible to discuss social control and social change in social systems with a much more sharply defined set of concepts than has previously been available in Social Action Theory. Thus "...both pairs of concepts (Piaget's and Parsons') are intended to deal with problems of a system capacity for openess to, or resistance against, change" (1976:212). The Lidzs' work then suggests a parsimonious system-framework for analyzing social control and social change in Parsons and for rethinking Smelser's analysis of social control and mobilization.

Although Smelser's development of social control is in some respects weak, Parsons himself has done considerable writing on social control, and has a fairly clear-cut model of what that term involves. His model actually contains two elements, and implicitly a third. These elements are:

1. beliefs about a population to be controlled and the population controlling,
2. an appropriate pattern of social relations or role structure when control is the desired outcome, and
3. power held by the controlling population.

The idea of "power" is implicit and its source is not developed in this area of Parson's work, but the belief systems and social organization are clearly derivable from Parson's descriptions. By reversing the value of each of the variables in Parson's description, it is possible to identify a set of beliefs and role relations which may not be appropriate to social control and may therefore be appropriate to social change situations.[40] That is, it is possible to identify beliefs and social relations which may make it more likely that external conditions will modify the social system rather than be assimilated to it.

The conception of social control in Parsons specifies that one actor or collectivity (Ego) is morally superior to the other, and therefore more responsible, more concerned about the total system (collectively oriented). He is permissive in relation to the other (or as a member of one collectivity to members of the other collectivity), permitting behavior that he would not accept from other "normals" in the society. But his total orientation in this regard is contingent, that is dependent upon the other's agreement that he must change and that his period of irresponsibility is only temporary. Ego also assumes the right to sanction Alter's behavior.

The other, Alter, accepts the definition of himself held by Ego and accepts that he is "irresponsible" in the relationship. He also accepts that it is he who must eventually change, and that he must be isolated and insulated while this process of change is occurring.[41]

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[40]The description of a control system is derived from Parsons; the modifications made by reversing values have been done by this author. I have not seen a published article which deals with the implications of treating Parsons' work this way, but this is intended as an attempt at theoretical elaboration which may or may not coincide with observation. See Assheton-Smith 1975 for a more detailed discussion of these models.

[41] Isolation means separation from others like the person being controlled, so he (they) cannot form a shared alternative definition of the situation; insulation means separation from others unlike the person being controlled so that the definition of the situation held by the person being controlled cannot be spread to others.

Such a system is free of conflict, but if Alter denies that he needs to change he will, by implication reject the validity of the beliefs about himself and Ego. He will presumably see himself as collectively-oriented as is Ego, or possibly redefine Ego's interest in the interaction as self-interest. He will reject the social organization which isolates and insulates him.

If Ego maintains his original view that Alter needs to change, he will presumably move to a repressive stance against Alter, for his earlier permissiveness was dependent upon Alter's co-operativeness. Such a system is inherently one of conflict as each party seeks to impress its definition on the other.

If, however, Ego comes to see Alter as not needing to change, as a "normal" like himself, the system is no longer one of conflict but one of social order, and isolation and insulation of Alter are no longer necessary. The transition implied is from social order based on one pattern of relations (called social control by Parsons) through conflict to social order based on a different pattern or principle of social organization.

This then represents in brief some structures of consciousness and patterns of social relations associated with social control, social conflict and social order not based upon control. In Smelser's terms such structures of consciousness may be seen as generalized beliefs and/or ideology and counterideology. They do not include all of the elements of such beliefs, but specifically those which relate to self/other definitions in different situations. As such, they would seem to explicate some aspects of Smelser's theory rather than change it.

The description also clarifies one sense in which collective behavior is uninstitutionalized. Beliefs about self and other, Ego and Alter, as actors in a system of action are essential elements of interaction expectations. Breaking these expectations is, by definition in Social Action Theory, uninstitutionalized action. When such breaking is associated with collective mobilization that is precisely the definition of collective behavior. In Useem's terms, social actors who act in terms of the "subordinate principle" of organization are transgressing the 'dominant principle' of organization. All efforts at social change may not involve uninstitutionalized action, but efforts which challenge expectations such as these described here are, by definition, uninstitutionalized.

Finally, the ideas provide us with a first approximation of systems theory in Talcott Parsons. This theory builds on the interaction of two people to larger and larger frameworks so that not only dyads but total societies can be described. It is such concrete systems of interaction which Parsons analyzes as subsystems of action, as personality, social, cultural, and behavioral subsystems.

The most important subsystem in Smelser's work is the social system which at the most comprehensive level is a society. It is analytically conceived as a system of values, norms, roles and facilities (Smelser, 1962:24; Parsons and Shils, 1951: pp.190-223). This system, which might be called the organizational structure of a society, is described by Parsons as follows:

> The core of a society, as a system, is the patterned normative order through which the life of a population is collectively organized. As an order, it contains values...norms and rules, all of which require cultural references in order to be meaningful and legitimate. As a collectivity, it displays a patterned conception of membership which distinguishes between those who do and do not belong (1966:10).

Parsons calls this system the societal community and describes its three environments in some detail. The cultural system provides legitimation or values for a societies normative order; the personality system provides motivated actors for social roles wheras the society reciprocally provides rewards to valued members. The organic-physical environment provides the physical requirements for organic life, mediated through technology (1966:10-16). [42]

But subsystems are also identified at the boundaries of the social system. The first, the pattern-maintenance subsystem, is concerned with the relations of the society to the cultural system. The second, the polity as a subsystem organizes personalities in pursuit of collective goals. The third, the economy, mediates between the society and the physical world by allocating facilities (resources) within the societal community. Thus the polity is the sphere of power wheras the economy is the sphere of wealth and its allocation in society (Parsons, 1951:123-126; 1966:1-18; 1971:10-16).[43]

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[42]However, recall that the work above by Lidz and Lidz requires a major revision in this subsystem.

[43]Parsons at one point defines political power as "...the capacity to control the relational system as a system, whether it be an organization or a more diffuse,

The structure of the social system consists of roles, the relations between those roles, and the distribution (or allocation) of moveable objects between the roles. Relational institutions define these roles (and related statuses) in the social network, and the roles ensure the continuity (the meeting of functional prerequisites) of the system.

Allocation involves the allocation of actors (personnel) to roles, the allocation of facilities and the allocation of rewards (Parsons, 1951:114-115;Williams, 1976:75-76). Each of these is presumably associated with legitimacy norms, although Parsons comments on this only in the context of competitive allocation (1951:118). Allocation of facilities implies allocation of economic power (broadly conceived) but power also has a political form which is associated with "mobilization of the relational context" (1951:123-126).

Thus two fundamental processes exist in social systems: allocation maintains equilibrium by maintaining a specified relation between the components of the system; integration maintains equilibrium by mediating system-environment relations so that the system can maintain its distinctive properties (Parsons and Shils, 1951:108).

Finally, in a complex social system, collectivities may be regarded as filling roles (Parsons, 1951:96-101; Williams, 1976:73). Role interaction and the complementarity of expectations associated with social relations would then necessarily make up part of the description of interaction between collectivities (Parson and Shils, 1951:105).

This, in summary form, is the social theory on which Smelser bases his work. (See also Bourricaud, 1981; Rocher, 1974; and the many texts by Talcott Parsons and his collaborators). It is not quite reasonable to evaluate Smelser's text as lacking in respect to some of the above concepts, for they were not fully formulated by Parsons at the time of Smelser's book (1962). However, Smelser does seem to pay relatively little attention to allocation and organization as explicit components of his theory. He also presents the social system as facilities, mobilization into roles, norms, and values rather than as a role structure with pattern-maintenance, economy and polity subsystems. One consequence of Smelser's choice in this respect is that it is initially difficult to see the Lidz brothers' conception of social control and externally impinging

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[43](cont'd) less integrated system" (1951:126). In this sense, political power involves precisely the capacity to modify the social system, the system of roles and role relations in any social order.

factors ("conditions") in relation to Smelser's theory, in spite of the fact Smelser uses the term social control. However, a fully developed critical analysis of Smelser and development of an alternative theory will be the next step in this chapter.

B. Smelser's Determinants of Collective Behavior

As noted above, in Smelser's version of Social Action Theory society is treated analytically as composed of four components of action: facilities, mobilization of individuals into organizations, norms, and values. After Parsons and Shils, situational facilities are items used by actors as means to achieve goals. They include information, knowledge, skills, tools, wealth, power, and prestige. Norms are regulatory rules governing the pursuit of goals, and values are the broadest guides to purposive behavior, often treated as goals. Mobilization as a component of action is a little more difficult to describe: at the individual level it is an attempt to address the issue of motivation, but at the level of social organization or society, it involves the other side of the coin, mobilizing individuals to fill roles (1962:24, 325). These four components of action are conceptualized hierarchically with values at the highest level. Therefore a change in values implies a change in the other components, wheras a change in facilities (the lowest level) implies no such change. Norms and role mobilization are intermediate between values and facilities.

Collective behavior, as action oriented towards changing or reconstructing social action, is categorized according to which component of action is believed to need changing. This is found in the "generalized belief" of the social actors. The generalized belief not only specifies what must change, it also specifies what is believed to be the source of strain, or the problem, in the social order.

The five categories of collective behavior, based on analyzing the generalized belief, are panics and crazes, hostile outbursts, and norm and value-oriented movements. The first two reconstitute facilities (negatively, in a flight pattern or positively in a stampede pattern), the third reconstitutes the mobilization series by focusing on individual actors, and the fourth and fifth reconstitute norms and values. As one moves up this scale (from facilities to values) the behavior becomes more complex and

incorporates some elements of lower level collective behavior. To reiterate an earlier point, it is that which the population believes needs to change which is used to categorize these beliefs, *not* that which is believed to be the source of strain or the problem in the social order.

Terms such as hysteria or value-oriented movement should not be interpreted precisely as they would be when used by the general population or even as they are used in the collective behavior literature. Rather, Smelser's definition must be accepted: a type of collective behavior based on a belief about an element of social action which needs to change. Thus, although the Luddites may have been treated as a social movement, for Smelser they would have to be classified as a panic reaction,[44] seeking to destroy facilities to relieve social strain. The key definitional characteristic is the nature of the generalized belief, not organizational or temporal aspects of the collectivity.

However, there is an overall problem with this set of categories, in that Smelser unsystematically shifts between negative and positive orientations to components of action. Only in relation to facilities does he clearly indicate both a positive and negative orientation. When a population seeks to positively reconstruct facilities, the result is a stampede called a craze. When they seek to negatively reconstitue facilities, the result is flight, called a panic. In relation to mobilization he mentions only a negative focus on actors (the hostile outburst), but it would seem from the literature that a positive focus on individual actors (the designation of charismatic figures) is also a frequent occurrance. Similarly, norms or values may be seen as negative, needing to be eliminated or changed, or positively needing to be retained or developed in a society. Thus, the overall theory would seem to require recognition that the generalized belief may be oriented either positively or negatively to a component of action, implying eight rather than five possible theoretical types of collective behavior.

The final element in Smelser's definition of collective behavior is the concept of "strain". Strain implies some particular relationship between the components of action such that some members of the population feel energized or impelled in some way into action. It is defined as "...an impairment of the relations among and consequently

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[44]Actually, Smelser would classify Luddite action as hostile outbursts, but this is due to a logical error in his work discussed below (infra p. 62).

inadequate functioning of the components of action" (1962:47). It resembles Merton's (1957) concept of anomie, but by 1968 Smelser seems defensive about the precise nature of strain. He maintains the above definition but indicates the general principal is more important: there must be some social reality which motivates people, and he chooses to use the concept of strain to encapsulate that reality.

This notion of strain will be further described in the next section, which outlines Smelser's determinants, for it is the second of six elements which he considers necessary and sufficient for collective behavior events to occur. However, it should be noted here that Smelser's master proposition states that "people under strain" mobilize in collective behavior (1962:385). His full theory explains why some people under strain do and some do not actually participate in collective behavior, but his 1962 version did not provide a clear indication of how to identify which people are under strain. Only the above statement provides a link between actual populations and his more abstract theoretical framework of components of action. In 1968 he specified this link a little more clearly when he stated that many of the cases of collective behavior are "... rooted in social conditions....economic hardships, social disorganization, and political repression" (1968:92).[45]

The six determinants of collective behavior [46] which make up Smelser's explanatory system and which must be activated in the following order, are structural conduciveness, structural strain, the growth and spread of a generalized belief, a precipitating factor or event, mobilization of participants for action, and the operation of social control. Collective Behavior events, or successful mobilization, occurs when the first five of these determinants are present and the sixth (social control) is ineffective.

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[45] He does not, however, integrate this statement into his overall theoretical orientation.

[46]Mark Gould, in trying to clarify Althusser's concept of overdetermination at a meeting of the *American Sociological Association* in Toronto in 1981, used Smelser's value-added theory as a base. Determination of an outcome occurs when selected variables are sufficient to create a given effect; in some cases some of those variables may be replaced by others and the same effect occurs. Overdetermination occurs when two or more substitutable independent variables are both present - eliminating one would not halt the occurrence of the event. Smelser clearly sees his system as a "determinant" one, but as each of his variables is actually a complex set of variables it may be useful at times to apply the concept of overdetermination.

In his 1968 text Smelser reduces these six elements to three. He calls them strain (malintegration in the relations among elements of a social system), reaction to the strain, and control (which consists either of restructuring the initial strain situation or acting upon the response to it, 1968:13). However they can be categorized slightly differently as three sets of determinants, the first being the social structural characteristics (conduciveness and strain), the second being beliefs held by the population including events which confirm their beliefs (one definition given to precipitating events), and the third being the interaction which occurs between mobilizing forces and social control forces. These three categories will provide the structure for the criticism and redevelopment of Smelser in the rest of this chapter.

Social Structural Characteristics:Structural Conduciveness

The two structural characteristics which Smelser incorporates into his theory are called structural conduciveness and structural strain. However, his definition of conduciveness (characteristics of a social structure which permit one form of action and militates against other forms) is seen by himself as designating what is possible in the way of social action in a social system (1962:15): the addition of other determinants shifts possible collective behavior to probable and finally to inevitable or necessary. For Smelser structural conduciveness logically precedes strain, but this would seem to imply that at the most general level it would be a description of social structures which would be subject to the buildup of strain. However, Smelser's discussion actually deals primarily with conditions which are determinants of one *type* of collective behavior as opposed to some some other type (panic vs. norm-oriented movements, for example). [47]

It would also seem reasonable to expect, under the rubric of structural conduciveness, to find descriptions of those structural elements which make it possible for the other four determinants to occur (the spread of a generalized belief to social control), but if the factors described are to be conceptualized this way Smelser is not

[47]That is, the most obvious prior element of conduciveness would be the possibility of uninstitutionalized, as opposed to institutionalized, action. A mental experiment might identify a social order in which the concepts of institutionalized and uninstitutionalized would be meaningless; such a social order would not, by definition, be subject to collective behavior.

explicit about it.

Finally, given the attempt to develop this as a formal theory, one would expect that the characteristics of structural conduciveness would consist of values on a number of variables which make up the four components of action (facilities, roles, norms, values). However, Smelser's discussion of conduciveness explicitly addresses the components of action for only two of the four factors which he identifies as elements of conduciveness. These elements of conduciveness are the following:

a)*Availability of Action Channels*
Lack of channels for expressing "lower level" action, such as crazes or hostile outbursts, contribute to "higher level" action. A corollary is that blocking of "higher level" channels and the opening of "lower-level" channels contributes to lower level collective action (1962:325,333). Smelser also implies that if *all* channels are open a population will select lower-level action (1962:286).

b)*Communication Access*
Access to means of communication to disseminate beliefs is necessary for any form of collective action.

c)*Relations Among the Components of Action*
Separation of the components of action so that lower level demands do not generalize to higher level conflicts. In this context Smelser speaks specifically of normative demands and value conflicts and he discusses world-views, especially religious world-views (1962:320).

d)*Interest Articulation and Aggregation*
Separation or differentiation of interest-articulation from interest-aggregation in political decision-making processes is conducive to norm-oriented movements. Absence of such separation is conducive to value-movements.

In relation to the first factor above, the presence or lack of channels for expressing action, the concept of "channels" should perhaps be understood as an analogue, referring to specific social arrangements which enable each type of collective behavior to develop. It is a useful analogue for Smelser for his last determinant, social control, can then be conceptualized as "opening" or "closing" channels.

In addition there are actually two slightly different points implied by Smelser's remarks. One specifies the conditions under which a population "under strain" begins to orient to collective behavior (rather, presumably, than

institutionalized action), and the other specifies conditions under which that action will be oriented to values, norms, role mobilization or facilities. Smelser is most clearly referring to the second set of conditions, but the first is suggested by his wording. For example, with reference to value-oriented movements Smelser says (1962:333):

> ...a part of the population finds itself under strain and unable to find means of remedying the situation. It is without facilities for organized action on its own; it cannot attack or expel the persons or agencies considered responsible for its difficulties, and it does not have access to those who could initiate normative changes....Under such conditions people begin to redefine the fundamental values of the entire system in which they find themselves.[48]

By contrast, collective behavior will be norm-oriented if there is ample opportunity for normative agitation in a social structure, and opportunity for lower level action is blocked. In fact, the situation which is conducive to such movements is one in which "avenues for agitation are open (petitions, elections, etc.) but participants perceive a precarious balance between their own power and that of the opposition" (1962:284).

But in this description Smelser has, in fact, smuggled in Parson's allocation principle without explicitly recognizing that fact. His development suggests precisely that, in Parsons and Shils terms, if a sector of the population lacks economic power (and perhaps political power) it will participate in value-oriented social movements (Parsons and Shils, 1951:200).[49] However, Smelser's point

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[48]Compare this to a similar, but slightly different statement in Smelser, (1962:325)
"Value-oriented beliefs...arise when alternative means for reconstituting the social situation are perceived as unavailable...The aggrieved group...(a)does not possess facilities whereby they may reconstitute the social situation; (they rank low) on wealth, power, prestige, or access to means of communication, (b)...is prevented from expressing hostility that will punish (those) considered responsible for the disturbing state of affairs, (c)...cannot modify the normative structure, or cannot influence those who have the power to do so....(That is) the aggrieved group feels powerless to reconstitute the Facilities, Mobilization, and Normative components (and their attention) turns to the highest level...reconstitution of the value component."

[49]Parsons and Shils state: "The allocation of facilities in a social system may be viewed as an aspect of the allocation of power.... (This generalized potency) is often such that it can be used to pursue...a wide variety of goals that might themselves be facilities or substantive goals."

could be interpreted slightly differently. It should be recalled that facilities are, by definition, anything which can be used as a means for goal attainment. By implication the existance of population sectors which lack institutionalized means or legitimized power is the first element of structural conduciveness, the first factor which contributes to collective behavior. This interpretation is not made by Smelser, but seems to be a clearer statement of conduciveness within Social Action Theory than "the lack of action channels."

Further, when one uses the phrase "power" in addition to facilities, one is led to Parsons' distinction beween economic and political power. It is economic power which is access to facilities ("means") but political power is somehow related to social relations. It perhaps has more to do with the development of collective, solidary relations and therefore influence rather than resources derived from the environment. It is in this sense that "access to people who can initiate normative change" is power, but presumably the development of dense, solidary relations within a collectivity also increases this kind of power. Thus 'availability of action channels' is not only having institutionalized means, it can be interpreted as having certain kinds of social relations. This then makes up a second element of structural conduciveness.

The relationship to the social control model described above is obvious. Social control is maintained by isolation and insulation of populations, by excluding them from relations of possible influence and relations of solidarity with each other. It would follow that Parsons' social control structure is conducive to collective behavior, but not to normatively oriented collective behavior.

But perhaps more significiantly, Smelser in this description begins to draw "sectors of the population" into his theory at this first stage, not just the analytic components of action. Thus his structural conduciveness is not merely described in terms of the components of action of a total social system, as would seem

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[49](cont'd) Secondly (as an element of power) facilities enable one to control the actions of others, to gain their collaboration in goal attainment (1951:200). They however also argue that if the legitimacy of the allocation system is widely acknowledged there will be no conflict (1951:200). By implication, there will be no social movement types of action. However, this properly is an issue of the relation between allocation (of facilities) and values and as such will be discussed under strain.

necessary for his theory, but in terms of different values on those components of action among different groups in the population.

The possibility of linking his overall orientation, for example, to class-based social theories would seem obvious, but Smelser takes no such direction. Clearly, however, even if Smelser does not follow this through in his work, his theory at this first stage begins to identify structural processes which will contribute to the formation of collectivities , as individuals share a particular location in the social structure which is or is not conducive to collective behavior participation. By omitting a detailed discussion of Parsons' allocation principle, Smelser misses this whole process of group formation which underlies his work.

Finally, in this discussion Smelser seems to implicitly define the conditions under which social actors must take "uninstitutionalized" action, rather than normatively approved modes of acting. That is, if a population sector has "power", they presumably can obtain the social changes they consider necessary through legitimized channels of action: they have no need to engage in collective behavior. However, power needs to be conceptualized both as economic, or access to facilities, and political power (somehow related to social relations or perhaps development of collective, solidary relations) and finally to influence, all aspects of power in Parsons.

But further the "quantity" of power needed to generate certain kinds of desired changes may vary markedly. Thus, a very powerful group may not have enough power to create some change in the social order, and may engage in uninstitutionalized action to achieve their desired goal. However, the most important point in regards to Smelser is that he misses this theoretical element (of power linked to allocation of facilities) which is implied in his own work, and thus misses the opportunity to develop it.[59]

Smelser's second element, access to means of communication, is not related to the four components of action at all. He simply sees it as necessary

[59]Smelser does introduce the allocation principle in chapter two, in which he details "levels of specificity" of the components of action. However this is allocation of facilities and populations to organizations (e.g. firms) so they can achieve their goals; it is not allocation of facilities to societal members or collectivities (1962:41,43).

for the dissemination of beliefs (one of his six determinants) and seems to take-for-granted that readers will agree with this point. But again, his terminology implies that some sector of the population has access to means of communication, not that communication per se is an important aspect of the social system itself. By contrast, Talcott Parsons, in a similarly terse reference, states that "disruption of the communication system of a society is...as dangerous as disruption of its system of order in the...sense of motivational integration" (1951:33).

But the question must be asked "communication with whom?" and "communication of what type?" The second is too large to address further in this work but it raises the possibility that the circulation of ideas by oral transmission, by the printed word, by electronic media, and even across languages may be elements of "conduciveness" in collective behavior. [51] But the first returns to the issue of population segments raised earlier: is it communication within the group which lacks power that matters, or communication between this group and more powerful sectors of society?

If the definition of the situation is an element of collective behavior, communication systems would seem best perceived as mechanisms for achieving a shared definition of the situation. For collective behavior to occur it would seem that there must be the possibility of communication among the affected group; for it to be halted there must either be disruption of such communication or the possibility of an alternative definition being imposed by others. The first implies communication within the group, the second implies at least one-way communication from a controlling group to an affected group. Two-way communication, in which opposing groups may influence each others definition of the situation would seem to be a third possible communication system influencing definitions of the situation.

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[51] Television was often credited, rightly or wrongly, with the particularly explosive nature of the student and youth movement in the United States in the 1960's. In contrast, Jo Freeman (1975) emphasizes the importance of communicative social networks in the woman's movement, and the rise of Social Credit in Alberta has been associated with Aberhardt's use of the radio (Pinard, 1975).

Within Smelser's own framework this should be seen as simply one facility, one instrumental means to be used for goal achievement, and it is not clear why this facility should be singled out rather than, say, wealth or prestige. However, it is apparent from Parsons' reference to communication above that this is a vital aspect of social structure. If it is just a facility, it is of exceptional importance in Parsons' theory. In fact, it may be better conceptualized as an element of the relations between roles in a social structure, and therefore an element of structure itself. [33]

The third element Smelser identifies is the relationship among the components of action: if they are separated conflicts will apparently not generalize to other levels. Otherwise they will result in lower level conflicts appearing as normative or value conflicts. Smelser is attempting to present here one aspect of "differentiation" as it is understood in action theory, an aspect which is intrinsically linked to the idea of "social system evolution" and opposes "modern" and "primitive" systems (Parsons, 1966). Yet precisely how one would operationalize this set of ideas is problematic. Smelser, for example, also says that conflict will generalize to "higher" levels (i.e. to value conflict) if it is prolonged (1962:62), and it would be difficult to know which is the reason in any given case.

The interesting suggestion here, in line with thinking in the sociology of knowledge, is that different kinds of social integration will generate different kinds of idea systems. One need not accept Smelser's apparent value-judgement that value-conflicts are threatening, to recognize the possibility of this point being useful in social analysis. However, it is difficult to determine from Smelser precisely how the idea of differentiation could be operationalized in observing one society or another. This problem will be returned to below in a discussion of role analysis, and a possible means of operationalizing the concept will be

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[33]One distinction should be made here. Any "object" in the social world becomes a facility when it is interpreted as means to an end. At the social system level the "allocation" or social distribution of beliefs or communication channels should be distinguished from their interpretation as facilities. Only when the actors wish to use them for goal attainment are they, strictly speaking, facilities. The distribution of ideas however will enter into the individual and collective definition of the situation.

identified there.

The fourth element in structural conduciveness is the articulation and aggregation of interests: again Smelser sees it as important that they be separated ("within and between") to prevent the development of value-oriented movements. Articulation of interests is the process of making problems and desired ends explicit; aggregation is the process of converting these desires into policy.

Within separation of interest articulation implies that individuals articulate their concerns through a number of different groups, as opposed to a social structure in which social cleavages result in many concerns being articulated through a single group structure. Within separation of interest aggregation implies a number of institutional structures dealing with policy-setting and implementation: the reverse is a single structure attempting to resolve all policy issues. Finally, if there is no separation between these structures articulation and aggregation of interests are carried on by the same structure. [53]

Smelser does not explicitly relate this to any of the four components of action. This may be because he sees it as a concrete social arrangement, and as such more than one of the analytical categories would be needed to describe it. Nevertheless, he has committed himself to formal theory, and the linking would seem to be essential in such a case. He either needs to present it as differences in role structures in a society or differences in the normative organization of roles.[54] If we analyze it as differences in role structures it is immediately apparent

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[53]These two slightly different points can both be highlighted by referring to the 1980 election of the Liberals to form the federal government in Canada. From the perspective of many Western Canadians this was only possible because Quebec (and/or French-Canada) votes Liberal, forming a powerful block which cannot be defeated by Anglo-Canadians. For Western Canadians the French-Canadians articulate group specific interests through the Liberal party which then forms the government and aggregates them into policy; this is what Smelser (after Lasswell) refers to as inadequate differentiation "between" interest articulation and aggregation. Similarly, it could be argued that what the Quebec voting bloc represents is a set of shared statuses, a particular language, religion, ethnicity, plus a perceived social and economic status: this is inadequate differentiation "within" groups involved in interest articulation and aggregation. In simple language, groups become polarized as concrete collectivities, and control of the government is seen as resting in the hands of one of the groups.

[54] The ambiguity here relates to the way in which Smelser develops the second and third component of action: neither is actually referred to as roles per se. Rather the second is "mobilizing into roles" and the third is "regulatory principles

that there are a number of different ideas included in this aspect of structural conduciveness.

First of all, it focuses on one type of social action, namely that concerned with "interests" in the political sense: it specifies different types of organization which are associated again with different types of ideas or knowledge systems (value or norm-oriented) and therefore different types of action. It may be appropriate to be concerned only with this type of action in the case of collective behavior, but the general theoretical question must be whether or not there are analogues in religious, or economic, or perhaps other spheres of social action.

Secondly, it presents two different levels of "role", the first at the individual level and the second at the organizational or collectivity level. In Parson's terms, the distinctions identified by Smelser are issues of role specificity and diffuseness. If the individual plays many specific roles which are sharply differentiated one from another the associated idea-systems are unlikely to challenge basic values; if his "roles" are diffuse in a social structure he is likely to challenge values.

At the organizational level one can again think in terms of role specificity and diffuseness but it is now the organization or collectivity which is conceptualized in role terms. If a social structure consists of many organizations with specific tasks the population is more likely to develop idea-systems which do not challenge the basic values or principles of that structure. If it consists of one or few organizations, the population is likely to develop such value-challenges. Again Smelser has expressed this only in terms of "political" tasks, or interests, but it is possible that it could be applied to other types of activity in the society.

It would seem that Smelser is again addressing here the notion of "differentiation" in social systems, as he is in his discussion of the separation of

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[54](cont'd) necessary if...values are to be realized" Such regulatory principles may include the expectations associated with roles (1962:39,27). Nevertheless, he does say that at the social system level the second component is "...roles (husband,...citizen) and organizations (e.g. political parties...families)" (1962:24) which implies that the notion of role as an organizational building block may best be treated within his second component.

components of action (*Supra* p. 62). However, in this case it is possible to operationalize and test the resultant propositions, which was not possible in the previous case. Again, we need not assume that value-oriented collective behavior is undersireable: one could easily argue that precisely the overall principles of organization or legitimacy "values" need to be challenged in some societies. However, this element of structural conduciveness redesignated the role structure of a social order provides a potential means of operationalizing a theoretical construct in the theory.

There is nothing in Smelser's discussion of structural conduciveness which might be construed as focusing on his fourth component of action, values or value-orientations. His theory would seem to require that certain

> ...conceptions of nature, of mans place in it, of mans relations to man, and of the desireable and non-desireable as they relate to man-environment and interhuman relations (1962:25, citing Klukholm, 1951:411),

need to be recognized as conducive to collective behavior wheras others are not. For example, value-orientations may legitimize "running amok" under specified circumstances: Smelser's theory would imply that such behavior should not then be analyzed as collective behavior. Similarly, they may legitimize men and women as actively reconstructing their social and political environment as a natural right; much of what are called norm and value-oriented movements could then no longer be analyzed under Smelser's categories. Smelser, in general, seems to avoid discussion of values and value-orientations, in spite of the fact he sees them as the most basic element of social structure.

To summarize the results of this, essentially immanent, critique of Smelser the phrase structural conduciveness is left in place as a potentially useful category for describing certain aspects of social structural conditions that may generate collective behavior (and in more detail, may generate certain types of belief or knowledge systems in a population or population sector). However, we suggest that it may be described somewhat more rigourously if the components of action are used to further specify the general idea. That is, the nature of facilities (especially communication), the structuring of roles, the norms of allocation of facilities, and the nature of legitimizing values, are each seen as aspects of

conduciveness. By implication in Smelser, if each of these take one form they are *not* conducive to collective behavior (or certain types of beliefs); if they take another form they are conducive to such behavior or beliefs. The term conduciveness lends itself to only one of these interpretations, but both the negative and positive direction are implied in Smelser's analysis.

Much current research in collective behavior can be easily reinterpreted within these categories, but large lacunae can also be identified. In the area of facilities there is relatively little work on the nature of facilities themselves, with the possible exception of work in communications media (in the Innes and McLuhan tradition, *Vide*, Innes, 1951;McLuhan,1962). Although the general field of political economy could be partially interpreted as focusing here, it tends to be more interested in the "normative" allocation (or control) of facilities than their characteristics.

In the area of role-structure, there is an ongoing debate in the current literature which is termed "breakdown theory" vs "solidary theory" (Snow et al, 1980; Useem, 1980). Although this debate is argued as Smelser vs Tilly (or Karl Marx), it might be more accurately viewed as Kornhauser (1959) vs Tilly. The polar cases are presented as social orders in which the level of disassociation is very high (the mass society) contrasted to those in which social relations are dense (solidary relations). The evidence is that social protest movements (generally best interpreted as normative within Smelser's system) rely heavily on block recruitment and social networks; therefore they are more likely to develop where social relations are dense. However, Snow et al (1980) specify this relationship by showing that it depends partly on the nature of the recruiting organization (isolating or integrating in relation to other social units).

But in 1981 Craig Calhoun demonstrated that Smelser's basic proposition is correct (reinterpreted as it is above), that communities with diffuse role structures are more likely to participate in radical collective protest than those with specific role structures. He argues, on the basis of English data, that both Tilly and Marx are wrong, it is not workers in capitalism who are most likely to fundamentally challenge the system but artisans in precapitalist social relations.

He commented in passing that Smelser, in fact, observed this relation in his 1959 work, but missed its significance. He also conceded that he was making something very close to the Gemeinschaft/Geselschaft distinctions, which suggests that the above collapsing of Smelser's two categories (differentiation of the components of action and interest articulation and aggregation) into role structural analysis does not reduce the capacity of the theory to identify relevant changes in social structures.

In regards to the normative allocation of facilities, the current concern with resource mobilization focuses on this dimension of the social order. However, the focus tends to be on the capacity of a social movement or social movement organization to garner resources, rather than the distribution or allocation of resources in a society. Tilly, for example, defines moblization as "...the process by which a group acquires *collective* control over the resources needed for action (labour power, goods, weapons...etc.)" (1978:7).

But it is possible to translate much of the discussion of class or social stratification into a description of the normative allocation of facilities in a social order. Further, the extensive work on relative deprivation (for example, Gurr, 1970) and the so-called "J-curve" as an economic theory (Davies, 1969) relate either partially or totally to the allocation of facilities.

Parsons adds another dimension to allocation, for the term refers not only to the allocation of facilities to population sectors, but also to the allocation of roles to population categories. Populations may be categorized as ethnic groups, kinship groups, social classes and so on (Parsons, 1971). Allocative norms in this regards, as with facilities, would be system norms. That is, they would both be internalized in human action so that people would make "appropriate" allocative decisions and they would be a result of social arrangements independent of conscious human agency. Although some of the work on ethnicity and other ascribed characteristics and collective behavior could be interpreted this way, it tends to be presented prescriptively, as something which ought to be changed, rather than descriptively as an element of theory.

All of these elements, the nature of roles, the relations between roles, and the allocation mechanism make up the social structure or social system in Parsons. Smelser does not describe social structure in this way but rather focuses on the components of action. But if we want to relate him to Lidz and Lidz's work (and Parsons' description of the societal community) it is precisely this social structure which is being "controlled" when a social system is in equilibrium, and it is this structure which is threatened by external "conditions" or forces of change. That is, it is this social structure which makes up the internal "organization" of a society, analagous to the schemata of Piaget in cognition. Smelser's conduciveness (although it is difficult to draw this out because of his choice of terminology) begins to identify aspects of the organization that makes it more or less subject to change or to shifts in its equilibrium.

If we restate this in the analytic language of social action theory, Smelser's structural conduciveness identifies social structural conditions which may generate particular types of collective actors (i.e. collective actors who may potentially engage in uninstitutionalized behavior oriented to changing the social system). The addition of structural strain (to be discussed next) energizes these collective actors and, if other determinants are present, they begin to act back upon the social structure itself. They become, in Parsons' language adopted by Lidz and Lidz, external "conditions" to which the patterned social organization must adapt.[55] It *may* adapt by assimilation, maintaining social control by transforming the social movement or other collective behavior event. Or it may adapt by accomodation, changing the internal organization so the social movement can be incorporated within it.

There is, however, as yet no attempt to incorporate Lidz and Lidz's view of the behavioral system into the collective behavior literature. What has been emphasized in the above discussion is a way of viewing social control/social change relations, *not* the reformulation of the adaptive system per se. Such a

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[55]There is an uneveness in terminology here which makes it difficult to maintain clarity in the discussion. Social control and conditions are not linguistically equivalent concepts, and social control and social change are only equivalent (as opposites) if particular meanings are given to them.

reformulation requires a reanalysis of the precise place of 'facilities' in social action, as it implies a systematic separation of knowledge from physical objects (resources). Technology may remain as the boundary structure, between the adaptive subsystem and the physical environment (as it is in Parsons, 1966:16), and the economy may remain its primary social system reference (*ibid*, 1966:15). However, the adaptive subsystem called the behavioral system would suggest technology is more clearly linked to a "knowledge system" than a cultural system. A reworking of "technological determinism" (such as W.F. Ogburn's work on social change) would require respecification of these subsystem relations.

Finally the area of values is addressed most frequently in contexts such as Habermas's "legitimation crisis" (1976). The contemporary analysis of social consciousness (as for example in Coulson and Riddell, 1980) and Marx's much earlier notions of false and true consciousness all reflect this aspect of social structure or structural conduciveness. It tends to be addressed but little in the collective behavior literature, especially as an aspect of total social order. It is discussed in the social psychological literature, as for example show that student movement participation in the 1960's was associated with "higher levels" of moral development. Smelser, however, does not address it as an independent variable at all in his system, in spite of his own assertion that values are the most fundamental of the four components of action. Rather, his analysis tends to show value conflict as a consequence of other variables in the social order. per se never enter directly into public debate.

This discussion does not, of course, exhaust the possible implications of a revision of the understanding of structural conduciveness within Smelser. Rather, it points to directions implied by such revision. Clearly, the analytical categories used for describing societies (in Smelser's case, the components of action) will influence the precise shape of any theory. The present analysis primarily makes Smelser's formalization more rigourous at this first level, and suggests possible changes and linkages to other theories; it does not propose the use of different analytical categories. At the end of this chapter it will be necessary to return to a consideration of his total theory, to deal with the possibility of overlap in his

categories, and to raise issues which cannot be identified by accepting to some degree Smelser's own boundaries on the discussion.

Social Structural Characteristics:Structural Strain

The second structural characteristic which Smelser incorporates into his theory is "structural strain". It is defined as "...an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action" (1962:47) with the components of action being values, norms, mobilization into roles, and facilities as noted above. However, in developing the idea Smelser modifies it in two directions: strain is felt *on one* of the components of action (on facilities it generates ambiguity and uncertainty; on role mobilization it generates deprivations (in rewards); on norms it creates conflict and on values what Smelser calls discrepancies(1962:16), and strain is felt by a sector of the population.[56] Thus for Smelser one of the most important points about "strain" is that it energizes a population to act. It may result in apathy or withdrawal rather than collective behavior (for all the determinants must come into play before collective behavior will result) but it is one essential determinant of action.

In the interest of parsimony one can understand Smelser's shift to strain "on" a component of action, for this reduces the possible types of strain to just four. However, if he were to analyze all possible pairs which could be under strain he would add only two (n-1 factorial) "types" to his total. The advantage of maintaining a focus on relations rather than elements is that either element in the relation can be changed to modify the situation. For example, if there is a disjunction between values and norms, understood perhaps as ends and regulatory procedures for arriving at the ends, either values or norms may be changed. Smelser's shift to strain "on" the components of action obfuscates this relationship.

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[56]In 1962 Smelser's definition is "...an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action" (1962:47); in 1968 the definition is "...malintegration in the relations among elements of a social system" (1968:13). The first definition shows more clearly Smelser's shift from the relations between the components of action to the functioning of any one component.

Further, Smelser's focus on a single component of action in fact eliminates the possiblity of identifying the *source* of the strain in the social order, unless strain implies not a disjunction between components of action, but opposing forces within a component of action. If, for example, strain "on" facilities leads to ambiguity and uncertainty we do not know if this strain is based in a disjunction between values and facilities, norms and facilities, or roles and facilities. We only know the indicator or symptom of the strain, the uncertainty as to the possibility of goal realization.

Finally, as with conduciveness, Smelser presents a definition which implies that strain is a phenomenon which can be identified in a total social structure but suggests an application of the concept to only a part of the population (i.e. "the population under strain" are the agents of action in collective behavior). Strain is presented then as a characteristic of a social structure but it is somehow differentially perceived or "felt", for apparently all people are not under strain when there is system strain. Again, if we take facilities as an example, does strain on facilities occur when certain facilities are not available to a total social order or when they are differentially allocated to population segments, so that *some* of the population are "under strain"? These are quite different theoretical propositions.

This problem of the location of strain is associated with a continued ambiguity in Smelser as to his level of analysis. It will be discussed again below (*Infra*: p.f 73), but it is very apparent here. A distinction between facilities, norms, and values at the social structural level and individual (or "personality system") level has not been made by Smelser, but a distinction *has* been made at the role-mobilization level. Specifically, at the social system level this is not role mobilization but role structure or social organization (1962:24). Strain "on" this component at the structural level should not be the same as strain on role mobilization. Strain on role mobilization should occur where the personality system and social system interpenetrate. Let me develop this argument by following it through in regards to values, norms, role, and facilities.

At the social structural level values may be defined as explicit principles of social organization, idea-systems which legitimize social action, or goals of an organization. All three may be present in a planned complex organization such as a business firm, but explicit organizational goals or recognized organizational principles may not exist in

social systems defined as societies, nor in various informal systems of interaction. Where all three do exist, one would expect some congruency among them, so that the principles of organization did not make the goals impossible, for example, or the legitimizing idea-systems would not be in opposition to recognized organizational principles.

For Parsons, these values and value-orientations lead to certain types of role-structures. He uses descriptive terms such as technical, artisan, and executive to characterize these as instrumental structures, but he also describes them in terms of role specificity and diffuseness. It is in this sense that Parsons' theory is idealistic, and opposed to "materialistic" notions of social organization being based essentially in man's need to provide food and shelter for himself.

To the extent that principles of social organization are *not* explicit and can only be deduced by analyzing actual role patterns, it is impossible for role patterns and values to be in opposition or "under strain". In contrast, to the extent that principles of social organization are asserted as legitimizing ideas, or goals are stated in a social system, they may imply quite different role structures than the one which exists and thus they may generate "strain" at the system level.

The same holds for allocative norms: if we take these as system norms which can be identified by observing how facilities, rewards, and personnel are allocated to roles they may be in marked opposition to legitimizing statements, stated goals, and even role demands. The most familiar examples is the relatively low salary and prestige allocated to garbage collectors in a society which values health and partially legitimizes higher salaries as based on job importance. The allocation of immigrants and racial minorities to similar roles in a society which claims equality of opportunity is a second example. This again represents "system strain".

In regards to facilities, strain would develop when roles are not allocated the facilities needed to enable role-incumbants to perform their tasks. This could range from parents not having food and clothing available to care for thier children to political leaders (presidents, prime ministers) not having sufficient knowledge to carry out their assigned task. But there is no implication here of a quantity of facilities; only of those facilities which are necessary to task and role performance in the social system under

analysis. Strain would develop when such facilities are not allocated or available.

When facilities are treated as rewards,[57] strain develops when rewards are not allocated to roles necessary for the "functioning" of the social system. Thus, because of inadequate rewards - income, esteem, prestige - there would be strain on the mobilization aspect of role performance.

All of this involves "strain" defined in terms of the components of action at the social system level. At the individual or personality level it must be interpreted differently. Individual goals or principles of action; individual norms, that is expectations or constraints on action associated with sanctions; individuals being mobilized or motivated to take a social structural role; and the individuals access to facilities all involve a different level of analysis. At this level individuals motivated to take certain roles and finding they are blocked by system personnel allocation norms, or by a system organizational structure which no longer includes that role, will feel strain. Alternatively they may be disappointed by a system which no longer allocates facilities to a desired role, or a system which no longer allocates rewards to role incumbants. I do not mean to reify system in this description, but only to distinguish between systemic effects and individual effects as these are understood in social systems analysis: the systemic effects are, of course, still the result of human actions.

Smelser shifts between these levels, essentially assuming that there is some congruence between system strain and individually perceived strain ("people under strain"). That is, there seems to be an assumption about levels of aggregation which assumes individual strain and system strain simply as homologues. In Michael Hannon's terms "The functional relations holding between corresponding micro and macrovariables (referred to as) aggregation relations" (1971:17) are not treated as problematic in Smelser. Robinson's 1951 lesson about aggregation errors at the empirical level is ignored at the theoretical level, and the precise relationship between system strain and individual strain is never addressed theoretically by Smelser. It is also not addressed by his critics, for they are far more concerned about the very concept of strain itself.[58]

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[57]Rewards and facilities are the same concrete phenomenon in Parsons' theory, but they are interpreted differently. For example, money interpreted as an object which can be used for goal attainment is a facility; money interpreted as an object of need-gratification is a reward.

[58]This problem is apparently, at least partially, derived from Parsons' work itself

It is probably the use of the concept of "strain" which has been most severely attacked in structural-functional theory, at least partly because of the imagery of system stability which is threatened and needs to be re-secured. Brown and Goldin (1973) state that Marx's concept of contradiction is much more powerful and should be used in preference to strain, but they do not explain precisely how this would be operationalized. Certainly the image of contradiction and dialectial development seems more satisfying to some contemporary social scientists than the relatively conservative image of "strain" (Useem, 1975). Smelser himself backs away from the terminology in later writing (1975:729), saying that the important point is that there must be some aspect of the society which energizes people to seek change rather than carry on in institutionalized patterns.

But there are problems with either replacing strain with a concept from another theory or with simply discarding the concept. Replacing it with a concept from another theory means the internal coherance of Smelser's work is lost, unless the new term is redefined within Smelser's framework. The original term "strain" might just as well be left in place, unless one wishes to posit some other set of relations in the theory as being the source of energy for actors.

Useem recommends the concept of structural contradiction for analysis of protest movements, arguing that it is more useful than strain. He defines contradiction as "...the presence of two or more principles of social organization that give rise to opposing social relations and courses of action" (1975:28). In any given institution there will be a dominant organizing principle which structures the institution and a subordinate one which is in opposition to it. If the subordinate principle becomes dominant there would be a transformation of the institution. People who experience the pressures of these contradictory principles may seek changes in the institution appropriate to the subordinate principle; such changes are in the interests of this population group. Structural contradictions, as defined here, are necessary but not sufficient conditions

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[31](cont'd) and perhaps reflects uneven formalization in Parsons' theory. Max Black objects strongly to the constant "ambiguity of scope" in Parsons, and to the application of a single set of concepts to social systems as well as persons (1976:281). He argues that such concepts *must* have different meanings when applied in these different cases, yet the precise meaning is often not made clear by Parsons. This problem pervades Smelser's work.

for social movements - the existance of a movement implies their presence but the non-existance of a movement does not imply their absence.

Although Useem deals explicitly with protest movements in his analysis, if his definition of contradiction were used to replace Smelser's definition of strain it would imply that strain is not between components of action but is normatively and value based. That is, strain should be specifically interpreted in terms of different patterns or norms of role structure. This process may be, however, for the group experiencing the contradiction a disjunction beween their organizational norms and institutional values. Nevertheless, this may be a concept which is easier to operationalize than Smelser's definition of strain, or which provides an operationalization of one kind of strain, and which can therefore be incorporated into Smelser's overall theoretical system.

Thus two possiblities are raised by this analysis. One is that strain should be interpreted as disjunctions between the components of action, a disjunction between facilities, rewards, roles, and values. In this case six possible types of strain may occur. The other is that strain should be interpreted primarily as disjunctions "within" a component of action, as opposing realities existing within each component. The latter does not necessarily imply no relation to the former, as the opposing realities may need to be evaluated as problematic before they can involve strain. Smelser notes the first in his definition; the second in his elaboration. A third possibility, not explicitly addressed by Smelser, would be interpreting strain as disjunction between the social system as a subsystem and the other subsystems of action (personality, cultural, adaptive). It will not be possible to distinguish further among these possiblities until the case study material has been presented.

In final summary then, the two aspects of social structure in Smelser's theory will continue to be utilized in this work. However structural conduciveness will be considered an aspect of facilities, the role structure, the normative allocation of facilities to population segments and population categories to roles, and the nature of legitimizing values in a society. Structural strain will be treated somewhat tentatively as a disjunction between the components of action differentially experienced by certain population sectors in the society, or as contradictions within a component of action. It will be reanalyzed in the context of the case studies in an attempt to resolve certain

problems with the concept and yet retain its potential theoretical and practical functions in Smelser's original work.

The next set of determinants, those associated with the belief systems of the population will now be analyzed in a similar way. Again, there are two specific determinants in Smelser's system. The first is called the spread of a generalized belief and the second a precipitating event.

Ideational Characteristics: Generalized Beliefs

A generalized belief as a determinant of collective behavior has two aspects: it has a certain quality or content and it must be spread in the society. The spreading of the belief is a matter of availability of communication channels which has been discussed under structural conduciveness so it need not be further analyzed here. However it is significant to note that spreading a belief involves in some way activating the existing communication facilities so they are used, or it may involve creating new channels (which is modifying a facility or the relational element of a social order).

We can shift our attention then to the nature or quality of the generalized belief itself. Smelser uses this term in lieu of the term ideology, apparently because he wants to be able to describe the belief system within his theory without incorporating the surplus meaning carried by the concept ideology. Given the multitude of meanings attached to the term ideology this is understandable, but it may be useful to think through his usage of generalized belief with the literature on ideology as background.

Like the other determinants of collective behavior, generalized beliefs are categorized according to the components of action, but in this case, the components which they reconstitute. There is no necessary relation between the source of structural strain and the generalized belief which arises. There is a necessary relation (in fact, a tautological relation) between the focus of the generalized belief and the type of collective behavior which occurs, for if they give rise to action they give rise to specific types of action, panics, crazes, hostile outbursts, or norm-oriented or value-oriented movements. [59]

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[59] The logic of Smelser's position would seem to require that some phenomena

Generalized beliefs then may be hysterical ("... empowering an ambiguous element in the environment with... power to threaten or destroy); wish-fulfilling (empowering some force with the potency to overcome the harmful threat, 1962:94); hostile (involving the identification and modification of persons thought to be agents of destructive forces, 1962:101); norm-oriented (involving the creation of social norms to control the destructive forces, 1962:109); or value-oriented (involving a reconception of "nature, man's place in it, man's relation to man, and the desirable and non-desirable as they relate to man-environment and interhuman relations", 1962:120).

As one moves along this scale from hysterical to value-oriented beliefs, each of the preceding beliefs is included, but *not* the ensuing ones, so the five types of belief exist on a scale of simple to complex. Also, the "reconstitution" envisioned in each case is from simple (facilities) to complex, in that the value-oriented belief includes all of the other components of action. Thus, one example of value-oriented beliefs is political ideologies (1962:127-128), and both norm-oriented and value-oriented generalized beliefs resemble the concept of ideology as used in Blumer, Rocher, and Heberle, among others.

Thus a generalized belief is a set of beliefs which "...identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to this source, and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate" in a social order (1962:16). That is, a generalized belief is the population's social theory, described in the language of Smelser's theory. However, unlike Ash (1972) who also classifies population beliefs in terms of her own (quasi-Marxist) theory, Smelser does not see these beliefs as rational and correct but rather as "magical" and displaying a quality of impatience as people jump from abstract problems to concrete solutions without working out the necessary intermediate steps (1962:8,72).

The one presupposition made by Smelser which has most angered his critics is this one, the presupposition that participants in collective behavior necessarily act on the basis of extraordinary belief systems. The attack on Smelser is most explicitly stated by Skolnick (1969:332-338) and Currie and Skolnick in 1970 (c.f. Gamson, 1975:132; Oberschall, 1973:22). The result of this presupposition, according to Gamson

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[39](cont'd) called social movements would have to be called crazes or panics. This will be discussed further below(*infra* p.f.81).

(1968:16) is that Smelser's whole text can be read as a theory of conflict regulation, or perhaps more accurately social control. This may have been acceptable theorizing for a generation concerned with the rise of Nazi Germany, but it is not acceptable to an academic generation which participated actively in the social movements of the 1960's (Gamson, 1975:134-136).

Smelser objects strongly to this challenge (1970:46-55). In particular he argues that in his work he clearly indicates that "...the generalized beliefs may give a true account of a social situation..."(1970:49). Smelser also describes his theory of generalized beliefs in this response to Currie and Skolnick, saying (generalized beliefs) are purposive collective efforts to redefine and restructure the social environment, that crystalize when individuals and groups are subject to certain stresses (strain) and certain types of constraints on their opportunities to resolve these strains (conduciveness)" (1970:49).[60]

However, I think Smelser is in fact ambiguous in his discussion of generalized beliefs. His definition of collective behavior implies that there is something distinctive about the belief-systems of participants, and this would seem to suggest one would not simply accept the definition of the situation developed within the participants belief system (1970:49-59; 53-54). Yet, there is no mechanism in his theory for testing the validity of participant's beliefs. Wheras Currie and Skolnick may well fall into the trap of accepting the beliefs of social movement members as valid, as Smelser accuses them (1970;51), Smelser at times seems to simply accept the beliefs of social control agents as valid (1962:73; p.f. 306), although he recognizes control agents may err.

The mechanism for introducing the question of validity is hinted at in Smelser, but not developed, and it is in his concept of precipitating event. As with many of his other determinants, Smelser actually provides two quite different definitions for this

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[60] Crozier and Friedberg argue that change "...must imply the development of new collective constructs (1980:228). Such constructs involve learning "...i.e. the discovery, creation, and acquisition by the actors concerned of new relational models, new modes of reasoning, and similar collective capacities" (*ibid* p. 221). Because of this ...change can come about only with the intervention of another concrete system of action - a social movement for example" (*ibid*., p. 164). This then is a more detailed statement of a notion of collective constructs close to Smelser's generalized belief. However, for these authors it is not strain but rupture and crisis which make such learning possible (1980:226).

determinant, and then develops it so weakly that he himself does not include it in his list of determinants cited in reponse to Currie and Skoknick (1970:48). Yet, if there is a single "cause" in Smelser's theory it is precisely the precipitating event which represents it, for it is a precipitating event which throws the mobilizing group into action. The precipitating event will be discussed below as the second "ideational" determinant in Smelser's theory.

But the generalized belief not only defines the situation; it also prescribes certain action as appropriate and necessary if the situation is to change. Smelser clearly indicates the definition of the situation may be correct (even though he has no validity test for determining error), but the proposed action is precipitous, short-circuited, or has a magical quality for people believe it will definitely transform the situation. It is thus the action taken to modify the situation which is "irrational", not the actors nor their description of reality. Unlike the concept of praxis in neo-Marxian theory, in which action leads to learning and potentially a modified and more accurate theory of collective behavior, action in Smelser's theory is by definition irrational because it is uninstitutionalized.[61]

However, in the previous discussion (*Supra*, p. 50) it was pointed out that the concept "institutionalized" is closely associated with power relations between groups, and with definitions of the situation held by interacting parties.[62] If Parsons' social control model is taken as an example of an institutionalized system of interaction, an actor who decides not to be transformed must, by definition, engage in "uninstitutionalized" action. He will no longer behave according to patterned expectations. In Chalmers Johnson's language his action is "violent", breaking the boundaries of expectations. Whether or not this distinction will account for differences in perception and actions of collective behavior participants and control agents will have to await analysis of the case studies.

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[61]Analogies to medical treatment and medical theory could be drawn. The patient who chooses his own treatment, even though he agrees with the doctors diagnosis, is considered "irrational" by the medical profession. His self-treatment is generally referred to as superstition, folk-medicine, or perhaps magic, all terms which imply that it is uninstitutionalized action or treatment.

[62]To follow through this notion in the medical field, discussed in the previous footnote, see Friedson, 1976, *The Sociology of Applied Knowledge*.

But we must return to two other problems in Smelser's use of the term generalized belief. The first is the problem of who precisely holds these beliefs, which Smelser slides over in his analysis, and the second is the qualitative categories which Smelsers uses to categorize the beliefs. Both of these relate to problems of social change and social control.

I indicated that Smelser uses the term generalized belief at least partly to avoid the surplus meaning in the term ideology. One of the problems with the term ideology is that it tends to be given one meaning when it is presented as the idea-system of a population (as in Marxism, specified somewhat in Mannheim's 1938 use of the term) and another when applied to the idea-systems of social movements (as in Rocher, 1972; developed in Mannheim's term utopia). However, Smelser does not clearly address this distinction, so a generalized belief is a belief held by the population *and* a belief held by people who mobilize in collective behavior.

Accepting his basic point, that some belief pattern must be present in a society before members will move to collective behavior participation, his overall discussion implies that such beliefs are to be expected in the "population under strain". It may be that there are some circumstances in which a total population in a society is "under strain" but Smelser's examples and descriptions continuously imply that only part of the population, one sector of it, is under strain. By implication, other sectors in the population hold other beliefs, and the relationship between these beliefs and their validity tests (or reality tests) may be as problematic as the beliefs of the population subject to mobilization. Smelser's own work does not address this possibility, because of his focus on the beliefs of the collective behavior participants.

By using a single term, generalized belief, Smelser also cannot address the possibility that people who mobilize may develop quite different belief systems than those which were originally held as "generalized beliefs" of the population under strain. Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, for example, in a 1981 paper demonstrates that the Partis Quebecois in Quebec is dominated by a higher and higher percentage of intellectuals as one moves from the constituency or base to the top, and that these people have "cultural capital" (as that term is used by Bourdieu and Passeron) to protect. This fact distinguishes them from the broad base of working-class Quebecois who

object to English economic domination in Quebec. Smelser could not clearly make this distinction within his theory, for "a" generalized belief is held in the society and the social movement as it mobilizes.

For analytical purposes, the term generalized belief can be held for the beliefs held by the population, but I suggest that the term ideology be added to characterize the somewhat more coherant and organized beliefs of a mobilizing group.[63] At times they may be the same, as in the case of panic, but at times they may be quite different and different terms make it possible to identify distinctions if they exist.

Finally, by using the single term "generalized belief" Smelser implies that beliefs are shared by members of the mobilizing (or mobilizable) population. It is at least possible that different populations, with different "strain" operating on them collectively, may mobilize into the same social movement. [64] This is especially the case in Smelser's formulation as there is complete freedom between the source of strain and the nature of the generalized belief. Similarly, it is possible that population members who share a source of "strain" will mobilize into totally different collective behavior responses. These possibilities may be expressed in terms of coalitions between groups, or alternative strategies for people under strain, but each requires that the generalized belief be much more clearly specified.

At a qualitative or content level Smelser's categorizes such beliefs within terms appropriate to his overall theory - they are oriented to facilities, roles, norms, or values - and he identifies a positive or negative focus at the facilities level (a craze or a panic). At the highest level (a value-oriented movement) all lower levels are incorporated so a value-oriented movement will demand changes in norms, in role-incumbants, and at the facilities level (other levels will likewise incorporate levels below them, but not above

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[63]Pinard actually recognizes this problem in Smelser's theory in his work. He also introduces the term ideology to solve it (1971:95-96).

[64]In the example provided earlier, the intellectual elite in Quebec were distinguished from the mass of Quebecois who held economic concerns. In spite of the fact the two population groups are pressured by different types of strain (the first primarily at the symbolic cultural level; the second related to the allocation of facilities in the population) they apparently shared enough of the same beliefs to be initially mobilized into the Partis Quebecois. It may be argued that the different bases of strain will, however, eventually result in friction ("strain") within that mobilized collectivity, which is essentially Pinard's (1981) argument.

them).

There is again a problem throughout this analysis in terms of the precise scope at which Smelser presents his concepts. For example, facilities, as an instrumental means used for the attainment of goals, may be conceptualized as an aspect of the social order or as one controlled by individuals. That is, they may be facilities available to a given social system *or* facilities that social system supplies to individuals (for role performance or as rewards). In his tables and definitions Smelser implies the first (1962:41-43), in his examples and description the second (1962:24,32).

This shift in scope is apparent in his types of generalized beliefs and therefore types of collective behavior, for collective behavior at the facilities level is viewed as individual action oriented towards acquiring individual goods (the craze), or escaping individual harm due to a negative power or force in the environment (the panic; 1962:40). It is *not* action oriented towards changing the facilities of the collectivity, the "collective goods" to use Mancur Olson's (1965) terminology. It should, within his definitions, include action oriented at destroying negative forces (or facilities) but Smelser appears to make a logical error and includes such actions under hostile outbursts (defined as action bent on attacking *someone* responsible for the state of affairs, 1962:226).

Elsewhere in the literature, most explicitly in Wilson drawing on Aberle (1973:23-27) distinctions are made between orienting to individuals or orienting to the social structure. In this context social movements may concentrate on proselytizing among individuals or they may seek to overturn patterns of social arrangements through other forms of action.[65] Clarification of Smelser demands clarification of these elements: it is quite different to demand that nuclear energy not be developed than it is to flee to isolated mountain settlements to avoid possible nuclear explosions. The first is a demand at the facilities level of the social order; the second is an individual panic reaction to changes in facilities.

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[65]Actually in Smelser's terms this would not be a distinction between individuals and social structure. Proselytizing would be changing the role incumbants, or mobilization into roles, component of action - the level which Brown and Goldin refer to as 'performance'. The intention is precisely to change the whole society by focusing on this level (*Vide* Brown and Goldin, 1973:126).

This problem is grounded in Smelser's precise development of a generalized belief and the central place of a generalized belief in his theory. The types of collective behavior are based on the component of action which is central to the belief (facilities or role mobilization, for example) *but* the generalized belief associated with a negative orientation to facilities is defined as hysterical, and therefore leads to panic or precipitous action. In spite of his denial, a change to treating generalized beliefs as potentially reasonable and correct transforms Smelser's theory in many respects. We may retain the notion that certain collective behavior beliefs focus on facilities, for example, and then ask the question -when do they become hysterical and result in panic and when do they result in planned, concerted efforts to change that facility?[66] Smelser partially introduces this question in his notion of social control, but he must shift to normative movements to do so. Similarly, we may clearly separate out negative and positive focuses on facilities and not necessarily imply a panic or craze as the outcome.

Likewise, at the level of mobilization into roles, Smelser deals only with a hostile outburst in which populations seek to attack persons held responsible for their plight. It follows, by following Smelser's own logic, that designation of a charismatic leader is at the same level; it is a positive attempt to identify a role incumbent who will solve the problems of the population under strain. In Smelser's theory this is at a "lower level" than normative or value-oriented movements, but the extensive work on charismatic leadership provides a great deal of data on the related social structural factors (for example, see Worsley, 1964).

Of course, a generalized belief which focuses on allocation, either of facilities and rewards to roles or of population to roles would be a norm-oriented movement. This is the defining characteristic of social movements for Heberle and Roberts and Kloss and characterizes, for example, the American civil rights movement and the women's movement in much of the world. Such movements very explicitly challenge power relations such as those explicated in Parson's model of social control (*Supra* pf.48). [67]

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[66]Hypothetically, if this distinction is made, one could speak of value panic as well as panic related to facilities.

[67]Norm-oriented generalized beliefs could also be beliefs which challenge the structure of roles in the society, the division of labour as it is associated with task performance and goal attainment of collectivities, for roles are in one

Finally, value-oriented movements will challenge existing values - defined as evaluative principles or perhaps broad value-orientations, or as explicitly stated principles of organization. The latter include values which legitimate principles of social organization found at the normative level. They may attack negatively certain values or present positive alternatives, or they may do both. The theoretical concern must be the circumstances under which such generalized beliefs arise, beliefs which make explicit the organizational principles of a social order and challenge them. We need not share be concerned that they sometimes arise, and we must separate out the issue of whether or not people seek to change those values in a social order or create separate worlds which express their values.

This view of beliefs is still based on their content, as is Smelser's, and it is still grounded in the original analytic view of the society, but it is not dependent on an essential image of "irrationality" or strangeness associated with those beliefs.. Further, it clarifies some areas which Smelser confuses, more sharply demarcating boundaries between beliefs (as those which are facility or role oriented) and incorporating Smelser's positive and negative beliefs in all four cases. It also requires a recognition of the difference between an individual focus and a social-structural focus, or perhaps between individual action and collective action oriented to change. It thus retains the internal theoretical coherence of Smelser's work but places it somewhat more clearly within other definitions of collective behavior.[68] It also retains the potential of general application, for a two person interaction system or a society may still be analyzed using this theory.

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[67](cont'd) sense a cluster of norms. However, in this work norm-oriented beliefs are treated under the component of action called roles but are considered at the structural level rather than the individual level.

[68]That is, one could argue that panics and crazes are aggregated individual actions and not collective actions, and that they are oriented to individual problem solving, not collective problem solving. An individual's decision to join a religious group so he can avoid the normative use of alcohol in his own group or so he can find more satisfying personal values, is a similar type of action. All may be responses to "structural strain", as may be deviance and crime, but they are not appropriately analyzed as attempts to "reconstitute the socio-cultural environment". In contrast, an individuals decision to actively proselytize, to convert others to appropriate values, is a value-oriented change. Panics and crazes may appropriately be analyzed as uninstitutionalized actions, but not as actions oriented to changing the social system.

There is, however, another possible substantive organization of beliefs which is more difficult to derive from Smelser. This is an organization which recognizes Mannheim's distinctions between utopian and ideological belief systems, and as such associates beliefs with social change and social control. Briefly, social control beliefs are those which justify existing social arrangements, especially in the distribution of facilities and power; social change beliefs are those which delegitimize or deny the justness of such arrangements. In Parsons' view such beliefs are at the value level. Thus we could say that value-oriented beliefs are specifically those which focus on legitimacy, but we do not have a detailed picture of what "legitimizing" beliefs might look like.

The beliefs component of Talcott Parsons' social control model provides us with a partial picture (Supra p.f. 46). Thus beliefs which justify one groups greater access to facilities (and rewards), by describing the behavior of the other group as not normative, irresponsible, and needing to change, are social control beliefs. Beliefs held by the second group which accept that definition of the situation are also social control beliefs, but if their beliefs deny the definition a situation is unstable or subject to social change. It is the second type of beliefs which we should expect to find in collective behavior participants.

Ideational Characteristics: Precipitating Events

A precipitating event is defined as an event which "...gives the generalized belief concrete, immediate substance" (1962:17) either by confirming or justifying the generalized belief or by initiating or exaggerating the condition of strain, or by sharply redefining the conditions of conduciveness. That is, a precipitating event acts upon the previous three determinants modifying strain or conduciveness or confirming a belief. [69] I will return later to its capacity to act upon the social structure; here I wish to clarify its function in belief systems.

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[69] Precipitating factors may occur spontaneously, or they may be arranged by persons interested in the social movement in the case of norm and value-oriented movements (1962:295,353).

A precipitating event in relation to a belief system functions precisely as does a "reality test" in Burkhardt Holzner's system. A reality test is the procedure used by a social agent to transform images of reality into reality constructs or beliefs held with certainty. In Holzner's terms they are tests of theories, but this word should not be understood to refer only to scientific theories. The tests of certainty for scientific theories are deductive and empirical, but other tests are used for other types of theories. In the work-place, reality tests are pragmatic or pragmatic/empirical, a search for evidence that a particular activity "works" in this setting. In contrast, when a person is interpreting or "making sense" of his experience reality tests may be based in the legitimation of established authority. (The reality test may accept or automatically reject that authority, but in both cases it is based in the same structure of legitimacy). Finally, when experience involves personal identity, Holzner refers to "mystical" tests, strong emotional insights or revelations which assure the person that his beliefs in this area are true or certain (Holzner, 1972:51-59). The simple addition of a reality test as an element of explicit analysis in Smelser's theory, makes it possible to independently raise the question of the truth or "rationality" of beliefs held by the population. One need neither take for granted their reasonableness, as do Currie and Skolnick, nor their unreasonableness. It is only possible from a perspective such as this to even determine, to again use Aâh's language, whether "emics and etics" correspond (1972), whether theories and reality tests are shared. Specifically, in social science knowledge terms, reality tests should be pragmatic/empirical or deductive.

Such an addition to Smelser also brings more clearly into the theory the idea of praxis, for if a pragmatic/empirical test (i.e. action) works it may be taken as confirming the beliefs or knowledge of the acting group. It it does not work the acting group may, in principle, change their beliefs.

To summarize the theoretical position taken here on beliefs or idea systems as determinants of collective behavior, Smelser's work is modified in a number of ways. First of all, generalized beliefs are treated simply as beliefs about the source of strain in a society and the means to resolve that strain: their rationality or irrationality is a separate question to be addressed under the rubric reality test. Secondly, it is expected that these beliefs will be found in some sectors of the population (those who are under

strain) but the social beliefs of others in the population (not under strain) are also of considerable importance and subject to the same kind of analysis. Thirdly, these generalized beliefs are distinguished from the belief system of those active in collective behavior events, and the term ideology is reserved for this latter set of beliefs. Finally, the potential for diverse beliefs and clarification of the nature of institutionalized action, are added to the work.

The classification of beliefs on the basis of which component of action in the society they focus on is retained, but the possibility that the belief is reasonable forces a different type of analysis from Smelser. The modifications proposed under structural factors in relation to interpreting components of action are therefore incorporated into beliefs, but a further element is added by equating value-oriented beliefs with questions of legitimacy and therefore perhaps "repressive" social control.[79] Some possible types of belief are identified, as legitimizing or not legitimizing social control, but an exhaustive list of different types of consciousness is not attempted.

There are still a number of loose ends. One of the definitions Smelser gave to a precipitating event has been dropped: it will be added back to the analysis before it is completed. A set of social relations or "role structure" approriate to social control has been introduced but not incorporated into revisions; it will also be readdressed in the next section. This next section much more clearly introduces social actors into collective behavior analysis, as mobilizers and agents of social control are added to Smelser's theory to complete his list of determinants.

Social Actors in Collective Behavior:Mobilization

Mobilization is defined as "...bring(ing) the affected group into action" (1962:18). It

[79]There is again a problem with terms here. Social control and social order, as indicated earlier, tend to be treated as the same concept in Social Action Theory. If we draw on Lidz and Lidz, they have used the term social control to mean an unchanging system not a particular type of system. The analysis here suggests that Social Action Theory (or Parsons) incorporates one particular view of that unchanging system, a view of dominating, repressive, or some such relations as intrinsic to it. This does not follow from the use of the terminology in Lidz and Lidz. In their terminology, Parsons' description of social control might be viewed as a detailed account of the process of "assimilation", as personalities are transformed to fit the social system.

involves the generation of membership or participants plus the actions taken by social movement members to achieve their goals. However, when Smelser deals with mobilization he no longer uses his general framework: he does *not* address either the other five "determinants" of collective behavior nor his conceptual structure of society (facilities, mobilization into roles, norms, values). In fact he now shifts to four new categories of analysis, namely leadership, real and derived aspects of movements, the effect of success and failure, and the institutionalization of the movement (1962:298,355).

a) *Leadership*

Leadership is not well analyzed in Smelser's discussion. It is "important" in the development of a movement and associated with internal conflict and fragmentation. Different leadership types occur in norm and value-oriented movements. In norm-oriented movements the leaders are those who formulate the beliefs of the organization, those who mobilize participants for action, and those interested in "organizational maintenance". In value-oriented movements charismatic leaders, as defined by Weber, are considered characteristic of leadership (1962:355).

b) *Real and Derived Phases*

Smelser actually considers the notion of "movement career" under this heading, referring to the incipient phase, the phase of enthusiastic mobilization, and the period of institutionalization and organization (1962:298). This presents some difficulty as he has previously rejected the concept of natural history in favour of his value-added process (1962:18) and this may explain why his development of the ideas expressed here is somewhat weak and difficult to analyze. But in both norm and value-oriented movements when there is a membership burst it may lead to people with quite different interests than the original members of the movement; Smelser calls this a derived phase. Presumably if membership controls are introduced early the movement remains in a real phase, which is to say its original goals, or at least general direction, are maintained.

However, Smelser deals with another notion under the concept of "derived phase" in his disussion of panics and hostile outbursts (1962:154; 259-261). In these cases a derived phase is a *result* of the original action. Thus, in the case of panic, when a population observes the panicking crowd the action is perceived as a precipitating event, leading to further panic. The first action is seen by Smelser as in response to the actual strain, the second is in response to that first action. In this sense, the recruitment of members based on the existance of a movement or actions of movement members, might be considered derived; the shift in goal orientations should be treated as an analytically separate issue.

c) *Success and Failure*

The effect of success and failure is presented by Smelser in the context of strategy and tactics. The implication, of course, is that goals are specific, that the movement takes certain actions to achieve those goals, and that the results of those actions may be designated "success" or "failure". In general an unsuccessful movement declines and a successful one takes on the task of guarding its accomplishments. From Smelser's remarks about growth above, it may also be assumed that success or hope of success leads to movement growth, but he does warn that "...any movement which crusades under a fully developed set of generalized beliefs is bound to fail in one sense, because its fears and hopes are likely to be exaggerated..." (1962:305).

d) *Institutionalization*

Once again, in this discussion, there is some breakdown in the consistency of Smelser's analysis in his discussion of mobilization and institutionalization. In norm-oriented movements although he has four headings he has only three topics, for the effects of success and failure is discussed under two headings. Institutionalization is referred to in his analysis but not discussed(1962:296,302-303). In value-oriented movements he states he will discuss "the same" four topics as with norm-oriented movements but his last two are now the effect of success and failure and the institutionalization of the

movement (1962:355-361).

Institutionalization has to do with "...[generating] leadership to sustain the organization of the movement itself, [seeking] permanent bases of financing; [accommodating] new and more specialized activities within the movement [and routinizing] modes of recruitment"(1962:359). Smelser notes (and criticizes) the sect to denomination transition as a possible prototype of the process, but otherwise does not develop it in detail. To some degree institutionalization is probably best understood analytically as a boundary process, as at some point a fully "institutionalized" organization is no longer an "uninstitutionalized" social movement.[71]

Smelser's approach to mobilization leads William Oberschall to object that Smelser presents his theory as static, not dynamic because he "...does not have a satisfactory theory of mobilization and social control and does not realize that the interaction between mobilization and control processes generates the dynamic elements of conflict and collective behavior processes" (1973:24). Jung makes a similar point in an early review of Smelser's book when he points out that Smelser "...does not explore the various theoretical avenues opened by his own formulation, for example the symmetry between mobilization and social control mechanisms" (1966:320). [72]

This criticism of Smelser has lead to a major reorientation in collective behavior research, a direction called "resource mobilization". Oberschall, for example, redefines mobilization as "...the processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals" and social control as "... the same process, but from the point of view of the incumbants or the group being challenged" (1973:78). Mobilization and social control then are "...competetive processes of assembling resources, both material and ideological... (and) occur simultaneously in all the groups in conflict" (1973:28). The resource mobilization literature tends to focus on material resources of social movement organizations, rather than address the total set of

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[71]Ash and Zald introduce the notion of a "social movement organization" to the literature in 1966, pointing out that most movements are carried by organizations. The relationship between this observation and Smelser's notion of institutionalization has not been addressed in the literature.

[72]Nevertheless, Smelser is explicit about mobilization and social control interacting with each other, and in that sense does incorporate a dynamic element in his theory.

theoretical determinants addressed by Smelser (c.f. Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1973).

Although Oberschall's solution does indeed make much clearer the "dynamic' in Smelser's theory, it does not solve all of the problems around these two determinants in his theory. It is apparent in his description of mobilization that Smelser actually shifts here from his theory of determinants to his theory of social structure, so that mobilization is not clearly presented as a determinant. To make this clear one must return briefly to Social Action Theory and Smelser's theory of collective behavior.

After Parsons and Shils a social order is conceptualized analytically as consisting of facilities, *mobilization* into roles or organizations, norms, and values. This is a perfectly general concept "... (a social system) may be constituted by an informal, even casual interaction among two persons or it may be constituted by a large-scale enduring institutional complex such as a church, a market-system or even a society" (1962:24). Under certain circumstances, that is when that social order has conditions of conduciveness, strain, a particular type of belief held to be true, *mobilization* and social control of a particular type, then collective behavior occurs. Thus Smelser's theory consists of identifying six determinants within Parson's and Shil's social system of four components.

But notice the term mobilization occurs twice, once as a component of action and once as a determinant. In fact, what Smelser has inadvertently done is shifted his scope of analysis again, and under the rubric mobilization he is referring to a social movement analyzable as a social system. At this level mobilization can only refer to motivating individuals to join the social movement (to take on a role therein) and maximize facilities (or resources to use Gamson and Oberschall's term); presumably this mobilization occurs in the context of the values (or goals) and norms of the social movement.

Smelser thus has no separate determinant in *the social structure* which might be called mobilization.[73] He has however, in the value-added process which makes up his

[73]As discussed above what should, in any case be discussed as a social-structural component here is role structure, not mobilization. Mobilization into roles should be understood as something which occurs where the social system and personality system interpenetrate.

theory identified characteristics of the social structure and the belief system which would make mobilization easy or difficult; and which would make, for example, mobilizing into a norm-oriented movement easier than mobilizing into a value-oriented movement (or vice-versa). He has also identified what population in the social structure (those under strain) are most likely to mobilize.

The development of the revised theory does not require redefinition of this determinant, but only an explicit recognition of its nature. The term mobilization will be used in the revised theory to refer to "bringing the effected group into action"(1968:18). However, it implies that mobilizing may involve attempting to change social structural variables (Conduciveness, strain, beliefs) as well as acting to persuade people to join the movement. It will become apparent in the next section that this implies mobilization and social control are complementary concepts, as the resource mobilization theorists claim. However, complementary is not interpreted in this work simply as conflict between interacting groups.

Social Actors in Collective Behavior:Social Control

As noted above in relation to mobilization, Smelser is not rigourous in his analysis of the determinants called mobilization and social control, but unlike his discussion of mobilization he does define social control within the terms of his over-all system. Thus, social control is "...counterdeterminants which prevent, interrupt, or deflect or inhibit the accumulation of (social movement) determinants (1962:17). This includes two somewhat different types of control, actions which minimize conduciveness and strain, and actions which are used to halt collective behavior mobilization *after* it has begun. These latter include discrediting generalized beliefs and reinterpreting precipitating events, as well as acting directly against the mobilizing agency.

However, having made these definitional statements, and indicated some general relations, Smelser shifts to specific "rules" in his detailed discussion of social control, and notes the following types of action as appropriate for authorities attempting to control collective behavior:

1. Prevent communication in general, so beliefs cannot be disseminated

2. Prevent interaction between leaders and followers, so mobilization is difficult
3. Do not refuse to recognize one or more groups in the community
4. Do not close off avenues for norm-oriented agitation; rather encourage it
5. Do not take sides in the controversy
6. Permit expression of grievances but only within the confines of legitimacy; do not permit legitimacy itself to be directly challenged
7. If force is necessary, do not vacillate
8. Do not actively encourage some other form of collective behavior such as mob violence or revolution.
9. Reduce the sources of strain that initiated the movement (1962:267,307, 310,364)

Some of these rules can be interpreted within the framework of his theoretical determinants. Preventing communication, preventing interaction, and recognizing all groups would be reducing structural conduciveness as that has been described above. Encouraging norm-oriented agitiation, refusing to permit legitimacy to be challenged, and being careful not to encourage other forms of collective behavior are, however, all rather curious statements in relation to the theory. They do make clear Smelser's preference for normative change but with the possible exception of the reference to legitimacy they do not make any aspect of the theory clearer.

Not taking sides in the controversy is a statement of a different nature: It implies that the authorities are themselves above the conflict. As such it is a very strong legitimizing statement in relation to control. By the same token "use force if necessary" grants the legitimacy of the use of force to the authorities. It may be possible to argue that eschewing force completely would generate much different (and perhaps more useful) outcomes in the case of collective behavior events. [74]

Finally, reducing the source of strain could, at least in principal, imply changing the legitimacy structure of the society. It is also noteworthy that three specific instructions are given in regards to conduciveness, wheras none are given in regards to strain.

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[74] I am not trying to make an argument for non-violence here, but rather to point out the implications of certain "taken-for-granted" elements in Smelser's theory. It may be clearer if one thinks of the advice to "not vacillate in the use of force" were given to social movement members.

Social Actors in Collective Behavior: Mobilization and Control Compared

If we look more closely at Smelser's definition of mobilization and control, the problems become clearer. Smelser defines mobilization as "...bring(ing) the affected group into action" (1962:18) but defines social control as "...those counterdeterminants which prevent, interrupt, deflect, or inhibit the accumulation of collective behavior determinants" (1962:18). Social control may act to minimize conduciveness or strain or may act after a collective behavior event has begun; these are considered slightly different types of social control by Smelser.

Although these definitions follow one upon the other in Smelser's text, they clearly demonstrate his vacillation between describing collective behavior as some sort of subjectless social process (in the case of social control) or an activity carried on by social actors (in the case of mobilizing). It is also apparent that social control is defined in such a way that it incorporates all the elements of Smelser's theory, wheras mobilization seems to require a separate sub-theory, a description and explanation of the mobilization process itself. Both of these definitions raise more clearly the problem of social system boundaries which has been implicitly addressed in the discussion of generalized beliefs and ideology; this problem will be returned to below (*infra*, p. 96 and p. 98).

It is also apparent from the above description that Smelser's theory is integrated and formalized, although some ambiguities in meanings have been noted in the above discussion. Nevertheless, although there seem to be gaps, it would in principle be possible to identify all the elements in Smelser's theory, determine the possible values on these elements, and develop a computer simulation which would predict precisely the occurrance of a hostile outburst or a value-oriented social movement. This would, however, require the capacity to operationalize Smelser's concepts, a process which cannot easily be inferred from Smelser's abstract description.

It would also require a clearer definition of a social system or society. Smelser does not address this, except to indicate that the concept "social order" is perfectly generalizable - it may be anything from a two-person interaction system to a nation-state or world-system. He could address this in his discussion of social control, but he

avoids it by referring simply to "the authorities". The authorities or appropriate agencies of control include the police, the courts, the press, religious authorities, and community leaders (1962:17). However when he describes social control in relation to norm and value-oriented movements he refers only to political authorities, and those who must implement the decisions of these authorities such as the police and the military (1962:262, 364-365).

Smelser's theory, then, takes the suggestion of causal structural elements in the symbolic-interaction explanation of collective behavior and attempts to formalize these as structural conditions and strain from Social Action Theory. He leaves in place the interpretive framework of the actor by incorporating "generalized beliefs" into his explanation, and he adds an interaction between mobilizing forces and agents of social control. He does not, however, develop this reciprocal interaction very well (the criticism levelled at him by the resource mobilization school) and there is a marked asymmetry in his treatment of the two explanatory elements. Mobilization is described primarily in terms of actions taken by the mobilizing group to form as a group; social control is described primarily in terms of actions which are appropriate or inappropriate for the achievement of the social control goal. These differences may well be simply a reflection of the focus in Social Action Theory (and Piaget) on control mechanisms rather than change mechanisms referred to by Lidz and Lidz.

As with mobilization, it is obvious that Smelser has no separate determinant in the social structure which might be called social control. Rather, he has a definition of social control which clearly contextualizes it within his theory, for social control is acting upon all the other determinants to transform their values so that populations will *not* be subject to mobilization. Mobilization, then, can simply be defined as the opposite of social control, as acting upon the determinants of collective behavior to increase the ease of mobilization and it then is defined within Smelser's theory. In the language of Lidz and Lidz, both mobilization and social control become external to the analytically conceived social system, as actors mobilized into concrete subsystems act to change or maintain that social system.

But there does need to be a distinction made between acting on the social structure (to strengthen mobilization or social control capacities) and collectivities acting

against each other to weaken their organizational strength. Smelser makes this distinction in regards to social control; it also needs to be made in regards to mobilization. For example, Smelser treats social control as a set of detailed rules for control agents, but notes that one central element is authorities maintaining their legitimacy by being "impartial, neutral, and firm" (1962:266). Restated as a belief we would say that social movement participants and the general population must *believe* this is the case for agents of social control; this must be part of their "generalized belief" or ideology in regards to authority. If it is transformed, social control agents will be less effective in the social order.[75] Such a transformation of beliefs is quite different than, say, witholding taxes in an attempt to reduce the facilites (and power) of the government as an agency of social control.

This distinction between acting on the social structure or acting upon the mobilizing or controlling sub-systems also suggests problems with the resource mobilization approach to collective behavior. For example, Tilly defines mobilization as "the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action" (1978:7). If this group is conceptualized as a population category which lacks facilities (in Smelser an element of structural conduciveness) providing them with facilities or resources should not increase their likelihood of uninstitutionalized action but rather of institutionalized or normatively regulated action - that is it is an element in social control, not mobilization. [76]

By contrast, an organized social movement as a "subsystem" acquiring resources for action increases their capacity to act and (if they have an adequate theory or knowledge base) increases their capacity to generate conditions suitable for mobilization. Incidentally, in Smelser's system knowledge is a facility so adding to such an organization's knowledge is adding a resource. But viewing this as a competetive process of conflict between two collectivities, as does the resource mobilization literature, extracts the process from the social structure and converts the analysis

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[75]This is Lewis Feurer's point in regard to youth movements "delegitimizing the elders" (1968).

[76]It is an element of social control because institutionalized action is action which accepts the premises of the social system. It is not precisely clear why population groups who lack facilities should be the only or primary source of value-oriented movements. I believe this is a correct inference from Smelser, but it is not empirically necessarily the case.

simply into relations of intergroup conflict.

However, recognizing the complementarity between mobilization and social control does add considerably to the theory, for it means that concepts Smelser has applied only to mobilizing must have analogues in social control and vice versa. This has been implied in the discussion of a generalized belief as either mobilizing or controlling; similarly the group-specific beliefs of control agents may not be exactly the same as their public's generalized belief and in this context one may speak of a counter-ideology.

The overall reanalysis of Smelser also forces one to ground both mobilizing and social control in some population subgroups. Smelser does this explicitly only with mobilizing, as a population under strain carries the generalized belief and is subject to collective behavior participation. Without moving to some other theory one can only infer that the population *not* under strain provides the base for the social control subsystem. The nature of their generalized beliefs and the reality tests they use must be subject to the same examination as mobilizing groups.

Thus the underlying dynamic element in Smelser is not only between mobilized social movements and mobilized agents of control, but between populations who differentially benefit from a social structure, or who differentially perceive those structural benefits. Although the modifying of "strain" may imply simply changing the lowest possible level of the components of action (for example, increasing education as a facility of the population)[77] so that the social structure will not be seriously challenged, the conflict which occurs between two mobilized groups may eventually result in a focus on values (as Smelser suggests, 1962:62), a bringing to the consciousness of all participants the principles which underlie the social organization and the legitimations of that structure and result in a fundamental transformation of the social system. Or it may result in a simple integration of the objecting group into the existing social order, as in Coser's notion of the functions of conflict, Smelser's belief in the importance of

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[77]Education, as a cognitive process may be related to Smelser's theory in a number of ways and I do not mean to imply here that it is "only" a facility. Although it could function as a facility, increasing power, knowledge, and skills of people under strain and thereby mobilizing them into social structures, it could also be the source of generalized belief which challenges the social situation. It may also at times be the source of individually experienced strain, implying certain occupational goals are possible when those occupations are not, in fact, allocated to this population segment.

norm-oriented movements, and Mello's insistance that protest movements are based in "system-bound" power.

In summary, mobilization and social control as the last two determinants are recognized as fundamentally different than the other determinants. Although both are based in certain structural arrangements, both clearly involve decisions and actions taken by social actors. As they become organized in social movements, countermovements, or institutionalized reactions, the organized form may also be analyzed as a social system but this must not be confused with the analysis of the larger social system or society in which each is based. They also may act upon each other, in a classic conflict relationship, and act back upon the society both intentionally and inadvertantly. It is this which generates the dynamics in collective behavior processes, a dynamic which may result in minor changes in the social order, transformation of the society, or the demise of the social movement structure.

Secondly, mobilization and social control are conceptualized as based in population sectors - Smelser is reasonably clear about this in relation to moblization but completely misses it for social control. Analysis of a collective behavior event requires then a full understanding of each population sector as well as of each of the organized oppositional structures which arise. There is some difficulty with this approach in Smelser, for he deals with institutions (specifically the state) as the primary agent of social control. Implying that the state is based in one population sector takes for granted that there is no autonomy of the state from the class structure (*Vide* Parkin, 1973;Skocpol, 1979).

Finally more of the structural elements of a social structure subject to mobilization or control are derived from Parson's work, and a precipitating event as a causal event is more clearly recognized. The problem of social system boundaries is recognized, and some of the implications specified, but it is left unresolved.

Before we explore the implications of this reorientation of Smelser's theory, three loose ends must be tied up. First of all it was noted above (p.85) that Smelser defined precipitating event in two ways. One definition was replaced by the concept of reality test; the other involved events which increased structual strain or modified conduciveness so that collective behavior would occur. In view of the discussion above

about the complementarity of mobilization and social control, an opposite concept should exist, perhaps something called a suppressing event which contributes to social control.

But just as mobilization and social control have no separate identity within the social structure (they do as organized subsystems, or alternatively as terms which characterize structural relations in some way), neither does a precipitating event. Rather it is an event which transforms an existing structural variable so that the system is engaged as a mobilizing system. If all other determinants are in place, the creation of solidary networks (an element of conduciveness) would act as a precipitating event; the destruction of such networks alone would act as a suppressing event. Smelser tends to emphasize these events as spontaneous and sudden, and in that context as events which fully confirm generalized beliefs, but he indicates they can be arranged by people wishing to do so (1962:295,353). Clearly a precipitating event (and its converse, a suppressing event) is what would be called a cause in causal analysis - it should be of great interest to mobilizers and controllers - but its exact nature will depend upon the determinants already present in a social system.

Secondly, there was a discussion above about the beliefs associated with mobilization and control, and specific models of beliefs were derived from Talcott Parsons' description of social control. In his description Parsons also specifies patterns of social organization appropriate to control. Briefly, these are referred to as insulation and isolation - separating the people to be controlled from others not in need of control, and separating the people in need of control from each other. There is a third element, a demand for social distance as the "controller" maintains a "professional stance" in relation to the other. These are patterns of social interaction or norms or role expectations, based on a single general principle of organization, or value, which might be called social control.

Parsons indicates precisely that if people are not isolated from each other they will construct an alternative shared definition of the situation and not be subject to control. This is another way of describing certain aspects of structural conduciveness previously referred to as solidary relations or role structures, but it is both somewhat more detailed and more general than Smelser. It does not relate solely to interest

formation or political processes, but rather social relations in general, and it describes a process which could be counteracted by Smelser's institutional differentiation but it could also be accomplished by various means. However, the end process of Parsons' view of social control is supposed to be transformation of the personality so social control is no longer necessary; it is not conceptualized as a permanent social structure.[73] For Smelser the end process of appropriate social control is a social structure in which normative social movements occur so that norms may be modified (including structural role relationships) but not values or fundamental or explicit principles of organization. It is this sense that Smelser's work most clearly relates to that of Lidz and Lidz, and that the charge that his is "only" a theory of social control is at least oversimplified if not entirely false.

Thirdly, there is a problem with boundaries in social systems analysis. What has been earlier referred to as a problem of scope in Smelser could also be analyzed as a problem of social system boundaries. In principal one should be able to specify the boundaries of the social system which exhibits conduciveness, strain, and the other determinants. For example, the whole analysis of collective behavior and social control could be applied to any bounded social system such as an education system, a church, or even a social movement itself. It is this which suggests that social control should also be conceptualized as a subsystem, a bounded social system analyzable in the same terms as mobilizing groups and the society.

But the problem of boundaries is a very slippery one in social system analysis (Olsen, 1968:229). The tendency is to define a society as a self-subsistent social system which spans the lives of individuals and recruits biologically (Parsons, 1951:19) but in operationalizing the concept, to think of it as delimited by state-boundaries (Parsons, 1971:16). Thus the territorial state *de facto* determines the boundaries of the society. The system of social control, especially repressive social control, is that available to the state. Smelser implicitly shifts to such a definition and analyzes social

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[73]There is an assumption throughout this model that when a person has been changed they will be reincorporated into the larger social structure. The fact that this assumption is generally false underlies much labelling theory, and perhaps explains the success of groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous which create incorporating solidary relations as part of the process of changing the individual's behavior.

control as the actions of state agencies (although he recognizes other agents, such as the media). Other authors, such as Tilly and Gamson, make this shift even more explicitly as the whole process of collective behavior is analyzed as a process involving collective political interests and state responses to collective actions.

The shift then is to analyzing collective behavior not in societies but within the bounds of existing social institutions as bounded social systems. During the reformation collective behavior would be analyzed as within the boundaries of the established church; today they are more likely to be interpreted as within the bounds of existing states, as the most powerful social institution (Tilly, 1978).

This then completes the description and analysis of Smelser's theory. In the following section of this chapter Smelser's theory, possible ways of operationalizing it, and changes to Smelser's work which produce a Critical Theory of collective behavior, will be summarized.

C. Theoretical Issues

In Chapter One the collective behavior literature was introduced as a literature which should enable one to address theoretical issues of social control, social order, and social change. Neil Smelser's theory was taken as prototypical of a mainstream theoretical structure which underlies much of the writing in this field. However, precise definitions of each of the above concepts were not presented. Rather the introduction discussed alternative definitions which distinguished between social control as socialization to conformity, as repressive, and as based on the maintenance of social order while social change occurred. It also proposed Parsons' theory of social control as a possible elaboration of Smelser's use of the term, and introduced the Lidz and Lidz revisions to Social Action Theory as they related to control and conditions.

It is now apparent that the uneven development of fundamental concepts in Smelser's (and Parsons') work poses some problems for the analysis. In particular, to incorporate the Lidz brother's work, it is necessary to conceptualize mobilization as something which both control agents and change agents do in a society, so that both can be viewed as external factors acting back upon the social structure. The development of the language of social control, social order, mobilization, and conditions makes this

conceptualization difficult. One possibility is that the concept of social order should be the overarching concept, with the dynamic interaction of social change factors and social control factors determining whether the existing social order is maintained, modified or transformed.

Critical analysis also suggested a number of problems in operationalizing Smelser's more specific concepts, but the analysis raised a series of possible solutions to these problems. It was suggested that conduciveness be interpreted in terms of the following ten elements:

1. The existance of population categories which can be described as differentially allocated to certain roles, or types of roles, in a social order
2. The existance of populations which lack institionalized means or legitimized power in a social order (that is, which are not "allocated" such means or power)
3. The nature of solidary relations among the people who make up that population
4. The nature of relations (solidary, distant) between the population which lacks power and the population which, relatively, holds it
5. Communicative structures within the population which lacks power
6. Communicative structures between the populations who hold and lack power
7. A role structure in which interest articulation is concentrated in a single (or few) institutional structures, contrasted to one in which interest articulation is dispersed amongst many structures
8. A role structure in which interest aggregation is concentrated in a single (or few) institutional structures
9. A role structure in which interest articulation and aggregation are accomplished by the same institutional structure
10. A value-system which does not legitimize, or specifically delegitimizes, social change oriented activity by certain population groupings

It was suggested that strain be tentatively interpreted in three different ways, and that a decision be made as to the most useful interpretation on the basis of the case studies. The three interpretations of strain each include a number of different possible types of strain. They were as follows:

1. Strain could be interpreted literally as Smelser defines it, as a disjunction between the components of action. Six possible types of strain could occur.
   a. Strain between legitimizing values and the normative role pattern, or pattern of expectations
   b. Strain between legitimizing values and role mobilization, specifically

rewards associated with roles
c. Strain between legitimizing values and facilities allocated to roles
d. Strain between normative role patterns or expectations and the reward patterns, or mobilization structures
e. Strain between the normative role expectations and the facilities provided to roles
f. Strain beween the rewards (mobilization) and facilities

2. Alternatively strain could be interpreted as an internal lack of coherance within a component of action. There would then be four possibilities:

   a. Value-strain, or the presence of value-orientations, legitimizing statements, and world-views among populations which are in opposition to each other
   b. Normative-strain, or the presence of patterns of organization (expectations) which are in opposition to each other (Useem's definition of contradiction)
   c. Role mobilization strain, or the presence of alternative modes of role-mobilization which are in opposition to each other
   d. Facilities strain, or the presence of means to ends which are mutually exclusive or contradictory

3. The third possible way of interpreting strain would be to interpret it as a disjunction between the social system and the other subsystems of action. This would result in only three types of strain:

   a. Strain between the social system (or patterned expectations) and the personality system

   b. Strain between the social system and the cultural system

   c. Strain between the social system and the adaptive system.
      The first would be strain on moblization, the second on values, and the third on facilities

These then are possible ways of interpreting structural conduciveness and strain for research and theoretical purposes. Smelser's discussion of a generalized belief, as the belief which diagnoses the situation and proposes appropriate action, was left as operationable, although some changes will be suggested in the alternative theory proposed below. Similarly, it is simply recognized that Smelser uses the belief to categorize the various types of collective behavior, from hostile out-bursts to value-oriented movements. Thus, his typification of beliefs is hysterical, wish-fulfilling, hostile, norm-oriented and value-oriented. Likewise a precipitating event in Smelser is simply recognized as two kinds of events, events which modify strain or conduciveness or events which confirm generalized beliefs.

Smelser's definition of mobilization (as "...bringing the affected group into action", 1962:18) and his definition of social control (as "...those counterdeterminants which prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit the accumulation of collective behavior determinants", 1962:18) are also simply recognized. However, his own categories of

analysis under each of these determinants needs to be specifically identified , as they were in above. They will be briefly reiterated here.

Under mobilization Smelser discusses leadership; a real and derived phase of a movement (the first is response to the actual structure condition, the second is partially response to the collective behavior event itself); the effects of success and failure, and institutionalization which is described primarily in terms of organizational permanency and stability, rather than legitimacy.

Under social control Smelser sets out nine rules. These range from actions aimed at reducing the social structural problem (i.e. the source of strain) to actions directed towards interfering directly with the mobilizing group. The nine rules are:

1. Prevent communication in general, so beliefs cannot be disseminated
2. Prevent interaction between leaders and followers, so mobilization is difficult
3. Do not refuse to recognize one or more groups in the community
4. Do not close off avenues for norm-oriented agitation, rather encourage it
5. Do not take sides in the controversy
6. Permit expression of grievances but only within the confines of legitimacy; do not permit legitimacy itself to be directly challenged
7. If force is neccesary, do not vacillate
8. Do not actively encourage some other form of collective behavior such as mob violence or revolution
9. Reduce the source of strain that initiated the movement

Smelser's theory, in trying to explain all forms of collective uninstitutionalized action, includes panic as one form of action. In the case of a military retreat, for example, panic is contrasted to orderly withdrawal of the troops. Although it seems problematic to incorporate this into a theory of change-oriented social action, it represents a kind of boundary case in which escape from the situation is believed possible. By implication, something must bind people to a social system before they will engage in other types of collective behavior, from hostile outbursts to value-oriented movements.

But if we search for a collective or group-based analogue to panic, it would be a situation in which a collectivity leaves (or separates from) a previously defined social

system. In the case of nation-states or societies, one action often called a revolution would be categorized as this form of behavior. This is the colonial revolution or separatist movement, in which collectivities within the same state structure establish independent state structures. Similarly, the 'craze' as a *collective* orientation to change would be the establishment of a utopian social system in which desired goods (facilities, values) are obtained for the population who participate in the utopia but there is no attempt to modify the larger structure which initially generated the discontent.

From this point on Smelser's theory is a complex description of social system conditions which will generate populations subject to uninstitutionalized mobilization, and which will channel a mobilized population in certain directions. At the social system level these conditions (strain, conduciveness) are interpreted in terms of values, norms, role mobilization, and facilities. At the level of interacting collectivities they are interpreted as the actions of agents of control and agents of mobilization. The intervening element, between the analytical system and the system of organized actors is a belief system, a generalized belief. In the last analysis something called a precipitating event is the "cause" of mobilization. In any given social system one should be able to predict from Smelser *who* (what social groups) will engage in collective behavior, and what type of action they will take, given the responses of control agents.

As a result of a critical analysis of Smelser, a Critical Theory is proposed. It does not modify structural conduciveness or strain in Smelser, except to the extent they are modified above to make them operationable. [79] It does however suggest modifications in all of the other determinants.

Specifically, the alternative theory requires a recognition of a pattern of binary relations implied by taking note of the complementarity between mobilization and control. Thus the base of both mobilizing groups (mobilizers and controllers in Smelser) in the social structure must be recognized, the beliefs of both mobilizers and controllers must be treated equivalently, and the general issue of conduciveness must be related to the capacity of both groups to act, not only one of them.

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[79]Although the changes to strain and conduciveness are primarily changes which make it possible to operationalize the concepts, they are in fact considerable, as the extensive discussion above implies (*supra*, pp. 54 to 74).

Under generalized beliefs three major modifications are suggested. One is the distinction between generalized beliefs and ideology, or counterideology. Generalized beliefs refer to population beliefs but the latter two terms are used for the somewhat more specific formulated sets of beliefs which develop in the mobilizing and controlling collectivities.

The second is the introduction of the concept of reality test which convinces actors that their overall belief is, after all, true. This is separated out as one meaning which Smelser gives to a precipitating event.

The third is the introduction, as an example, of one possible pattern of beliefs which might be called social control beliefs (derived from Talcott Parsons work, supra pp. 48-50). Thus the beliefs in the Critical Theory are not only to be characterized according to their orientation to a component of action and their proposal for action to correct the situation, but also some overall character. This may be treated as a "value-orientation", and in Parsons' theory it would then determine the identity of a social system. It requires, however, a type of categorization of beliefs which Smelser does not demand.

Under precipitating event the modifications in the alternative theory are primarily matters of conceptual clarification. They distinguish between a precipitating event as the confirmation of a belief (a reality test, above), and a precipitating event as an event which modifies social structural conditions (strain or conduciveness). The binary nature of the second theory requires the recognition of a complementary concept, a supressing event, which contributes to social control.

In relation to mobilization and social control the second theory recognizes major problems in scope in Smelser as he shifts between mobilizing within a larger social structure and mobilizing for collective behavior participation. It then proposes to treat mobilization and social control themselves as opposite concepts. Each collectivity must then be analyzed in terms of their actions *on the social situation* which favours change mobilization or control mobilization, as well as their actions *on each other* which favours mobilization or control, and finally *their internal actions* which strengthen or weaken the organized mobilizing and controlling collectivities. Smelser deals only with social control agents in relation to the first two, and mobilizing actors in relation to the third.

Finally, the Critical Theory leaves open the question of short-circuited beliefs and action. For Smelser this is the action of uninstitutionalized mobilizing populations, and it is action which jumps from diagnosis to solution without specifying intermediate steps. By implication in Smelser's work, agents of control do not act in a short-circuited manner; their behavior is calculated and "rational" in relation to goals.

The overall shift in the second theory is toward viewing the process of mobilization and control in terms of Lidz and Lidz's (1978) modification to Parsons' theory. Thus mobilization and control are seen as external factors impinging upon an analytically conceived social structure, a structure which is analagous to schemata in Piaget.This overarching conceptualization which may be dealt with under the rubric social order replaces Smelser's overarching concept of social control, in which social control as an umbrella concept relates to every other element of this theory.

It also requires that Piaget's concepts of reciprocal assimilation, assimilation, and accomodation be interpreted as social system concepts. First approximations would be to interpret reciprocal assimilation as change related to a reorganization between patterns in a social structure, and to interpret accomodation as a process whereby existing patterns of interaction are modified to enable external patterns to fit within them. Assimilation would be a process whereby external actors or patterns are made to fit an existing pattern of action or social structure, and imitation would be its opposite, in that an existing pattern of action is modified to precisely fit an externally impinging pattern. Of course, assimilation from the perspective of one social system is imitation from the perspective of the other.

It is these many concepts which will be used in the descriptive work which follows. The first case study will be the Akaitcho Hall "riot", as the lowest level of collective behavior response and therefore (in principle) the easiest to analyze. The next cases will involve increasing complexity, first the Dene nation social movement as a norm or value-oriented movement and then an analysis of changes in the N.W.T. state structure.

IV. The Akaitcho Riot as a Hostile Outburst

A. Introduction

This case-study is a study of a collective behavior event which occured in a relatively small context, a student hostel called Akaitcho Hall in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada. The social structure which is being explicitly challenged is that of the school-residence itself, but the conflict draws in people from wider and wider circles. These include the education system, the government of the Northwest Territories, and the government of Canada, as well as the townspeople of Yellowknife. Although the event begins as norm-oriented (directed towards changing written rules and the pattern of organization in the residence), in its final form it would be categorized by Smelser as a hostile outburst. Thus the values of the explanatory variables should be somewhat different than those found in the later social movement case (Chapter Five) or the case of state formation (Chapter Six).

The event occurred in February of 1969, beginning with a question raised in the House of Commons about residence rules (on a Tuesday). It peaked the following Saturday morning with a minor cup-throwing incident, called by the student involved "my one-woman riot". The associated state of minor hysteria in Yellowknife town peaked Saturday evening, after the involved student rushed into the C.B.C. radio broadcast booth during the six o'clock news and announced to the whole town her sudden expulsion from the school residence. Following this education personnel issued a firm reassuring statement on the radio, C.B.C. took their phones off the hooks, locked their doors, and changed their programming to soft music, and the town calmed down. The event could be considered formally ended when the Commissioner of the Territories was appointed to investigate the residence the following Tuesday, one week from the day the question was raised in the House of Commons. This then is the event which the rest of this chapter describes in detail.

Within Smelser's theory a hostile outburst is "mobilization for action under a hostile belief" (1962:226). It is a 'higher level' response than a panic or a craze,[10] for it

[10]This is not a value judgment by Smelser; rather it is a function of the notion that components of action are hierarchically related in a social system.

is collective behavior oriented to roles rather than facilities. For Smelser however it would be preferable if such mobilization were a norm-oriented movement, but not a value-oriented one. That is, the outcome of social control should ideally move it up the hierarchy one notch, but not two.

The generalized belief of the participants is then hostile but it includes elements of the hysterical[31] and wish-fulfilling beliefs[32] associated with panic and crazes. The change sought in the situation is "...the destroying, injuring, removing, or restricting a person or class of persons considered responsible for an evil at hand" (1962:101). Smelser discusses lynch-mobs, ghetto riots, and other forms of mob violence as his examples of hostile outbursts.

Thus in a hostile outburst, some person or persons are held responsible for the discomfort people feel as strain, and attention focuses on that person. The term scapegoating is used by Smelser in this context, and he notes that people are not satisfied to address laws or other kinds of reform.

What would the Critical Theory described earlier predict as the causes of a hostile outburst? That is, given that we are able to define a particular collective behavior event as a hostile outburst what behavior would we expect to find associated with it? What would mobilization and social control agents do? What social structural conditions should we find? It is tautological to say the belief of the mobilizers will be hostile (and that it would therefore incorporate some elements of hysterical and wish-fulfilling beliefs), for that is used to define our type as a hostile outburst, but all other statements in the theory are open to test.

In brief, hostile outbursts occur when neither escape (panic) nor magical solutions (wish fulfillment) are available, and when normative changes are impossible. This is the first element in structural conduciveness in Smelser, but a number of other structural factors identified in the preceding chapter should also be present. The four elements of

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[31]Hysterical beliefs are beliefs which "empower an ambiguous element in the environment with a generalized power to threaten or destroy" (Smelser, 1962:84). They arise in response to ambiguity (or uncertainty) and anxiety. "Unstructured...ambiguity arises with an irregular or abnormal event, unanticipated information, or dangers of unknown proportions..." (ibid:86).

[32]Wish-fulfilling beliefs "...guarentee a positive outcome in an uncertain situation by empowering some force with generalized potency to overcome the possibly frustrating, harmful or destructive possibilities" (ibid, 1962:94).

conduciveness are:

1. A population sector which lacks institutionalized means or legitimized power to create change.

2. Role structures which
   a. display social relations which make influence impossible (i.e. lack of social relations between those out of power and those in power, or social distance between the two categories)
   b. display social relations within the group which make the spread of ideas possible
   c. communication structures in which there is lack of access to those in power
   d. communicative structures which permit access to others not in power
   e. interest aggregation through a single structure[13]
   f. interest articulation through a single structure[14]
   g. a single structure both articulates and aggregates interests[15]

3. A normative structure in which there is
   a. differential allocation of the above roles to some people and not others
   b. allocation of identifiable populations to population sectors with and without the above characteristics

4. Value systems which
   a. are in conflict, that is differing conceptions of the desireable and undesireable as they relate to human/environment and intrahuman relationships
   b. do not legitimize, or specifically delegitimize, social change oriented activity by certain population groupings

Structural strain should also be present and it should look something like this:

1. Strain between legitimizing values and the normative role pattern, or pattern of expectations
2. Strain between legitimizing values and role mobilization, specifically rewards associated with roles
3. Strain between legitimizing values and facilities allocated to roles
4. Strain between normative role patterns or expectations and the reward patterns, or mobilization structures
5. Strain between the normative role expectations and the facilities provided to roles.
6. Strain beween the rewards (mobilization) and facilities

Alternatively strain could be interpreted as an internal lack of coherance within a component of action. There would then be four possibilities:

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[13]There is no actual reference to this aspect of role in hostile outbursts; it must be assumed from norm-oriented social movements.
[14]Again, this is not discussed in Smelser in the context of hostile outbursts.
[15]As with the previous two factors, Smelser does not state this in relation to hostile outbusts

1. Value-strain, or the presence of value-orientations, legitimizing statements, and world-views among populations which are in opposition to each other
2. Normative-strain, or the presence of patterns of organization (expectations) which are in opposition to each other (Useem's definition of contradiction)
3. Role mobilization strain, or the presence of alternative modes of role-mobilization which are in opposition to each other
4. Facilities strain, or the presence of means to ends which are mutually exclusive or contradictory

The third possible way of interpreting strain would be to interpret it as a disjunction between the social system and the other subsystems of action. This would result in only three types of strain, strain between the social system (or patterned expectations) and the personality system, or the cultural system, or the behavioral system. The first would be strain on moblization, the second on values, and the third on facilities.

Some of the above conditions of strain or conduciveness may occur quite suddenly, or they may be shaped by some event, resulting in all the conditions for collective behavior falling into place; such occurrences are precipitating events and Smelser would predict that some factors could be interpreted this way. The generalized belief has been described above as the means of typifying this event, but the Critical Theory would also predict a reality test which gives this belief power, or a degree of certainty. This is a second type of precipitating event or immediate "cause" in the theory. The Critical Theory also implies that beliefs of the controllers must be considered. These are expected to be the beliefs associated with Parsons' view of social control. That is, controllers should believe they are responsible for the situation and others are irresponsible (or not responsible) within it, the others must change their behavior to be incorporated into the system, and that they do not provide "normal" sanctions to the others unless they refuse to recognize their obligation to change. In the latter event the type of sanctions may change markedly, perhaps becoming punitive and repressive. Such beliefs should also be made concrete or certain by some reality test, some confirmatory observation or event.

Given that this event has a relatively clear-cut ending, there may also be some factor which could be interpreted as a suppressing event, that is, the opposite of a precipitating event. This could be another reality test, something which confirms a different set of beliefs about the situation, or it could be something which changes one of the five other determinants so it no longer contributes to collective behavior.

Finally, there are specific actions predicted for the mobilizers and controllers by the theory. Mobilization is briefly described as dependent on leadership (various types are presented), ecological factors (the availability of an object of hostility), and the actions of social control agents. But there is not a really clear picture of mobilizers in hostile outbursts[16]; they appear to arrive at their beliefs and act upon them in a crowd or mob situation. However, Smelser also predicts that hostile outbursts may occur when authorities respond in particular ways to social movements; given the case here, this should prove to be the major causal prediction for this particular event.

Smelser's theory is much clearer in its description of control agent behavior than of mobilizers, at least in terms of what should be done to bring the situation under control. That description in the text occurs first in relation to hysterical beliefs and hostile outbursts, then in the context of social movements. The control for unstructured ambiguity leading to hysteria (which is an element of hostile outbursts) is:

1. Facilities oriented - supply information which defines a surprising event as non-threatening
2. Role-oriented - provide firm leadership in the face of crisis
3. Norm-oriented - create norms in advance for unanticipated events (as in disaster exercises)
4. Value-oriented - appeal to 'having faith' that everything will turn out well (1962:88, 158-168)

In relation to hostile outbursts the control specifics are:

1. Facilities oriented - prevent communication so beliefs cannot be disseminated.
2. Role-oriented - prevent interaction between leaders and followers
3. Norm-oriented - refrain from a conditional attitude toward violence by vacillating in the use of the ultimate weapon of force
4. Value-oriented -refrain from entering into the issues, remain impartial and unyielding on the principle of law and order (1962:267).

Finally, in the context of social movements, Smelser desribes ways that control

[16]The details about mobilization presented in the previous chapter relate to norm and value-oriented movements.

agencies may act to block or discourage normative social movements, thereby ensuring other kinds of collective behavior. Most of these actions are included in the above, but he adds:

5. Do not vacillate in response to pressures from the social movement

But the Critical Theory developed in Chapter Three suggests we should not only observe for these kinds of behaviors, but explicitly observe the way that mobilizers and controlling collectivities act on each other, on their internal structure, and on the social system which is the source of conduciveness and strain.

Given the addition of Lidz and Lidz's work to the theory, one especially crucial element is the way that mobilizers and controllers act upon a pre-existing social structure (analagous to schemata) and the way that social structure makes certain responses to those actions possible or impossible. Formally moblizing actors function as "conditions" influencing "control" structures in the overall process of system integration. The system can respond by assimilation, exercising control over the conditions, or by accommodation, permitting its structure to be influenced by the conditions. Precise predictions are not possible, as the concrete manifestations of this theoretical reconceptualization is not worked out, but it will be necessary to reflect on this question at the end of the chapter.

Two other issues should be addressed through the case study. The first is whether or not the addition of Parsons' work on Social Control (and the modifications) assist in explaining any of the observations, or clarifying Smelser's use of social control. The second is how to deal with the systems issue. Smelser's theory proposes that systems can be defined and described in such a way that collective behavior can be analyzed as a consequence of intrasystem factors - this case study in fact will continually push us outside the system in question, and that fact will be discussed in the conclusions.

Let us turn to see what theoretical insights the case provides.

B. The Case: Structural Conduciveness and Strain

The incident which is referred to as a riot or hostile outburst has been quickly described at the beginning of this chapter. On a Saturday morning at 9 a.m. there was a heated exchange between the Akaitcho Hall administrator and a young Metis woman student, the student cursed and threw a few cups, most other students left the dining hall, and the incident was soon over. For that event to reflect upon our theory, we need to describe the setting with regards to the determinants of collective behavior; to be able to understand it in other terms we need a chronology and contextualization through a longer time period.

The data for this chapter are drawn from five major sources and some minor ones. As I was present in Yellowknife at the time of the incident, and involved in some of the negotiations, some data are drawn from field notes and reports to my employer. A second major source of data is a report on Akaitcho written by Steve Iveson, a CYC volunteer at the time, who was held by some to be responsible for the incident. Other documents include other reports written on Akaitcho Hall, newspaper reports, and government reports on schooling in the Northwest Territories. Miscellaneous other resources were used, but each makes a relatively minor contribution to the chapter; they will be referenced when they are cited. [87]

Akaitcho Hall was a student residence for pupils from outside of Yellowknife attending Junior and Senior High School at Sir John Franklin School. Residents came from communities throughout the Mackenzie District, some from acutely troubled Indian or Inuit communities, some from stable traditional land-based Indian and Inuit settlements, and others from mining communities.

The local-level administrator was formally the school principal, as an educator, and the hostel administrator should have reported to him. This was in keeping with a federal policy of no longer having "residential" schools for Native students. The principal of Sir John was in practise, however, directly responsible for the school only and the administrator of Akaitcho for the residence. Both reported to the Zone superintendent of education in Yellowknife, who in turn reported to the regional office

[87]Most of the sources are available in the National Archives at Ottawa, Record Group 116, The Company of Young Canadians.

at Ft. Smith. The Superintendent of Education reported directly to the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, for although there was a Territorial Council which functioned somewhat like a legislature, there was no cabinet structure, and hence no Minister of Education. The Commissioner's "line" for reporting was to the Federal Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Ottawa: the Territorial Council was formally considered an "advisory" council.

Like all such residences (in 1969, a total of nine), it was owned by the government (in this case, the Federal, not the Territorial Government), but unlike most other residences it was formally operated by the government not the church. (Four were operated by the Roman Catholic Church; three by the Anglican, and two by the government.) It was not, however, "just" a government school. This was to be a modern, secular school, a "campus of the north". It was the showpiece of government policy for years, and a film documenting its merits was widely shown. This northern high-school would not be "missionary", but academic and vocational, in keeping with the times (Carney, interview, 1982). However, it was partially perceived as an Anglican residence; the director and his wife had been Anglican missionaries in the North since the 1940's, the staff was largely hired through an Anglican network, and the Anglican priest in Yellowknife functioned as an unofficial Chaplain to the residence.[88]

When Akaitcho Hall was built in 1958, the average age of the student body was about 22 years. By 1969 the average age was 18.5 years (14 to 24) and students were virtually all in high-school programmes (Iveson, 1969:1). The student enrollment in 1969 was reported as 23 Eskimos(Inuit), [89] 60 Indians, and 93 others (Government of the N.W.T), but the Iveson report says the largest group are the Treaty Indian and Metis students, while in somewhat smaller numbers are the White and Eskimo students (1969:1). If we assume the Indian and Metis numbers were approximately equal, this suggests about 33 whites in the residence.[90]

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[88]This point was discussed with Dr. R. Carney, who was with the Department of Education on and off through the sixties and seventies. He agreed it was a surrogate Anglican residence, but had not thought of it that way himself.
[89]The term Eskimo is used in these reports, as the term Inuit was seldom used at this time. Throughout the rest of this thesis I will use the term Inuit for this population unless I am citing a document which uses the word Eskimo.
[90]Tompkins (1969) reports students in Akaitcho from 32 Mackenzie communities, but 100 of 166 are from Ft. Simpson south. He divides the "others" into 32 Metis and 57 "others" or non-natives. This figure for Metis seems a little low.

Students in Akaitcho Hall came from elementary schools in small communities, in which most of the children were Native, or from mining communities in which all of the children were White. Akaitcho Hall itself was close to the past experience of Native students, in that most of their student peers were Native. But the school, Sir John Franklin, enrolled all high school students from the Yellowknife Public Schools and all grade 12 students from the Yellowknife Separate School system (Canada.N.W.T., 1968,p. 50). For many of the Native students Sir John Franklin was their first experience with large numbers of Whites as competitive peers, as as members of social cliques which were not easy to enter. Most of these White students also lived in the town of Yellowknife, and had homes and parents to return to after school, not a student residence.

But the homes of some Indian students in Akaitcho Hall were quite close -the local Yellowknife Indian village (now called Detah), or old town in Yellowknife, or Ft. Rae or Jean Marie River. These students had usually attended elementary school at Ft. Smith, or sometimes Ft. Simpson, where there were residences for elementary age children. Their experiences with schooling are graphically portrayed in the following two accounts.

> I caught a ride to Rae Lakes today, on the plane going to pick up school children. I was anxious to see Rae Lakes and happy for the chance to go along. But what a scene. The children did not want to leave. They ran and hid in the bush, mothers hid their children behind them. Everyone seemed to be running and crying at times. Eventually we loaded 12 children on the plane, and away we went to another school year in Ft. Smith. (Letter to the author in 1970, from a C.Y.C. volunteer).

But all Indian children did not try to avoid school, in spite of considerable misery associated with it. A young Dogrib lad in grade eleven in 1971 described his experience like this:

> ...when I was six years old I went to school in Ft. Smith then. I stayed at Breynat Hall....I'm telling you I was so homesick. I cried every night for three years. I was just a little kid....That sister there she used to call us savages....In the morning we had to take a shower.... The sister would pour shampoo over our head and push us into the shower...And it was really cold...It was like a punishment.
>
> Then after three years, one summer I said to my parents, I am not going back to school. That was okay with them. I had grade three and could read and write and I thought I was pretty smart....When the Indian

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[99](cont'd) The exact date of Tompkins data is not clear, but it appears to be the 1967-1968 school year.

agent came I went hunting ducks with my brother; I said I don't want that Indian agent to catch me.

But then my parents were getting a little ration in those days. My Mom and Dad, they went into town to get their ration. You know that guy that was the Indian agent then?...still I hate him....He wouldn't give them no ration; he said Charlie's got to go to school or no ration. They cut off the family allowance too. My Mom comes home and I run to meet her...(but) she says there are no good things, the Indian agent says no rations unless you go to school. I say, I am not going.

My Mom say that is okay. We live on fish and caribou meat. We go to live in the bush. Well that was great, I thought. I never live in the bush before....But boy that life is hard....I had my own dogs, and I was getting some of the meat to feed the family. Like I was really proud, I felt like a man, to own my own things and to be bringing home meat.

Then after three years I think, I am working all the time just to stay alive and I am not getting nowhere. So I decide to go back to school. Now I am fourteen and they put me in grade four. I didn't like that much, being with all those little kids, and I went to see the principle at Ft. Smith. He says...we can put you in grade seven vocational. Me, I didn't know what that vocational thing was, but that sounded okay. So I take grade seven that year and pass.

Then the next year I want to do grade eight. My parents, they don't know what this grade thing is and they still don't know. My brother says all you want is to take another year off. So I had to stay home that year and look after my brother's dogs...that is really hard work. So the next year I try to go to school again...and I went to Ft. Simpson...

But the next year I go back and I say I want to go to school here, in town, so I can see my Mom and Dad sometimes. The school counsellor says there is no room in Akaitcho Hall....So I go to see the administrator and he says, okay, Charlie, we will find you a bed. I go tell the school counsellor it is all fixed up...he laughs and says okay. (Field notes, Yellowknife, 1971).

Of the Akaitcho students half were men and half were women, and they were distributed in grades 10, 11 and 12 and in special programmes. The Iveson report says the actual enrollment was not the 176 reported in government documents but more like 200 students packed four to a room in a hostel designed to hold just 96 students. The administrator's response to "Charlie's" plea, above suggests the larger figure may be correct.

The supervisory staff complement was 6; or a ratio of one staff to thirty students. Starting salary for staff was less than $4000.00 a year and junior and intermediate staff were required to live in the hostel. Iveson reported that in 1967-1968 staff were being hired with grade ten schooling (and therefore were unable to assist high-school students with their work) and in some cases staff were younger than the students they were supervising. The Anglican network was an essential element of staff recruitment, and they usually came from "outside" -southern Canada.

Iveson describes the hostel administration as "extremely suppressive and authoritarian" (1969:4). The stratification system was displayed in the dining room (staff sat at a table in the front with a table-cloth and often food superior to that served to students; students sat at cafeteria-type tables without table clothes) and in staff / student relations. Iveson says, "Students were not allowed to organize any kind of meeting without asking a staff person first, have him call it [the meeting] and have him in attendance at all times." He also describes a student being punished for criticizing the food. The student was first asked to apologize to the kitchen staff. A change of mind on the part of the staff disciplinarian had the student shoveling snow off a large area outside the hostel, returning "for more duties when he is finished" (Iveson, 1969:11). The students refusal resulted in his expulsion and within one and one / half hours he was in a plane on his way home- out of the hostel and *ipso facto* out of school. This suggests highly arbitrary power in the hands of the administration, power much like that described in Goffman's "total institutions".

An image of "maturing" students is presented, as students who co-operate with staff are granted more privileges and may become monitors over other students. But if they show any signs of stopping that co-operation, and Iveson sees this as the case if they try to discuss with other students problems in the hostel, all privileges are suddenly withdrawn and they will be punished for minor rule infractions which have previously been ignored.

For the senior administration, the hostel was "one happy family" in which he was the father. He believed that problems should be brought directly to him, and him alone, and not discussed with other students or people outside the institution. If students began to form a student council or any kind of responsible student body he immediately moved to stop them, for chaos would inevitably result. Native students and vocational students were especially defined as "...incapable of making responsible suggestions or decisions, either because their background didn't prepare

them for it or they just don't have the mental capacity" (Iveson, 1969:14).[91] All student funds were controlled by the staff, and student newspapers and publications carefully censored.

Much of this image of the stratification system and the attitude structure of the hostel became clear to Iveson as he tried to assist the students in organizing a representative student organization. He was amazed at the consequences. Six students met and decided to ask the administration if they could elect a Student Council, take over some responsibility for administering student funds, and review the rules. These students met with the administrator and were told, in essence, that the hostel was his responsibility and the final say on any issues in the hostel must be his. They were also told that one staff person had threatened to resign if a Student Council formed and if he did resign all six students would be expelled. All six were given a piece of paper to sign promising they would not tinker with the rules nor talk to Iveson (Iveson, 1969:11).

Prior to this students meeting to discuss the Student Council "whispered in corners" for fear of the administration. Iveson says

> I could really sense the tension in the whole hostel between students and staff and between groups of students... the university residence guide book containing (a) student council constitution was treated as a secret document with students who wanted to read it afraid of being caught (Iveson, 1969:7).

The threat of expulsion and therefore the end of schooling loomed over the head of each student.

The emphasis in Iveson's report and analyis of Akaitcho Hall is on "self-discipline, responsibility, and freedom", a set of ideas borrowed from Lloyd Denis of the Hall-Denis Report in Ontario (1968). The gist of Iveson's analysis was that hostels work precisely contrary to those principles, permitting only dependency. Both Joseph Katz, writing on northern hostels in 1965, and Charles Hobart, writing in 1967, made similar remarks about hostels in general in the territories. Katz's report, which contained fourty recommendations, had been little acted upon by the time of Iveson's report

[91]The student whose vignette is presented earlier in the text, "Charlie", is one of these "incompetent" Native and vocational students.

(from 1965 to 1969). However, I have a copy of his recommendations in my files which had apparently been gone over carefully by an administrator in Ft. Smith. Almost every recommendation has a large "yes" beside it - but one has a conspicuous blank. Katz's recommendation #7 is 'Resident councils should be established in all hostels with significant responsibility for the conduct of Affairs' (1965:23).[93] No "Yes" appears beside this recommendation; apparently the administrative system beyond Akaitcho Hall likewise found such an idea threatening or unreasonable.

Finally, the Iveson report documents the constant attempts by the hostel administration to keep residents of the town and the hostel separate. An ex-teacher of some students invited them for dinner during the Christmas holidays; she was coolly refused by the administration because "we look after our own" (Iveson, 1969:15). There had been an attempt to organize a Student Council four years previously, the local Anglican minister, a number of citizens, and four staff and students were involved. All were rebuffed by the administration and the Student Council was suppressed (Iveson, 1969:16). The hostel rule book specifically forbid students entering local residences without permission, whether those residents were the home of interested Whites or people seeking baby-sitters, or relatives of the Indian and Metis students.

Akaitcho Hall then was a rigidly statified social system, administered within the educational system of the Northwest Territories. Further description of the control ideology is found in a later section in which "the rules" of the residence will be presented and discussed. These rules became the focus of the students attempts to change Akaitcho Hall which eventually resulted in the so-called Akaitcho Hall riot.

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[93]A person who was an administrator at the time could not recall this report. He thought the "blank" in this case may have simply reflected the fact that many hostels held young children, and the recommendation would seem inappropriate for them.

C. The Case: Generalized Beliefs and Mobilization

Mr. Iveson, the writer of the report frequently referred to here, was a volunteer with the Company of Young Canadians. He lived in Akaitcho Hall for a few months in the winter of 1968, essentially because accomodation was very difficult to find in Yellowknife and the hostel administrator was willing to let him (and the other CYC volunteer) stay there temporarily. The administrator agreed to his staying with some trepidition, for he did not want the volunteers to get involved with students. In his opinion he was sitting on a tinderbox and he did not want it ignited.

However, the ideology of the Company of Young Canadians was one which favoured participation of any population in decision making, and the formation of groups to solve problems. It was in this respect, a mixture of a community development organization and a "New Left" young adult organization (*Vide*, Day, 1969; Hamilton, 1969). Because of that C.Y.C. philosophical orientation and perhaps his inclination to identify with students close to his age (20), while in the hostel Mr. Iveson did discuss with students the formation of an elected Student Council, and gave them a copy of the constitution of his university residence organization. He discussed with them the possibility that such a group might be a means to address rule changes and to get some control over student funds (Iveson, 1969:10). When the students met with the Administrator, he indicated that students seeking a Student Council were selfish troublemakers. Any problems were to be discussed with him individually and he would decide how to solve them. Students were not to start a group of students talking about their problems or talk to anyone outside the hostel.

As a result of his four months in Akaitcho Hall, in the spring of 1968 Mr. Iveson had a fairly negative view of the residence. He talked about his impressions with the administration, the Principal of the school, the local (zone) School Superintendent and the Commissioner. His comments were received with some interest, but little reaction. After listening to Lloyd Denis, co-author of the Hall-Denis report which had a theme of self-discipline, responsibility and freedom, speak to a meeting of principals and administrators in Yellowknife in January of 1969, he wrote the report which is our source document. The gist of this report was that the residence was highly

authoritarian, not conducive to responsible action on the part of students who would soon return to communities with leadership responsibilities, and that its administration actually isolated hostel residents from town. It was nevertheless a relatively cautious description of the hostel administration.

Attached to the report were the Akaitcho Hall rules. Although none of the rules themselves were necessarily alarming, the tone of the document was. A selection of these rules are presented here, to present data on what the students saw as problematic in the residence. The full document was eleven pages long.

1. Alcohol was forbidden and:

> If you disregards this rule and you are under 21, you are also disregarding the laws of our country. An infraction of this rule calls for our severest and most determined action...(because it is) most detrimental to the character and social development of the young people of the north and indeed of all Canada.

2. Students were also told that

> Suggestions, directions and orders given by supervisors are to be honoured and obeyed without question. Student leaders are not regarded as giving orders but their suggestions and directions to students are to carry all the weight and authority of an order inasmuch as these suggestions and directions are based upon experience and maturity of attitude incidental to their *appointment* as student leaders (italics added).

3. Students are to

> Follow the standards set or requested by supervisors on matters of grooming, dress, deportment and manners. These are considered to be too important to be left to the whim of the individual taste.

4. They were permitted to date but

> ...holding hands will be permitted [only] while on town leave [not in residence]. More intimate exhibitions of *Boy-Girl* relations will be subject to stern discipline such as being confined to your dormitory or to your room for prolongued and indefinite period(sic).... Supervisors are instructed to report all disturbing situations of *boy-girl* relationships to the superintendent. (Underlining in the original).

5. All clothing is to have the students name or number stamped or sewn on it and "*Student numbers are not to be removed or defaced from clothing*" [astericks and underlining in the original][93] Anyone who disregards this rule - which is now raised to one of the prime rules of our residence - will be subject to severe discipline and indeed the ultimate penalty.[94]

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[93]Number here refers to disc numbers used for identity of Inuit students.
[94]The ultimate penalty is likely expulsion, although it sounds like it may be

Although there are many other rules, those parts of Yellowknife classified as "out of bounds" highlighted a number of problems. It included any place where alcoholic drink was given or consumed (presumably excluding the Anglican communion service), and the area north of the Fire Hall called "Old Town". In capital letters, on the fifth page of the rules, it says:

NO DRINKING, NO SWEARING; NO CAR RIDING;
NO DEFACING OF CLOTHING MARKS; BE RESPECTFUL;
HONOUR THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS;
HONOUR THE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY; BE PUNCTUAL;
TAKE PRIDE In EVERTHING YOU DO.
THIS IS AKAITCHO HALL

Thus the ideology of Akaitcho Hall could be characterized as authoritarian and excercising control based on moral principles. Students were not considered adults, no matter their age, and they were denied freedom of movement within the town. If they were local Native students, they could not easily visit their relatives who lived on "the wrong side of town".[95]

When the initial efforts of students to organize a Students' Council were blocked, mobilization moved from Akaitcho Hall to outside, then took a new twist within the residence. Mr. Iveson discussed the residence rules and his report in general with school authorities and the Commissioner. No action resulted. In January of 1969 he discussed the situation with a local man in Yellowknife. The man asked Iveson to give him the report and he would "get it into the political arena". No discussion was held as to just how this was to be done, but the man was given a copy of the report.[96]

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[94](cont'd) something worse.
[95]The severity of this authoritarianism should not be unduly exaggerated. The rules are much like those used in elite private schools in much of Canada and British public schools in the United Kingdom. It is within a particular context that they seem inappropriate and authoritarian.
[96]Information contained in this section is taken from a report written by myself to the Company of Young Canadians office in Ottawa on Febuary 28, 1969, and a file collected in relation to the incident. When other sources are used they will be cited in the text.

On Tuesday, February 18, 1969 the leader of the New Democratic Party raised a question in the House of Commons in Ottawa about Akaitcho Hall. This story was carried by C.B.C. national radio on the World at Six (the 6 P.M. newscast). It was repeated the next morning (February 19) on the World at Eight (8 A.M.) and most students in Akaitcho Hall were listening by this time.

At the noon meal, when all the students were together, the hostel administrator presented them with a telegram which he had drafted. He wanted them to vote on sending it to the leader of the New Democratic Party (Mr. David Lewis) and the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Mr. Jean Chretien). It advised Mr. Lewis and Mr. Chretien that all was well in Akaitcho Hall and no investigation was needed. The vote to send the telegram was open; it was defeated 43 to 34 with 99 abstentions.

That evening the hostel staff were very upset and they called another meeting of the students after supper, to try to get them to send the telegram. On this occasion the ballot was secret, but it was again defeated 74 to 64, with 44 abstentions. People working in the local news media had been told they could not attend this meeting, but both a C.B.C. radio reporter and a local newspaper reporter did attend. It ended shortly after their arrival.

Following the meeting, on the evening of February 19, the telegram was circulated among the students by student monitors. Now 134 students signed it and it was sent by the hostel administration to Mr. Lewis and Mr. Chretien.

While this was going on in the hostel, the news media locally and nationally were giving full play to the Iveson report. C.B.C. radio locally did a studio discussion with students from Akaitcho (Mr. Iveson attended and participated). During that discussion students decided to send a second telegram to Ottawa to contradict the one sent that night. The students were, for the first time, given a copy of Mr. Iveson's report to read. In Ottawa, Mr. Lewis asked (and was granted) the right to make that report public.

That evening also, the evening of February 19, the administration circulated a new set of regulations for students in Akaitcho Hall. Although the rules were not markedly changed, the tone was less abrasive and grammatical errors had been corrected.

On Thursday, February 20, the story continued as a media event, but Mr. Chretien did not answer Lewis's charges in the house. He promised to answer the next day. The February 19 Edmonton Journal arrived in Yellowknife and David Lewis is quoted as describing the rules as

> childish...outragously degrading... puritanical to the nth degree...I can't think of prison regulations any more stringent than these (*Edmonton Journal*, Feb. 19, 1969, p. 23).

Across the country the story was major news, appearing largely unchanged as far away as the Cape Breton Post on March 12.

That day (February 20) sixty-nine students sent a night letter to Mr. Chretien and Mr. Lewis, requesting an investigation. They told Lewis and Chretien that votes on sending the previous telegrams were defeated and that they believed many people who finally signed were coerced into doing so. The names of the signing students of this night letter reads like a who's who of Indian, Metis, and Inuit family names in the Mackenzie: Charlo, Blackduck, Rabesca, Beaulieu, Hardisty, Firth, Gruben, Nahagalock, Diamond-C, Thom.... This telegram arrived in Lewis's office, but not Mr. Chretien's office (through a Canadian National Telecommunication's error in their Ottawa office). Both men did not have the telegram until the following Monday.

Although Mr. Iveson, the Company of Young Canadians volunteer, was being blamed locally for much of the trouble at the hostel, a student described it somewhat differently to me two years later. In his discription he also expressed some of the excitment of the event, perhaps more in his facial expression than in his words.

> That was some time, with the Akaitcho Hall rules you know. I remember one girl from Hay River. She was standing in the hall and it was morning and we were talking and standing around, like half asleep yet. (The administrator) comes along and she says to him, you don't like sex, well I just want you to know I been sleeping with men since I was thirteen years old. He (the administrator) didn't say nothing. He just turned and walked away, and he never come to meals or nothing for three days...
> That was some time. We more or less force Steve Iveson to help us that time. (Field notes, 1971)

On Friday February 21 Mr. Chretien still had not answered Lewis's question, for Lewis was not in the House. Chretien however generally defended the hostel and the

rules. That day the *Edmonton Journal* of February 20 arrived in Yellowknife. The local correspondent had filed a story completely denying the validity of the charges, or student concerns with residence rules. She reported that the previous night the students had drafted a telegram and sent it to Mr. Lewis and Mr. Chretien, and that the telegram was signed by 80% of the 182 students (*Edmonton Journal*, February 20, 1969). She also says that Mr. Lewis, in his Commons remarks, "...quoted regulations for Akaitcho Hall, which he *claimed* prohibited the chewing of gum, threatened expulsion for obscene language..." (*idem*, italics added). She cites the Superintendent of Schools from Ft. Smith as defending the rules, and reports that the superintendent and administration "pointed out that the rules of the hall are reviewed on a regular basis by a committee of superivisors and students....Both also denied that students were expelled because of the use of obscene language"(*idem*).

The story in the Edmonton Journal infuriated a number of the students. They began to write a letter to the editor and a story for the Edmonton newspaper. The local Indian-Eskimo Association office was providing some assistance with typing and xeroxing as the students attempted to respond.[97] The radio continued to carry exchanges in the House in Ottawa, and the local telephones were very busy as people within the government and eductional system tried to decide what action to take.[98]

Friday evening students were permitted to attend a dance in town. Instead of the usual sign-out procedure being followed, separate sign-out sheets were used for those who had signed the first and second telegrams. Students who had signed the second telegram were warned to "expect no favours", and one was asked if she would like her "past experiences spread around." A student in a monitors position who had signed the second telegram found another student would not follow her directions, and she was told she could expect no support from the administration. (Bittman letter to Edmonton Journal, file copy). At the same time a student who sided with the administration and

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[97]The Indian-Eskimo Association office in Yellowknife was, at that time, staffed by Mr. Wally Firth a Loucheaux Indian from Ft. McPherson who was later elected as the Mackenzie constituencies New Democratic Party representative to Ottawa.

[98]My own phone frequently rang as various people associated the Company of Young Canadians with the event. On this particular day (Friday) phone lines in Yellowknife were unusually open as anyone who dialed my phone "cut into" ongoing conversations. Conversations became conference calls, perhaps as a result of a poorly placed "bug" in the telephone system.

stayed up late typing their position, was permitted to stay in his room and sleep on Friday rather than go to school. This was an unheard of luxury for students (*idem*).

On Saturday February 22 at 8 a.m. a local man (employed at the management level of Giant Miles, a B'hai, and active in the Indian-Eskimo Association) phoned Mr.Chretien at his home in Sherbrooke, Quebec.[99] The Minister was thoroughly irritable, blamed the Company of Young Canadians for much of the trouble, and was especially cross that the Iveson report had gone to the opposition. The local man's efforts to reassure Mr. Chretien and to get him to focus on Akaitcho Hall as an issue, not on the Company of Young Canadians, were largely unsuccessful.

At the same time one of the girls who had written the letter to the Edmonton Journal was sitting at the breakfast table in Akaitcho Hall asking students to read her letter and sign it if they agreed with it. A hostel supervisor came and read the letter over her shoulder and moments later the administrator came. He threatened to dismiss students who continued to claim the first telegram was not valid and influenced by him. The student with the letter stood up to defy him and then engaged in a heated exchange of words. He finally granted her the right to read her letter, but kept referring to her group as "rebels" as she was reading. When she was finished he asked anyone who supported her to stand up and only three students did (Bittner discription, February 22, 1969; unpublished files).

In Ms. Bittner's language,

> I sort of went out of control and the police were called. By this time everyone had left the dining room except a few. I was not creating a riot for only the supervisor and a few students plus members of the staff were left (*idem*).

Apparently one or two cups were broken in the brief melee. This student phoned my apartment at 9:30 A.M., sounding hysterical, and asked for Mr. Iveson, the C.B.C. and the *News of the North*. All went to Akaitcho Hall, as did the R.C.M.P. on the request of the administration. The news media and Mr. Iveson were asked to leave and only students (and the R.C.M.P.) were to remain.

The local Edmonton Journal correspondent phoned me to obtain information. In the conversation she remarked that "those Natives should be glad for three meals and a

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[99]My telephone was used for this call. I cannot recall why, but most likely because I could bill the charges to my employer.

bed and have no right to complain."

That afternoon the local educational administration met - the administrator of Akaitcho Hall, the principal and vice-principal of Sir John Franklin School, and the zone superintendent of education.[100] The hostel administrator and school principal were furious, anxious to blame somebody for the situation. The zone superintendent was much more analytical, looking for a direction which might be helpful, but he felt his hands were tied because the affair still rested formally with the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs.

Just before 6 P.M. the student who had, in her language, engaged in a "one-woman riot" (Bittner report, *op cit*), was expelled from Akaitcho Hall. Extremely upset she ran to the C.B.C. radio station, walked into the six o'clock newscast, and told her story to all of Yellowknife. All that day the town, as well as the hostel, was tense and

> ...rumours began circulating throughout the town of a riot and of an invasion by the boys of the girls dorm...(*News of the North*, Feb.27, 1969,p.1).

The C.B.C. received dozens of phone calls, some supported the administration and blamed "the Natives" for the problem. Others offered the girls (two were expelled) a place to stay now that they could not stay in the dorm. The zone supervisor of education went to the radio station and made a long, calming statement promising an investigation and assuring that the girls would be supported in their efforts to continue schooling. (Both girls were in grade 12.) Finally, the C.B.C. radio station locked their doors, took their phones off the hook, and replaced regular programming with soft music. The day of hysteria in Yellowknife ended.

The "riot" was also over, although the whole event was not. On Tuesday, February 25, the Minister agreed to an investigation, appointing the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories to the task. The Commissioner himself met with students on Tuesday evening and arranged an election so he could get a group small enough to talk with. (He did not seem to realize that he was introducing precisely one of the procedures which had been denied the students.) New rules were written. The *News of the North* reported that "Several students have told members of the press that morale in

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[100] I was in attendence at the request of the School Superintendent in Ft. Smith.

the pupil residence is much higher...the prison atmosphere is gone...." (April 3, 1969). The *Edmonton Journal* carried the "rebel" students stories on February 26, after two students flew to Edmonton with the story, and at least the students were satisfied that their side of the story was out. The C.B.C. television national network news program "The Way It Is" did a documentary and showed it nationally March 7, and in Yellowknife on March 16 (*News of the North*, March 6, 1969).

But many in the administration were still very angry. The Commissioner had, according to the rumour mill, threatened "...to get Steve (the C.Y.C. volunteer) and Whit Fraser (one C.B.C. staff member) out of the territories." (Personal report, February 28, 1969). However, the feeling I had on the streets of Yellowknife was that people were not angry at the C.Y.C. as instigators. In fact, we were being treated warmly by the people of Yellowknife.

D. Summary and Analysis

Analysis of this event will be developed somewhat further in the concluding chapter, after all three case studies have been presented. However, with just this event in mind, we need to consider the explanatory power of Smelser's theory and the Critical Theory developed above.

The first and obvious factor is related to the various types of events which Smelser defines, and the relationship among them. This event could have been analyzed as a norm-oriented social movement if the focus had been on the students attempt to change hostel rules, or an incipient hysterical event (which could lead to panic) if the focus had been on the townspeople. The fact that all of these elements are present suggests the overall accuracy of Smelser's theory (in seeing all grounded in similar conditions and partially sharing beliefs). It also suggests a limitation in the present analysis as detailed data on the townspeople and their responses to the situation are not available.

The data raise some problems with the concept of system, which I will return to below (*infra* pp. 132-133). At that time the Lidz brothers contribution to the overall theory will also be discussed. However, at this point , analyzing the incident retrospectively I will focus on the rather remarkable "predictive" ability of Smelser's

theory.

The analysis of this event as a hostile outburst seems reasonable, given the self-descriptive language of the student ("my one-woman riot") and the hostility directed towards the hostel administrator. It seems to be appropriate within the theory, even though most students left the scene of the incident rather than participating or joining in a mob. The overall causal statement, that such events occur when neither escape (panic), wish-fulfillment, nor normative changes are possible (supra p. 2) seems to hold, although clearly escape was possible for most students, averting perhaps a major riot. It would seem that "escape is impossible" must be interpreted as including certain elements of psychological committment, for the student(s) who engaged in the hostility were physically as able to leave the room as were the others. They seemed however to be intensely committed to the efforts to get the story straight in the public eye (that is, to be "leaders" in this context), so that simply leaving was not psychologically available to them.

However, some language used by Smelser in relation to hostile outbursts seems less appropriate here. The hostility was clearly focussed on the administrator. But it is difficult to see the administrator as a scapegoat, as he was the main agent behind the obstruction and repression that the students faced. It is possible that if many students had remained, the hostility would have come to focus on one of them. It would then have been appropriate to refer to that person as a scapegoat, but in the actual case the hostility could almost be defined as rational and appropriately directed.

The detailed theoretical structure leads us to look at structural conduciveness, strain, beliefs, precipitating events and mobilization of social change actors and social control actors. Again, the descriptive and explanatory power of the theory is impressive. The population sector which lacks institutionalized means to create change however shifts in the analysis; it is initially the students in an administrative structure, later a subset of students who are predominantly Native within the same structure. The term Native has been used, both by myself and others, in describing the active students in Akaitcho Hall, but it is at no time used by the students in the conflict. They see themselves in conflict as students with the administration. Tompkin's(1969) groupings seem more reflective of the protest group, as it is led by the confident girls he

describes and it is supported by the "out of it" native youngsters. The students who support the administration are closer to his "successful" group, and this includes some Native students. Nevertheless, the reality of being Native in the situation is, I believe, a factor in this outburst, and it is a factor in precisely the way that Smelser implies. It is these students who most lack power within the school context, a context in which virtually all students lack legitimized power.

The role structure partly follows from that relationship: social relations enhance social distance between the administration and the students and reduce communicative access to or influence upon those in power. However, again, some details of that relationship are perhaps slightly different than Smelser's theory clearly predicts, but they can be inferred from the analysis of Parsons' theory of social control. Students do have individual access to the administrator, it is collective or representational access which is denied. On the basis of this inidiviudal access they may be granted privilages or receive rewards not available to them within routine procedures, such as Charlie's admission to the hall. But if they seek group access and representational access it is not only denied but described in hostile terms by the administrator. His desire to keep them isolated from each other and insulated from others outside the hostel is also obvious. That is, the preferred role structure is precisely that defined by Talcott Parsons in his social control model(*Supra*, p. 48-49).

The place of "communication with others not in power" is also clear in this case. The administration struggles valiantly to ensure that students will not be able to communicate with each other on these issues, and to ensure that they will not be able to communicate with a "leader" (Iveson). But the ecology of a student residence makes it difficult to stop students form "whispering in corners" or otherwise talking to each other. However, it does seem that he can exercise enough control when the students are met one by one or in small groups to get a telegram signed, so the dynamics in the dining room (where voting occurs) are different than the dynamics in one-to-one or one-to-small group situations. The dynamics in the dining room change again when the issue is not normative but rather shifts to direct hostile confrontation with the administrator; most students side with no one at that point and simply leave.

The nature of interest articulation and aggregation (as described above, pp. 62-65) in the residence are also consistent with the theory. Students are able to articulate and aggregate interests only through the administrator himself; there is no structure within the residence which permits some alternative way of making decisions or having them carried out. In fact, this concept seems useful for understanding why the event spread as widely as it did, involving the whole administrative structure through the Commissioner to the Federal Government. There is one clear line of authority, one single structure from student to Federal Parliament. There is no intervening church or school board, much less a student government. Smelser's theory would predict that out of such structures should arise value-oriented movements; it is possible that would have happened except for the repression of the administration which ensured a hostile outburst instead. [101]

The normative structure followed the pattern predicted by revisions to Smelser's theory in that there was a differential allocation of population to roles with varying influence and power, and there are identifiable populations allocated to each of these categories. That is implied by the above discussion in relation to Native peoples.

The value-system also fits the theory well. Students are delegitimized as social change agents (or even as responsible actors) but Iveson brings in a conflicting view,a view in which student governments addressing student residence rules is a normal and expected occurrance. His view has considerable credence, as the student population is generally young adults approaching the age of university students, although some are younger.

If we look at the issue of structural strain from the viewpoint of the administration in relation to the students, there seems to be no strain. That is the values or principles of action do not oppose the imposed role relations or the lack of rewards and facilities distributed to the students. However, if we look at the issue of structural strain from the perspective of the "new principles of organization" proposed by Iveson, then strain runs throughout the system for it simply does not match in any way the

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[101]It is possible to argue that the students were really engaged in a value-oriented movement in their attempts to change the rules of Akaitcho Hall, for the premises or principles upon which the rule changes were based were quite different from those which operated within Akaticho.

structure which he presents. There is not only value strain but normative strain, as the new principles of action imply expectations which are in opposition to each other. Should the students agree with the administrator's view of himself as a father-figure, accept his advice and opinions on all matters, or should they begin to be "responsible self-determining adults", at least in some spheres of action? Should they attempt to determine different rules or norms for the residence, or should they leave that to the "father". Should they have access to some funds for residence activities, or should all facilities be controlled by the "father"? Once value-conflict is identified, there is obvious strain on all the other levels of action for the students.

The precipitating event is clear but we really must consider two of them rather than one, and in simple system terms the first one does not come from within the hall but outside of it. This is the question raised in Parliament which became a major news story across the country. This event would seem to confirm the beliefs of the students that the hostel administration is unreasonable, and the beliefs presented by Iveson that alternative organizational patterns in hostels are normative in Canada.

However, this event *per se* does not bring the students into action. They are excited by it, and communication increases among them, but there is no mobilization which can be clearly identified. It is possible that some leadership structure would have mobilized in response to the news story, and perhaps a goal and plan of action would have developed, but such action is preempted by the mobilization of the administration. The administration (or social control structure) mobilizes very quickly to try to influence beliefs outside the hostel, to reassure Parliament that the picture they have of the situation is false. That is, the question in Parliament and the news stories function as a reality test for both students and the administration, but as a precipitating event which mobilizes action only for the administration. It appears to confirm the administrators fear that he is in a situation which may easily get out of control, or become chaotic (a tinder box that would easily be set afire) and that he must act to stop that. This suggests that strain should be more sharply present within the administrative or control structure than the student population, but it is difficult to determine how to measure that at this date.

From this point on, Smelser's theory is highly predictive. The administration breaks all of Smelser's control rules, becoming intensely engaged in the issue itself. There is no attempt to supply countervailing information to the students themselves, or to act as a leader in relation to them. Rather the administration attempts to pull them into supporting him in the face of a hostile environment.

At the same time, outside agents of control constantly vacillate, leaving the issues open and unresolved for days. Local authorities feel unable to act because the question has been posed to the Minister; the Minister does not respond to it for various reasons (perhaps not sure how to respond initially, unsure of the accuracy of the charges or the political climate in the situation). It is only when the hostile outburst (and consequent expulsion of the students) occurs that leadership outside the residence takes over, offering reassuring information and ensuring a fair hearing to all parties in the dispute. This immediately settles the students down, although there are those in power who would use the legitimized form of hostile outbursts to get rid of "the trouble-makers" in the situation rather than deal with the issues.

It is apparent that the system under analysis here (the student residence) cannot be considered independent of the larger system of which it is a part. The analyses of communication above, for example, focuses only on the communicative structure within the hostel. Yet, the precipitating event and much of what follows are related to communication *outside* the sytem, communication with those at higher levels of authority and with the public.

The ability of the students to mobilize, to garner resources to present their case, also depends on external systems - the Indian-Eskimo association, the C.Y.C., and the news media. Interestingly, the internal control system (the administrator) seems to rely on mobilizing internal resources, although the overall structure of authority tends to support him (at least in public). This of course raises a central problem with Smelser's theory, for by implication social control within his theory is neutral or disengaged from the issues. In fact, social control in this case might almost be defined as *the* issue, and it therefore seems impossible for the social control agents to remain above it. However, control agents outside the hostel itself prove somewhat better at this task.

What might be inferred from this case for Lidz and Lidz, and for Parsons' and Smelser's view of social control? First of all, it would appear that Parsons' view of social control is very restrictive, indeed some might say repressive, and there is little room for accommodative responses within this system. Rather, the whole orientation is not to change in the system but to assimilation -forcing external factors of change ("conditions") into preexisting structures. Given this reality, the control agent's responses are reasonably predictable; he will brook no challenge to his authority and control.

However, in this situation he only holds such control on the basis of the support of others outside the hostel, the administrative and political structure of the education system. He finds himself in the paradoxical situation of having to rally the population which he controls to maintain control. In such a situation his control breaks down and the control process in this case is largely taken over by other actors.

The other actors seem to work within a different "system of control", a system which more closely matches Smelser's use of the term, so they engage in actions which reintroduce control but it has a slightly different meaning. This control encourages accommodative responses, permits students to elect a representative structure and to begin negotiations with agents of control. However, it is not possible to call this response pattern "collective behavior" for it is fully legitimized within the larger system. Nevertheless, as a reaction to the initial outburst, it would seem to represent a change in values, in organizational priniciples and in all the other components of action. As such, it is "value-oriented", a possibility which Smelser does not address well in his theory. It may well lead to a further clarification of the Lidz brothers potential contribution to the theory, but that will follow the presentation of the other case studies.

This then is the "Akaitcho Hall riot", a small-scale hostile outburst which strongly supports the overall predictive power of Smelser's theory and supports with equal strength the utitlity of broadening the analysis to study controllers as well as mobilizers. It however leaves us with at least one puzzle - if social control follows Parsons' pattern is social change possible? If it follows Smelser's pattern is it possible to create value-oriented changes, or fundamental changes to the system? Or is there a relationship between value-oriented changes and hostile outbursts in the sense that

repression of potentially value-oriented movements does not lead to norm-oriented ones but hostile outbursts....? In the next chapter a much different collective behavior event in the Northwest Territories will be described, in an attempt to further clarify the theory and identify necessary changes. This is the development of a social movement, the Dene nation, within the Territories.

V. The Dene Nation as a Social Movement

A. Introduction

The Dene Nation movement, represents a collective behavior event of a different type than that described in Chapter Four. It is a large-scale social movement involving at times much of the Indian population of the MacKenzie District in the Northwest Territories. In Smelser's terms it is either a norm or value-oriented movement, and it is the fact it develops under a norm or value-oriented belief rather than a hostile belief which should imply different values on variables than those obseved in the previous chapter. The Dene movement perhaps began with the founding of the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood in 1969. The organization was a Status Indian organization with a young Cree woman from Ft. Smith as its first president. The following year the presidency changed briefly to a Saulteaux from Manitoba, then to a Dogrib man from Ft. Rae, and the organization began to strengthen its local base.

By 1972 the N.W.T Indian Brotherhood had adopted the term Dene as a term of self-designation. This meant that they could include the total non-Inuit Native population in their membership and reject the internal boundaries created by the federal governments categorization of peoples as status or non-status, Indian or Metis. The word Dene came from the Slavey (local Indian) language and like the Inuktituk term Inuit was intended to replace an externally imposed identification ("Indian") with an historical and self-generated term.

In 1975 the Dene issued *The Dene Declaration* which included the definition of themselves as a nation and argued for the continued development of that nation within the Canadian state. In 1977 the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood changed its name and in 1979 was incorporated under Territorial law as "The Dene Nation" (*Dene Annual Report*, 1980). The implication is that the Dene nation, as a collectivity (a national or cultural-linguistic grouping) and the Dene Nation as an organizational structure are one and the same. Although this may present difficulties in the ensuing description, it should be recognized that the linguistic collapsing is equivalent to that used by nation-states as, for example, Canada is treated as both a nation and a state.

In terms of public awareness, the Dene Nation movement reached its zenith with the Berger hearings on the proposed MacKenzie River Valley pipeline in 1975. Communities were mobilized so that individual Dene would testify at community hearings, academics were mobilized to testify at more formal hearings, and the national media gave the year-long event full play (*Vide*, Berger, 1977; Watkins, 1977). However the organization exists in the Territories through to 1987, headed by its sixth president. The focus of this discussion will be the early years of the Dene Nation, as the time period in which it came into existance. The key years are 1968 to 1970, and the years through to 1976 are next in importance for the theoretical work being done here. Some material is also presented on the years 1976 to 1982.

Within Smelser's theory a norm-oriented social movement is "...an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief"(1962:270) wheras a value-oriented movement is "...a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief" (1962:313). In norm-oriented movements participants may attempt to affect norms directly, by developing particular organizational or institutional forms, or they may agitate to induce some constituted authority to make such changes. In value-oriented movements there is a challenge to the legitimacy of existing political orders, or the development of a collectivity within a existing order which is based on distinct values but does not challenge the order itself. A value-oriented movement is "higher" than a norm-oriented movement in Smelser's hierarchy (and in fact the highest on the scale), so it will include elements of all other types - panics, crazes, hostile outbursts and norm-oriented beliefs.

Because the beliefs of the Dene Nation are complex, I would like to refrain from typing this movement as norm or value-oriented until more data are presented on it. If it is value-oriented it will include norm-oriented elements (for if values change, norms must change) and if it is norm-oriented it will not challenge the legitimacy of the larger social system. As noted in Chapter Four for Smelser the ideal outcome of social control is a norm-oriented movement; he emphasizes control strategies which do not permit social movements to challenge systems of legitimacy.

Our theoretical questions for this case are: What would the theory predict as the causes of norm and value-oriented movements? What behavior should we find associated with such movements? What would social control agents and mobilizers do? What social structural conditions should we find in the society in which the movement occurs? From our last case we added questions about the specific nature of social control - if it follows Parsons' pattern is normative change possible? If it follows Smelser's pattern is value-change possible? What can we add to Lidz and Lidz's proposed changes in Social Action Theory in relation to social change and social control based on this case?

The simplest causal statement about norm-oriented movements is that they occur when lower level collective behavior is blocked and challenges to legitimacy are rejected; value-oriented movements occur when lower level collective behavior including norm-oriented behavior is blocked and the only possible direction for a group to move is challenge to values or legitimacy of systems. However, there are a number of somewhat more detailed predictions in Smelser and the Critical Theory presented in Chapter Three.

All the detailed relations predicted in Chapter Three and Four will not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that structural conduciveness includes a population sector lacking legitimized power in the social system and engaged in role-structures which limit influence and communication from the group to those in power, but permits communication within the group. It also includes a single structure for interest articulation and aggregation in relation to that powerless group. There are also present conflicting value systems (with different conceptions of what is desireable in a society) and a value system in the overall social system which delegitimizes social change acitivity carried on by the population.

Structural strain involves a disjunction between the components of action (values, norms, roles, and facilities) or conflict within a component of action. In the latter case we should find oppositional values and world-views, contradictory patterns of organization or expected behavior, opposing modes of role-mobilization, and/or facilities strain or contradictory use of resources or "means to ends".

Some of the above conditions (of conduciveness or strain) may be brought into place over a short-term, completing the full set of determinants; if that happens that condition is a precipitating event. Some such events may actually simply be reality tests, confirming a generalized belief.

Smelser also predicts specific behavior for control groups and for the mobilizing social movement population. Much of his concern with these predictions[102] is to point out to controllers how they can keep a norm-oriented social movement from becoming a value-oriented one. His initial control predictions would be:

1. Discredit generalized beliefs
2. Reinterpet precipitating events
3. Act against the mobilizing group to weaken them

To these he adds the controls outlined in Chapter Three (*Supra*, p.92):

1. Prevent communication in general, so beliefs cannot be disseminated
2. Prevent interaction between leaders and followers, so mobilization is difficult
3. Do not refuse to recognize one or more groups in the community
4. Do not close off avenues for norm-oriented agitation; rather encourage it
5. Do not take sides in the controversy
6. Permit expression of grievances but only within the confines of legitimacy; do not permit legitimacy itself to be directly challenged
7. If force is necessary, do not vacillate
8. Do not actively encourage some other form of collective behavior such as mob violence or revolution
9. Reduce the sources of strain that initiated the movement (1962:267,307, 310,364)

As with the previous case, Smelser's instructions to the mobilizers are fewer and much weaker. However, if we treat his descriptive text as predictions or advice we could say:

1. Select good leaders to be successful, ones who can formulate group beliefs but who will also work at organizational maintenance
2. If a value-oriented movement, select a charismatic leader[103]
3. Have successes to maintain membership
4. Be sure your generalized belief is not too full of promises, for it will then inevitably fail and the movement will suffer

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[102] I use the term predictions here, although the statements are made more as instructions to controllers. Presumably if the controllers follow these instructions they will gain control; in that sense they are predictions.

[103] There is some problem with this concept, as Worsley(1964) demonstrates.

5. If a value-oriented movement, recruit primarily amongst the affected population

6. If a norm-oriented movement, recruit primarily outside the affected group

If we add the implications of Oberschall's work and the other modifications of the Critical Theory they would imply:

7. Build resources to carry on the movement, but be wary of institutionalization for it may blunt the cause

8. Act on the social structure to create conditons of conduciveness or intensify conditions of strain or present beliefs which make existing strain clearer to the population affected

9. When all circumstances are just right, create an event which will function as a precipitating event or reality test, thereby mobilizing the affected population

10. Weaken the powers of the social control agents in whatever ways possible by reducing their resources, making it difficult for them to recruite members or actors, delegitimizing their normative control, and presenting alternative values

B. The Dene Nation Case: Structural Conduciveness and Strain

In Chapter Six the development of the Northwest Territories state structure will be described in some detail, as well as associated population, economic, and institutional changes. However, we need a brief introduction to these changes for the present case. The Northwest Territories participated in the heady political climate of the sixties primarily through the move of the Territorial Government from Ottawa to Yellowknife. That government was still, strictly speaking, a colonial government with a partially appointed Council and headed by a Commissioner responsible to the Federal Government. By 1966 there had never been a Native person elected to the council, although that began to change rapidly in the late sixties.

Not only did the government or territorial "state" move formally into the Territories in the sixties, but by the end of the decade "Canadian" (southern) social institutions such as schools and health centres had been extended into virtually every Native community. There had been an associated massive increase in the size and presence of governmental administrative structures, an increase in economic activity at both the primary resource level and at secondary and tertiary levels, and changes in transportation and communication systems.

This latter change meant that Northerners received radio and newspaper reports on Indian "media events" in the rest of North America. They were no longer isolated from external communication structures, even though television was not yet a major

element in the communication system. In mass media terms the Northwest Territories was like the 1930's in the provinces: radio was becoming widespread and newspapers were available to the English community, but not television. At the same time transportation between "the inside" and "the outside" was opening up. It was possible to fly between Yellowknife and Ottawa in a few hours. The new MacKenzie Highway, opened in 1959, meant automobile traffic was feasible throughout the Great Slave Lake area (from Ft. Smith to Yellowknife) although not beyond. Air travel was still preferred - the nearly 1000 mile drive to Edmonton or even the four hundred mile drive from Yellowknife to Ft. Smith were not easy automobile trips.

Perhaps in association with media changes, or with the massive increase of well-schooled senior civil servants, the ideological structures of the north were also under seige. The church/state relationship was changing, and part of this was a secular ideology of justice rather than a sacred ideology of morality.[104]

The Indian population in the Northwest Territories was not active in Indian political activity in Canada, until the end of this decade. There was no Indian assocation which could speak on their behalf. The 6000 Status Indians were dispersed in at least 20 communities from Ft. Smith to Aklavik, a distance of over 700 air miles. There were no roads downriver from Ft. Providence. The people spoke six indigenous languages, mostly Athapaskan (Chipewyan, Slavey, Dogrib, Hare and Loucheaux or Kutchin) but including some Cree (Ft. Smith and West Channel at Hay River).[105]

This Indian population had fairly large numbers (although not large percentages) of well-schooled young people, but relatively few employment opportunities. The "roles"

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[104]Douglas Schmeiser, a law professor at the University of Saskatchewan, toured the north in 1967. He described to me his disbelief at the judicial process he observed in the lower courts. His favoured example was an Inuit man in the Eastern Arctic who had paid the liquor vendor in advance for a case of beer. When he returned a few days later to pick up the beer (after a flight in), he had lost his receipt. In spite of the fact he was well known to the clerk, the clerk refused to give him the beer. The man got angry and swore at the clerk, using the popular four-letter word for intercourse. He was charged before a justice of peace and was sentenced to jail for three months. The justice cited no legal criterion, but did cite everything from motherhood to God in his decision. This is the distinction I wish to convey in describing the difference between a secular ideology of justice and a sacred one of morality.

[105]The Athapaskan speakers are the longer term residents of the areas; the Crees appeared as migrants associated with the fur trade and a small-scale fishing industry on Great Slave Lake (*Vide*, Gillespie, 1975)

available to Indians did not seem to be changing quickly. As noted above, there were no Indians on Territorial Council, appointed or elected. There were some special training programmes developing, such as a Community Health Worker progamme in the Federal Health Services (since 1964), and a northern teacher training programme (since 1968), but many young Indian adults had difficulty finding employment. New possibilities and new expectations seldom seemed to be fulfilled.[106]

Communication and social interaction patterns among the Native peoples roughly followed linguistic lines, although one might also say historic transportation networks. The MacKenzie River had been (and still was) the major transportation system for goods from the south (and furs from the north). Thus from Ft. Smith through Hay River to Ft. Providence, Ft. Simpson, Ft. Norman, and down to Inuvik and Aklavik Indian people "knew of each other", especially the leaders. The other major social grouping was the 1500 Dogribs of Ft. Rae and the inland Dogrib settlements (Lac La Martre, Rae Lakes, Jean Marie River). This group linked with the Bear Lake people who were Hare or Slavey. The Dogribs most closely resembled a tribal structure (which the river system did not), and the Rae chief (Jimmy Bruneau in the sixties) was seen as a head chief in this larger area. Most Dogribs over 30 were monolingual Dogrib speakers, although some elders seemed to know Hare and Slavey. Many older Slaveys were also monolingual, but more older Slaveys than Dogribs also spoke English perhaps because of mission schools or the river commercial system. The Loucheauxs of Ft. McPherson were considered

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[106] The concept of role models is perhaps relevant here, and three examples may demonstrate the changing situation. The Indians at Yellowknife Indian village had seldom taken employment in town, four miles away by dog-sled and eight by road. A local man was trained at a Community Health Worker training programme in Hobbema, Alberta in which two Indian women from the reserve worked daily as the cooks. Back in the North he commented that, if those Indian women could drive to work every day on the reserve, he was sure the men in his village could drive to work every day from the village. It seemed to be a new idea for him. A year or so later, the C.Y.C. Indian volunteers were permitted to drive the C.Y.C. staff car as a matter of course. The mission at Rae began to permit their Indian worker to drive the mission vehicle, although it had not been done previously. In 1968 C.B.C. radio in Yellowknife was trying to decide which of two young Slavey men to hire as a disk jockey. A studio discussion brought conflicting advice: the local school superintendent was most anxious that the man without a Slavey accent be hired so children would "model" his speech. I thought there was not much use hiring an Indian if he did not sound like an Indian, as he could not be seen on the radio. They hired the lad with the Slavey accent, and for years he emceed one of the most popular programmes in the native community.

the "most advanced" Indians by Federal civil servants, at least partly because they were Anglican rather than Roman Catholic.

In addition to these linguistic and cultural social groupings, the young schooled population mentioned above was beginning to become evident in the middle and late sixties. As the "Charlie" vignette in the previous chapter illustrates they had often been in a number of residential schools in the north. They knew other young Indian adults from along the MacKenzie and they shared a lingua franca - English. If they had been to Grandin College at Ft. Smith (the Roman Catholic attempt to build an elite school system) they had good high school and often university entrance qualifications. They seemed extremely well educated in communities like Rae in which a brother five years older might have grade five and one a few years older perhaps never have been to school.[107]

The internal organization of these Indian communities varied from strong traditional structures to weak elected Band Councils. In the Dogrib case, for example, a group of "elders" made up a virtual government, the traditional Chief and Council. Others were designated by them to be "foremen" for the fall caribou hunt, or for tea-dances held as celebrations. When a tea-dance was organized (which was also a feast) it seemed that everyone in the settlement had a task to do. There seemed to be little coercive power in this group, but a person could be expelled from the group or settlement for a period for some infractions. One of the young men who worked with me had transgressed (I think by drinking too much alcohol on one occasion) and he had to face the Chief and Council one evening. He was extremely worried, and obviously the very fact of being "called up on the carpet" was enough to keep social behavior within bounds.

But what all communities lacked were organizations which functioned somewhat like voluntary organizations in outside communities, or local government structures other than Band Councils. There were no school boards, no youth groups, no ladies sewing circles. There were, then, no organizations which interfaced easily with outside agencies - to outsiders it was difficult to find out "what the people wanted". Roman Catholic priests and sisters, teachers, Indian agents, health personnel, and various other

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[107] I use the term educated here to mean schooled. The non-English, unschooled, elders of Rae were very knowledgable, both about their land and about politics.

Whites in Native communities seemed to feel this interfacing was their responsibility.

At the same time there was no Territorial Indian organization. There was no single body to speak for the total Indian population and address, for example, the activities of the treaty team in its 1968 trip along the river. The Treaty Commissioner could only go to meet people in each settlement, and try to reach some agreement with them. Alternatively, Indian Affairs could use the regional consultation system in which a meeting of chiefs was called especially to discuss an agenda topic prepared by the Branch. This was the route they went with the Indian Act consultations in 1968 and 1969.

In these terms (and I emphasize, in these terms), the Northwest Territories Indians in the sixties were totally unorganized. There had been neither large-scale mobilization, nor even small-scale protest type activities. They had been living their lives as "bush Indians" to use Helm's phrase(personal communication, 1980), or as river people.

It was into this scene that various community development structures in government suddenly entered. It seemed that "organizing the local Indians" was part of virtually every government department's mandate. By the end of the sixties there were (some) School Committees (especially the Rae-Edzo School Board), Housing Committees, Adult Education Committees, Health Committees, and developing Settlement or Hamlet Councils under the Territorial Department of Local Government.

Not only was this organizing a governmental enterprise, there was also an office of the Indian-Eskimo Association in Yellowknife with organizing responsibilities. The Roman Catholic church had priests whose primary work was community development in the territories (Father Piche in the territories, Father Gauthier who visited from Alberta). The Federated Co-operative from Saskatchewan sent two Community Development workers to work in Rae in 1966. There was also one organization which came into the territories specifically to organize a Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood; this was the Company of Young Canadians and it will be discribed further below.

As much of the above situation would imply there were many direct pressures on Indian peoples in the territories in the 1960's. Examples were not only the provision of services such as schools and health care centres, but creation of new settlements and moving of old ones. Communities such as Inuvik and Frobisher Bay were built

almost from scratch as government administrative centres. Communities such as Ft. Rae and Hay River Indian village were "moved" for one reason or another (to Edzo in the first case, to the new Indian village in the second).[108]

There were also constant attempts to involve the northern population in various government decisions and programmes. This went beyond merely extending the franchise to Indians in 1955 and to Eastern Arctic residents in 1962 (Williamson, 1971), and involved direct consultations. In 1963 the federal government had decided to divide the Northwest Territories into two territories (assuming the MacKenzie would move more rapidly to provincial status). Objections raised to the move resulted in hearings being held throughout northern communities as the federal government tried to decide what would be appropriate policy (Williamson, 1971).

In 1968 the federal government became worried about housing in Canada and a Minister Responsible for Housing was appointed. He began a cross-Canada tour to determine the nature and extent of Canadian housing problems. The north being "in" as an area in Canada, he included the MacKenzie in his consultation process. The first president of the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood remembers this as a first gathering together of Indian peoples throughout the MacKenzie to talk about common issues. "The government provided money for us to meet and we began to talk: before that we could never afford to hold meetings" (personal communication, 1982). [109]

But perhaps more important than these various consultations was the federal governments recognition that the north was beginning to expand. More mineral development seemed likely, yet the Indians had not been "settled on reserves". There

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[108] Hay River Indian village had been "moved" three miles up-river in the early sixties, resulting in two communities three miles apart. That is, a number of government frame homes were built and any Indian family who needed a house had to go to the "new" village. In the late sixties, the federal government decided a spot a few miles further up river was even better, and they proposed to move it again. I mentioned to a local man that "they" said they'd put electricity in the "new" homes if people moved. "Yes", he said sardonically, "that's what they said the last time."

[109] When this minister was asked in Yellowknife where he had seen the worst housing in Canada, he promptly replied "In Thompson Manitoba, where half the houses have families living in their basements." He had just that day visited crowded frame dwellings in Ft. Rae where two to three families lived in houses *without* basements, but these were Indian houses and he implicitly applied a different criterion to them. His "worst" scenario was crowded middle-class suburban-type housing in a Manitoba mining community. (Personal files, October 1968).

were attempts to negotiate the location of reserves in the late fifties, and again in 1967 a Commissioner (Mr. Norm Ogden) was appointed to settle claims outstanding from the 1902 and 1921 treaties. Thus treaty time, a time when Indian people generally come from the land and meet in the settlements to receive annual treaty monies, became a time for discussing and potentially renegotiating terms of the treaty.[116]

But Indians were also invited to attend national and regional meetings discussing possible changes in the Indian Act. The first such meeting in the Northwest Territories was held in Yellowknife in July of 1968 (News of the North, July 21, 1968), and Chiefs and representatives from every band were invited to attend and funded by governmental committees. As with the housing meetings, government funds made possible contact between bands which would have been virtually impossible otherwise.

These activities indicate a pattern in the sixties as governmental personnel felt a need to involve Indian populations in governmental decisions, and therefore frequently arranged hearings, consultations, meetings, or some form of "public input". This was, as implied above, part of the new community development philosophy of government. But it also seemed to reflect genuine problems in decision-making in an ideological climate which did not justify pure colonialism. My files include a number of letters exchanged between myself and senior civil servants or Members of Parliament, as they wondered how they could get an expression of opinion from a widely dispersed and "not together" Indian community. Similarly, the Territorial Commissioner after 1967, Mr. Hodgson, made settlement visits, discussions, and immediate decisions around those discussions, part of his governing style. It was into this context that the Company of Young Canadians, (and other organizing groups such as the Indian Eskimo Association) entered in the late sixties.

If we interpret the above description in terms of structural conduciveness and strain, and add to it the position of the Indian population in the Northwest Territories social structure, it is apparent that the underlying conditions for social movement mobilization are all present. Many of these conditions simply relate to a clearly defined

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[116]Treaty terms generally include a $5.00 per head annual grant to Indians, as well as slightly larger sums to chiefs and councillors. It is these treaty monies which are distributed at treaty time, but as many people come together it also provides an opportunity for other governmental activities, such as X-Rays by the Health Department.

cultural group existing within a larger social structure which is dominated by some other cultural group. Thus the native people are linguistically limited in their ability to communicate with those in power, and limited in their social relations with those in power-at least partly because of their distinctive ecnomic structure.

As social institutions of the external culture invade the north (schools, hospitals), the native residents participate in them only in very specific ways - as clients, or consumers, of the services. This (among other things) sets them into a particular kind of relationship with "the others" which may be defined as "professional", a relationship which is characterized by social distance, low expectations in regards to responsibility, and lack of influence or communicative channels.[111]

Although the role structure associated with aggregation and articulation of interests perhaps could consist of a wide-spread division of labour, in this case it did not. Initially the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs had specific and unique responsibilities for the Status Indian population, so that interest articulation and aggregation were fully collapsed in a single structure. This should, according to Smelser, lead to value-oriented social movements.

In fact in the sixties in the Northwest Territories the power of the Department(DIAND) waned rapidly, and the Territorial Government attempted to take responsibility for all populations. However, interest articulation and aggregation remained virtually a single structure and much more personalized, as responsibility for action largely rested in the hands of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories.

C. The Case:Generalized Beliefs and Mobilization, the CYC as Prologue

In February of 1967 the Company of Young Canadians described above, hired a full-time field staff to supervise its work in the Northwest Territories.[112] The Company had sent two volunteers into Inuvik the previous fall without on-site staff support and the

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[111]I am trying to avoid providing an explanation for these patterns; rather the attempt here is to interpret them within the theory so they may eventually provide an explanation of collective behavior or challenge the theory.
[112]The author of this thesis was that person, and the following information is from personal files and reports. Most of it is available in National Archives, Ottawa, Record Group 116, "The Company of Young Canadians".

experience had been a disaster. One of the volunteers was facing a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and both had to be pulled out of the community in the face of a very hostile town.[113]

The C.Y.C. Great Slave Lake Project goals were community organizing among the Indian and Metis of the area. Because a Treaty Commisioner had been appointed by Indian Affairs Branch to discuss the unsettled land provisions in the treaties, one major purpose was clarification of the nature of the written treaty. It was also hoped that project members could clarify and record the Indian recollection of that treaty ("the oral treaty," or treaty as recalled by the Indian people). The longer range goal was to assist in the formation of an Indian organization which would eventually take over such functions as treaty clarification and protecting other Indian interests. It was this second goal which required a strategy of recruiting Indian volunteers so they would gain organizing experience and political knowledge, and a strategy of increasing organizational activity in communities and communication between them.

In June of 1967 the C.Y.C. staff person moved from Edmonton to Yellowknife, as it was decided that unlike many governmental jobs, this one could not be done from outside the territories. A car was leased, a small apartment was rented to serve as accommodation and office, and community visits were begun. The staff person had visited almost all native communities around Great Slave Lake in her previous work, so she knew both Indian people and civil servants in all of them. By August the first volunteers were recruited; two from outside (Montreal and Armstrong, Ontario) and two from inside (Ft. Rae and Ft. Providence). During the following two years outside

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[113]Although one of the young men who were volunteers in this case was probably "youth-culture foolish" in his behavior in the community, flouting a beard and dress-style that was guarenteed to irritate, the anger which developed in the community towards both volunteers was far too intense to be so easily explained. I visited Inuvik as a health professional while they were still there, and my sense of the atmosphere was that the anger was so intense there could almost be a lynching party. The men had flagrantly broken community mores, not by having sexual relations with a young Inuit woman which was common enough, but by socializing and even living in "the west end", the Native end of town. The situation was perhaps made worse because the Company of Young Canadians was, at that time, not under a Minister of the Crown but under the much more prestigous Privy Council Office. In this civil service northern town, it would be well-known that their mail came with a Privy Council return address on it. In any case, the C.Y.C. was anxious to avoid a repeat of the Inuvik northern experience.

volunteers proved more and more problematic and the project relied heavily on local Indian men and women.[114] This decision was at least partly based on the opinion of the project staff person that volunteers learned a great deal in their two year stint, but at this time in the history of the north it was more important for those learnings to accrue to northern Indians than outsiders.

Throughout the fall of 1967 and through 1968 the volunteers worked primarily on a community-based training programme and on the treaty issue. Volunteer meetings were held approximately once a month, and occasional trips were taken to other communities to open up communication links and to stimulate ideas. The young Dogrib man first recruited, Louis Rabesca, had perhaps grade four formal schooling and was deeply immersed in his own community. He proved to be an extremely good organizer, and more and more the work seemed to base itself amongst the Dogribs.[115]

In the summer of 1968 a young Slavey man from Ft. Providence decided to work as a volunteer on the "Indian Brotherhood" project. The man, Leon Samble, was 23 years old, a matriculation graduate of Grandin College at Ft. Smith, and had completed two years towards a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry at the University of Calgary.[116] He was a very bright, poised young man, fluent in English and Slavey, who

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[114]Outsiders were a problem primarily because of housing and clothing problems, as well as to a lesser degree difficulties with "cultural adjustment". Nevertheless, two outside volunteers will figure heavily in the following account: Mr. Steve Iveson and Ms. Laura Dexter. At least two others came into the territories, worked as volunteers and moved into Territorial Government positions and were extremely helpful to the work of the project. Two were outside Indian men (Naz Therriault, an Ojibway from Armstrong, Ontario and Roy Daniels, a Saulteaux from Manitoba) and each made a distinctive contribution. Thus, the statement, "outside volunteers proved problematic" should not be taken to mean incompetent.

[115]Louis Rabesca was an unknowing teacher for the outsiders on the project, for he was continually surprised at "white ways". But when he realized he was "teaching", he could seldom resist a joke. He spent one evening explaining to Steve what he needed for a six week caribou hunt -clothes, things that were good and bad luck, and so on. Genuinely surprised when Steve said he did not know how to pray, a necessary activity for the hunt, Louis quickly said, "You say - my God, how did I get here" (notes, August 1, 1968). Louis died of natural causes in Edmonton, at age 26, in the spring of 1973, leaving a widow and six children.

[116]Mr. Samble remarked that he had no trouble with prejudice at the University of Calgary. Everyone thought he was Japanese and he just let it ride. His potential seemed unlimited. His death by freezing while out staking mineral claims in February of 1969 was a great loss to the north.

moved easily in Indian and non-Indian social circles. He had decided not to go back to University for a year, and he worked all that summer on the Brotherhood idea. Among other activities, he visited the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood in Winnipeg and brought back papers detailing its structure to discuss with Indians in the MacKenzie. He did not feel very successful in the work and found the lack of structure of the task and minimal income both difficult. He resigned to look for better paid employment in the fall of 1968, but he fully expected to continue to work organizing the Brotherhood on his own time.

That fall (1968) Laura Dexter joined the group. She was from Nova Scotia, had a Bachelor of Arts, and had been working as a reporter on the local newspaper. She went to live in the house of the Chief of Yellowknife Indian village. Her main interest was schooling and she began an informal classroom at the Chief's kitchen table. From two to ten children regularly attended and she taught them a little English, reading, and arithmetic.

That winter a volunteer who had trained to work with an all-Indian National Film Board film crew (a joint project of the National Film Board and the Company of Young Canadians) was invited north as the film project seemed close to collapse.[117] This man, Roy Daniels, was a Saulteaux from Manitoba. He had virtually completed high school but no post-high school education. He was to film in the area and more importantly tape the treaty stories so there would be a permanent record of the position of the Indians who had signed treaty in 1921. It was anticipated that these tapes could be used in future negotiations and perhaps even a court case if necessary, so that the gradual depletion of men and women who had been present at the signing of treaty would not determine the information available for future negotiations. Mr. Daniels began, with other volunteers, visiting and taping in Indian homes. He soon married a Dogrib woman from Rae and more or less settled into that community.

In the spring of 1969 the staff person gave a ride to a young Dogrib man hitchiking from Ft. Providence to Ft. Rae. James Washie had lived in Akaitcho Hall the previous year, when the first two outside volunteers were there. He had just spent most of the previous year travelling throughout the United States and Canada with a

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[117]Others on this film crew included Noel Starblanket, later president of the National Indian Brotherhood, and Willie Dunn, a Mohawk musician and vocalist.

northern all-Indian muscial group called the Chieftones. In his early twenties, he was now returning home not quite sure what to do. He had grade twelve, was fluent in Dogrib and English, but he had no definite career plans. He soon signed on as a volunteer and began working with Louis and Steve in Ft. Rae and Yellowknife: the main topic continued to be the treaty but the Brotherhood was always in the background.

That May the C.Y.C. field staff person resigned and left the North. A new, aggressive young man arrived in August. He had a political science degree and soon was actively involved in local level politics - community councils, settlement councils, and band councils. The project continued to "hire" young Indian volunteers as much as possible and to support the Brotherhood concept.

By the fall of 1969 the Company of Young Canadians organization itself had been through considerable turmoil, and a revised CYC Act was passed in the Canadian parliament. A new executive-director was hired. Among other changes, the new executive redefined the word "project" in the Company. An areal focus such as the Great Slave Lake project was no longer permitted. A project now became a "task", such as organizing a day-care centre, and the Council of the Company in Ottawa approved each volunteer position individually. Wide-scale travel and visiting of volunteers and community members within a project area were no longer legitimate. Each volunteer was to work on his or her own "job" and be "supervised" by periodic visits from the staff person.

The Great Slave Lake project did not change rapidly. However, by this time an Indian Brotherhood was in existance and it is possible to follow the development of the Dene movement in the Territories through the Brotherhood. Only one more statement need be made here about the Company of Young Canadians. In 1971 the staff person resigned, and a young Dogrib man from Yellowknife was selected to replace him. There was conflict in head office over that decision and I was sent to Yellowknife to serve as interim staff for twelve weeks while Ottawa repeated the selection process. The result was confirmation of Georges Erasmus as the C.Y.C. field staff for Yellowknife. He remained in that positon for two years, until the summer of 1973. That year he was elected president of the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood, defeating the

incumbant James Wah-shee.[118]

Before the Brotherhood itself was formed, other protests began to occur in the Indian community as external pressures and internal organizing built up. In fact resistance and reaction become almost common-place in the territories, especially in the Upper MacKenzie. This period of restlessness and agitation is the more remarkable if contrasted to the previous hundred years. Although there is some question about the adequacy of the record, there is virtually no evidence of active resistance to, or active attempts to pressure, the government in previous periods. Nor are there records of resistance to, or hostility against, the other external institutions such as the Bay and the Church. [119]

Yet, beginning in 1968 there were many acts of resistance. I will describe two such events, the treaty boycott at Rae in the summer of 1968 and the school petition from Yellowknife Indian village in the spring of 1969. The Akaitcho Hall incident in the preceding chapter must also be seen as one of these events, as must the formation of the Indian Brotherhood which will also be described in this chapter. There were a number of other similar incidents during this period. The Indians at Rae refused to move to a new town-site and a lengthy meeting with the commissioner finally at least resulted in the townsite name being changed from Morphy to Edzo. The Indians at Ft. Resolution petitioned to have the Indian agent removed. The Indians of Latham Island organized to form their own band and elect their own chief. Finally, band council and hamlet council elections became mobilizing points or points of contention.[120]

The first major, well-organized, protest was the treaty boycott at Ft. Rae in July of 1968. The C.Y.C. volunteers, Steve and Louis, had spent much of the spring of 1968 discussing the treaty with the men at Rae, in preparation for the upcoming negotiations with the newly appointed treaty commissioner (Mr. Ogden). In June one of

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[118]Mr. Wah-shee modified the spelling of his name to conform more closely to its Dogrib origins in 1970.

[119]Although Inuit were considered hostile to both the Bay and the church, and there were deaths at the hands of Inuit in the nineteenth century.

[120]A volunteer, writing to me in the fall of 1969, said that a local territorial counciller was having the C.Y.C. investigated because he held them responsible for ruining the hamlet council elections at Rae. The volunteer insisted it was the villagers themselves who had ruined the elections, because they were confused about the precise relation of the hamlet council to the band council.

the head councillor's well-schooled (grade 12) sons asked me to review the material they had received on the treaty and explain it to his father. I did so, the young lad acting as an interpretor. In my notes at that time I commented that settling the treaty

> ...is not a simple task because many of the bands, and especially the Dogribs at Rae, do not accept the contents of the written treaty. As the treaty was signed in 1921 many people alive were witness to the signing and are confident that they know the contents of the treaty, on the basis of the words of the old chief. It is apparent in the most superficial discussion that the contents of the oral treaty are not the same as the contents of the written treaty. (personal document, July 3, 1968).

On July 2, while I was visiting Rae, Louis Rabesca asked that Steve and I go to a meeting at Chief Bruneau's house to explain about the treaty. It was a large meeting of 40 or 50 men. In my opinion at the time it included "...all the power people of the band." The three of us were received formally and seated on three chairs in the middle of the room, and we began to talk through an interpretor. Steve did most of the talking about the treaty, primarily outlining the contents and comparing some provisions to the governance of his home town (for example, the provision that Indian children would be turned over to "his majesty's government" for education). At one point, when he talked about the terms in regards to the land, the interpretor almost refused to translate, because "that would make the chief mad" (*idem*, 1968).

The following day, I returned to Rae at 3 P.M. The treaty party had been their since 12 noon and no one had taken treaty. The X-ray party was furious, and blamed the C.Y.C. for the trouble. Neither Steve nor myself were included in Indian discussions that day. My notes indicate they were not the place for White men. The treaty boycott lasted six hours, until the local Member of Parliament (Mr. Orange) arrived. A long meeting was then held in the community hall with the members of the treaty party (the Indian agent, the treaty commissioner), the band, and Mr. Orange.

The chief of the Rae Dogribs objected throughout this meeting to the possibility that they would be talking about land, either now or at later meetings in Yellowknife. (These were the first scheduled meetings on revisions to the Indian Act, scheduled for Yellowknife the following month). He said,

> If they are going to talk about land, one square mile for five persons, how the people are going to live? The people will starve to death" [121] (translated from the Dogrib).

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[121]The taped transcript of this meeting was translated and typed by C.Y.C. personnel. It is available in the C.Y.C. archives in Ottawa.

The chief is here talking about the provisions for reserves written into Treaty #11, but it is obvious that he describes it as a new provision. It would seem that to him this was not discussed in 1921, and this was very much the position of the Dogrib people.

The treaty commissioner responds by saying that if the people don't want to talk about land any more, he will respect their wishes. He also says that the treaty says the people can live and keep hunting, trapping, and fishing in the areas they have always used to hunt, trap, and fish. He makes no reference to reserves as specified in the treaty, nor to changes in northern resource exploitation and settlement which will affect the tradional land use. Steve Iveson, the C.Y.C. volunteer, raises these points and Ogden does concede them. He does not, at any time, imply recognition of an oral treaty, or of the possibility that he and the chief are talking about much different content in Treaty #11. Rather he reassures the people that "the treaty" (i.e. his version of it), cannot be changed without the Indian's permission (*idem*).

The Dogrib councillors object not only to the image of land ownership and control implied in the treaty, they also object to the use of wild life. A councillor says,

> In 1921...they never said anything about the white man going hunting on the Indian lands,...now some of the white men have licenses for moose. Its not right to us. The white man has lots of money, they don't need to shoot the animals...all the animals is what we live on, the animals is *ours*....

Ogden then promised again that the people must agree to a new treaty before any changes can be made, and the Member of Parliament makes a speech about how the Indians at Rae have won. The people of Rae felt satisfied with their boycott and proceeded to take treaty for 1968. (Transcript of treaty meeting, July 3, 1968).

The text of this treaty confrontation, even in the little that is presented above, makes it quite clear that the governmental representatives and the Indians are talking about the treaty in very different terms. The governmental representatives do not recognize this, either by choice or because they really do not understand it. At least one of the problems is a totally different concept of land and land ownership. A few weeks prior to this meeting I had been trying to explain to a young woman the terms of the treaty as written. She was riding as a passenger in my car, so she could not escape the conversation, but it was obviously making her restless and irritable. Finally, when I said "the Crown owns the land", she exploded in anger.

Own the land, own the land, own the land. I don't know what the white man

is talking about all the time. *Nobody* owns the land.

She paused a moment, as if a new idea had just occurred to her, and she said firmly, "God owns the land." Such anger at the definition of the situation which I was presenting would not come from a well-schooled Indian adult. He or she would well know what I meant by owning land. Only a relatively unschooled person would reflect the Dene definition of the situation by total irritation with the non-sense of my conversation.

In February of 1969 the Akaitcho Hall incident described in chapter three occurred. That same year the Indians of Yellowknife village decided it was time they got their own school. The C.Y.C. volunteers had been discussing it in the village, and had circulated a petition which was signed by most people in the village (many signing with an X). The Montreal Gazette reported 40 village children going to school in Ft. Smith, 15 of kindergarten age in the village, and 20 of school age who have never been to school at all. The journalist remarks that no one had thought of putting a school in the village with its 75 school-age children, even though a school went into Pine Point (mining town) as soon as the town was built, as a matter of course (Richards, *Montreal Gazette*, April 14, 1969).

Action was slow. The education department wanted to continue to send most children to Ft. Smith and bus the twenty non-attenders to Yellowknife. On the last day of the spring 1969 territorial council meeting in Yellowknife, the villagers took the matter directly to the council.

> ...the men of the village won their school by marching into the Northwest Territories council the very last morning of the June sitting, en masse: leaders of the village, C.Y.C. members, Wally (Firth, of the Indian-Eskimo Association) and Phoebe Nahanni and me. Dave (Searle) and Big Stu (Hodgson) looked so alarmed that they settled the thing immediately, conceding a school (within five minutes of our entrance) before it could go into council records.... Now it is built, 2 rooms, 2 teachers, and full of kids (personal correspondence from L. Dexter, Nov. 1969).

D. The Case: Generalized Beliefs and Mobilization, the Brotherhood is Formed

The major event of this time period was the formation of the Indian Brotherhood (and thus the clear-cut beginnings of the Dene nation) in the summer of 1969. It began, however, not exactly as a social movement but as a rather prosaic Indian organization.

Even so, it began as a response of protest and with an uninstitutionalized action, not as a carefully planned event. There had been much discussion about a Brotherhood but no organization yet existed. Material from the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood was circulated amongst C.Y.C. volunteers, and many Indian people were well familiar by now with organizations elsewhere in Canada. Consultations on the Indian Act had begun the summer before, with a regional meeting of chiefs and councillors in July of 1968. These meetings continued in the north (and across Canada) into 1969.

In the summer of 1969 the Northwest Territories Regional Consulation meeting was being held at Ft. Smith. In the midst of the consultation process, the government of Canada brought down its "White Paper" on Indian policy. It began with the dramatic statement "To be an Indian is to be a man" (Canada: 1969), [122] but it went on to describe a policy in which there would be no special status for Indians and perhaps no recognition of Indian claims in Canada.

The notion of integration and assimilation was not new to the Indian: it was the goal of Sir John A MacDonald's Indian policy in the 1880's and restated in changes to the Indian Act in 1951. Nor was it something the northern people saw only in government documents. For example, the editor of the *News of the North*, a partisan Liberal, frequently editorialized against special Indian status. In August of 1968 he wrote,

> The government must decide now whether it is going to pursue a policy of integrating the Indian into white society or preserving the traditional way of life....Northern development dictates a decision in favour of integration....

Elsewhere in the same paper he remarked,

> no special status for Indians or anyone else... Canada's people should make it clear they are not about to allow it to continue anyway...tell them there won't be any Indian Act....whether they continue in their original way of life or are going to become ordinary Canadians the same as everyone else. (*News of the North*, August 1968).

This editorial position clearly demonstrated the dilemna as posed by the government - either preserve the traditional way of life *or* become ordinary Canadians, with no status

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[122] I neglected to ask the woman who was elected president of the Indian Brotherhood if it was that statement that gave her the edge. The Indian men and women at that meeting were more than capable of picking up such a remark as a challenge, and electing a woman just to remind govenment that to be an Indian might also mean to be a woman.

as Indian. The possibility that these were not the only set of choices does not seem to occur to anyone. But it also indicates an interesting dichotomy. "Canada's people" apparently does not include Indians. Rather "Canada's people" should *tell* Indians what the case will be in Canada in regards to the Indian Act.

The Federal Government's White Paper was widely interpreted as a betrayal by Indian groups. They were engaged in a lengthy and difficult consultation process with one wing of government, while another was deciding on Indian policy without their advice or involvement and in a manner inimical to their interests. Sally Weaver (1980) has documented the contradictory process in Ottawa which generated this pattern; in Canada as a whole one result was widespread Indian opposition.

In the Northwest Territories the regional advisory council meeting at Ft. Smith discussed the implications of this general process and the White Paper. The chiefs and councillors in attendance decided to take matters into their own hands. They dissolved the regional advisory board (which they did not have authority to do), and decided to form the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood. The first meeting of that Brotherhood was called immediately, replacing the ongoing regional board meeting, and an executive was elected. The first president was Mrs. Mona Jacobs, a Cree woman from Ft. Smith. Like Mr. Samble (described above), who had worked on the idea the previous summer, Mrs. Jacobs had two years of University. Like Mr. Sambele, she moved comfortably in Indian and non-Indian social circles, and was very much at home in the community in which she was raised (Ft. Smith).[133] Mrs. Jacobs viewed the government as extremely hostile to the formation of the Brotherhood. They wanted to implement the White Paper, and the Brotherhood appeared to be an obstacle. Within weeks all Northwest Territories offices of the Department of Indian Affairs were closed, all Indian agents left the territories, and files were burned (personal communication, 1982). It is likely that the elimination of the Indian Affairs Branch in the territories was planned for some time, but the speed with which it was implemented after the Brotherhood was formed seemed less than coincidence.

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[133]She was a class-mate of Harold Cardinals, of the Indian Association of Alberta, at St. Patrick's College in Ottawa in the middle sixties. She married (and later divorced) Alan Jacobs, an Alberta Chipewyan from Cold Lake, who was one of the founders of the Canadian Indian Youth Council (with Harold Cardinal) in 1966.

Mona Jacobs continued as president for almost one year, but she took employment during that time within the Department of Social Services of the Territorial government. She found that they were unwilling to grant her leave to attend Brotherhood meetings or national consultations, and she felt that she was, in any case, in a position of conflict. She resigned her Brotherhood position and the treasurer became interim president. This was Roy Daniels, the C.Y.C. volunteer who by now had married a woman from the Dogrib community of Rae. He was, as noted above, a Saulteaux Indian from Manitoba.

A number of C.Y.C. volunteers were redesignated Brotherhood field workers during this time period, which meant they received income from the C.Y.C. but were in principal responsible to the Brotherhood. The arrangement lasted just a year, and there was considerable unhappiness within C.Y.C.'s administrative structure about its operation.[124] By the end of 1970 the C.Y.C. was no longer formally involved with the Brotherhood, although informal relations were generally good for at least one more year. In a C.Y.C. project evaluation in September of 1970, the evaluator remarks that "Whites" in Yellowknife have mixed feelings about the project work. They were critical of its involvement in events such as the Akaitcho Hall riot and the Brotherhood, but generally approve of activities such as the school in Indian village (Wilkinson, 1970). The linking of the Brotherhood and the C.Y.C. perhaps contributed to an increased hostility towards both organizations, as each was defined as somewhat more radical than it might otherwise have been because of that linkage.

In 1970 the Brotherhood (and the C.Y.C.) also supported Indian candidates in territorial elections. For the first time status Indians were elected to the territorial council, and attempted to participate actively in the legislative process of that council. Thus the political and organizing activity of the Brotherhood was both internal and external, both involved with field activities of the Brotherhood itself and involved with the Territorial Government.

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[124]The ostensibly cooperative venture actually raised issues of conflicting lines of authority and jurisdiction. The Ottawa office often had some difficulty keeping its financial systems functioning, and a great deal of hostility developed between the field and Ottawa. There is at least one report on archival files documenting this (Wilkinson, 1970).

In December of 1970 the Chiefs elected a new president of the Brotherhood, James Wa-shee from Ft. Rae. He too was married by this time (in 1969). His wife was a non-Indian woman from Toronto who had been a C.Y.C. volunteer in Calgary and Winnipeg. She had come north to work with the territorial department of adult education. Throughout Wa-shee's presidency, she was influential in the Brotherhood's relation to the White community in Yellowknife.

With the previous presidency the Brotherhood had begun to receive Secretary of State core funding. With this presidency it became much more aggressive in its organizing acitivity and began to involve "white advisors" (as lawyers, political analysts, and so on). It also strengthened its economic base by obtaining research grants, especially in relation to treaty research and land rights.

In its meetings in 1971 the Brotherhood established a regional system of vice-presidents and clarified that its base was in the chiefs or existing band structure. Each language group (of the five) was represented by one chief who functioned as a vice-president. The executive also identified key problem areas, in particular the possibility of having to pay for health services [123], the possibility of an oil pipeline down the Mackenzie, the problem of settlement councils competing with band councils, and they established a committee on Indian rights and treaties.

In July of 1971 at a meeting of the Indian Brotherhood Board of Directors the Board passed a resolution asking the Company of Young Canadians to "withdraw all personnel from Indian communities". Although the resolution seemed to come out of the blue, it may well have been an attempt to get the public to see the two organizations as separate. It would have had unfortunate consequences if it had been followed to the letter, for most volunteers in Indian communities were local Indian people. It took some time for the new C.Y.C. staff person, George Erasmus to renegotiate relations with the Brotherhood, but he eventually did so. [124]

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[123]This is a long-standing dispute between Status Indians and the Medical Services Directorate. Status Indians (more accurately, Treaty Indians) insist that medical care is included in the terms of their treaties. Medical services insists it has only historically provided free medical care on the basis of indigency of the Indian population, and that if Indians have funds to pay they should pay.
[124]The Board of Directors had some reason for concern about the public linking them with the C.Y.C. One of the local non-Indian volunteers had been charged with dynamiting a communications shed in Hay River (charges were dropped; it is impossible to know if there was any substance to them), another was

That August, a vice-president of the Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood (Chief Ed Bird of the Fitz-Smith band) was shot and killed in his Yellowknife home by an R.C.M.P. constable. Bird was a tall, good-looking crew-cut man in his early thirties. Always reasonable and good-natured, and far removed from any "radical" pretensions that people wished to associate with the Brotherhood, he seemed a most undeserving candidate for a policeman's bullet.[127] The policeman insisted that he did not know who the man named Ed Bird was, nor even that he was an Indian. That seemed hard to believe in a town as small as Yellowknife. The incident sent shock waves throughout the Native community, and contributed to the further mobilization of the Brotherhood.

The political problems of Dene land and the possiblity of a Mackenzie pipeline seemed to be the major threats to the developing Dene nation. Their first tactic was a legal one, applying for a caveat on northern lands, making it impossible for companies to purchase or lease the land. Initially, their caveat was granted, and the legitimacy of their land claims seemed assured. This judicial decision was overturned in a higher court on a technicality, and the Dene had to begin again.

In 1973 the organization had another leadership change, as Georges Erasmus of Yellowknife contested James Wah-shee's presidency. There was some bitterness over Erasmus's success, but he remained president of the organization to 1982. Like the other leaders he is relatively well-schooled, with grade 12 from St. Patrick's school in Yellowknife. He too is Dogrib, and like Wah-shee he continued to rely on various outside advisors for specific tasks within the Brotherhood.

With lobbying, briefs, and media attention (and the luck of a minority government in Ottawa), the Dene managed to get a public inquiry into the building of an oil pipeline

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[126](cont'd) considered involved with the local "hippy" community. At the same time, as noted earlier in the text, both the Brotherhood and the C.Y.C. were tarred with the brush of "trouble-maker" and their memberships were virtually interlocking. It is impossible under the circumstances to know if either damaged the reputation of the other, or if the same public forces were at work in defining both of them. It is also possible the resolution was, in fact, aimed at Georges Erasmus who was a potential leadership contender for the Brotherhood. He in fact ousted the incumbant president two years later.

[127]He had been drinking one night and his wife became frightened that he might hurt her or the children. She left the trailer and phoned the police. The police officers who came called for him to leave the trailer. He refused to do so and said they would have to come and get him. They emptied their guns through the door of the trailer, in spite of the fact the children were sleeping there. Bird was wounded and later died in hospital in Edmonton.

down the Mackenzie. Jean Chretien, as outgoing Minister of Indian Affairs, made the recommendation in 1974 and Justice Thomas Berger of British Columbia was appointed to head the inquiry in March of that year. He decided to have not only formal hearings, but community hearings, and people in small Indian settlements all along the Mackenzie had an opportunity to speak their piece. By the time of his report, in 1976, he was prepared to recommend a ten year delay on pipeline construction so that northern institutions would have the chance to evolve to the point that northerners could handle such an intrusion in their home-land.

While the Berger hearings were ongoing, members of the territorial council expressed opposition to it. In 1976, before the Berger recommendations had come down, the council voted in favour of the pipeline, apparently to influence Berger's recommendations. They thus explicitly stated what had been implicit for years; their disagreement with, and even hostility to, the Indian people and their organization the Indian Brotherhood. The Dene decided their members sitting on the council should resign, and that they should not participate further in its deliberations. In the words of one Dene member, it seemed the Dene were just there legitimizing decisions which they could not influence (Gerry Cheezie speaking in Edmonton in 1977; also see Barnaby in Watkins, 1977:120-122).

Beginning in 1972 the Brotherhood and the Indian population had begun to use the term Dene to refer to themselves. In 1976 the Dene Declaration was issued, a declaration which demanded the right of the Dene to be recognized as a nation. This was followed by the name change of the Brotherhood to the Dene Nation in 1977, and its incorporation under that name in 1979 (Dene Annual Report, 1980). The beliefs of the Dene can be descibed in detail because of the above documents, and the documents published in the Watkins book (1977).

There is a core of beliefs which seem to be central to the Dene movement. These include a specific construction of the historical process in northern Canada, a specific description of the most important elements of the Dene collective reality, and a set of beliefs about "the other" described variously as governments, outsiders or southerners, whites, or sometimes colonizers. Related to these is a general "plan of

action" or appropriate direction for the Dene movement to take.[139]

The history of the Dene is one of a people, a nation with "...our own land, our own language, our own political and economic systems...our own culture and traditions and history, distinct from those of your nation" (T'Selie, 1977:13). This nation not only made its own laws and educated its own young, but made its own history, naming and in a sense thus "creating" the world in which it existed (Erasmus, 1977:177-78).

Into that history came outsiders, whites, and they were welcomed as guests but gradually they have taken over the history of the Dene; they, the outsiders, now "make history" naming the Dene Indian, Metis, Status and non-Status; naming the place-names on maps and so on(Erasmus, 1977:177-79; Blake, 1977:7; Nahanni, 1977:17). These outsiders and the Dene signed treaties between 1898 and 1922, treaties of peace and brotherhood which clearly recognized the continued occupancy and ownership by the Dene of their lands (Erasmus, 1977:178). To the extent what is recorded in the written treaties indicated some other agreement, the latter either was not presented and negotiated at the time of treaty signing, or the documents are forged, or in other ways ways are of doubtful authenticity(Fumoleau, 1977).

As the outsiders came into Dene territory they began to pass laws, laws now imposed upon the Dene by others rather thun created by themselves (Erasmus 1977). They began to "educate" Dene children, to teach them a different and alien way of life that was not Dene (Kakfwi, 1977; Overbold, 1977; T'Selie, 1977:14). In every area they introduced their institutions, their way of doing things, and ignored the Dene way of doing things (Blake, 1977; Barnaby et al, 1977). The consequences of all of this was a people confused, sometimes drinking too much (Snowshoes, 1977), and finally a people feeling inferior, no longer actors naming the world but being acted upon, living in a world named by others (Erasmus, 1977:178).

The reality in which the Dene now live is that of the Fourth World as defined by George Manual, clusters of aboriginal people who live within the boundaries of industrialized nation-states but do not share the wealth and power of the dominant society. It is within this context that the Dene claim to reaffirm those values and laws

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[139]The language in the following description follows as closely as possible the language of the written text in Watkin's book. Where direct quotes are used they are, of course, set off by quotation marks.

which are important to their identity as a people. They consider themselves a people with a specific relationship to the land,a relationship of trust and responsibility to the land which feeds the Dene. The land, the water, and the animals are "..to make (a) living on...not to play with" (Nahanni, 1977:22).

As a people the Dene are different from whitemen; not better or worse but different (T'Selie, 1977:14). They have always called themselves Dene, which could be translated as "people different from animals". When Europeans arrived the word **Dene** came to mean also "ourselves" as separate from the Europeans (Erasmus, 1977:178).

The Dene have their own way of seeing things, their own values, their own life styles, their own laws (Barnaby et al, 1977:120). Dene laws are concerned with benefitting everyone, not just a few. People are expected to share if they have a lot. Respect for the old people is a law, and so is the way of decision-making. No one can make a decision for anyone else, and when everyone is affected by the decision everyone takes part in the discussion. No one person owns land; it belongs to all of the Dene (Barnaby et al, 1977:121). These are just a few examples of Dene laws, of the Dene "way", But the Dene also believe they are "...the last free Indian nation..."(T'Selie, 1977:12) and as such they may have to fight to survive as a free nation.

The "others" as noted above, are designated by such terms as Europeans, whites, colonizers, southerners, or sometimes non-Dene. Thus, Philip Blake describes the school as "...a symbol of white domination and control...part of a system set up to destroy Indian culture and to destroy our pride in our Indian heritage" (1977:6). Other parts of this system are rental (not owned) housing, a judicial system which "...punished the Indian for stealing from the Bay but not the Bay for stealing from the Indian" (1977:6), and the Indian employed as cheap labour by others rather than working for themselves. Blake states "Your nation is destroying our nation" (1977:7) as part of his description of Euro-Canadians and the relationshiop of the "system" to the Dene.

The Dene see the "white visitor" as laying claim to Dene lands and they consider this to be completely unjust. They accuse "the other" of being too greedy for oil and gas to be concerned about justice. They argue that the north is colonially ruled (Blake, 1977:7) and that proposals for northern gas lines are demands that the Dene give up their land and resources, not to help the poor of the world but to help the rich and

powerful.

The white visitor is further seen as taking the Dene children from their families and teaching them foreign ways, as moving Dene into communities so they would forget how to live off the land and so the whites could take the resources, and of encouraging the natives to drink and fight amongst themselves (T'Selie, 1977:15; Kakfi, 1977:142). T'Selie expresses this somewhat dramatically when he says the whites seem to "...take away the centre of my existence, to steal my soul" (1977:15-16).

The "system" is a white system, a southern system, one which serves the interests of the south whether one speaks of schools, the Territorial Government, or anything else (Barnaby et al, 1977). It is a system in which a few make decisions for many, and this oppresses people. It is a system of oppression and exploitation in which a few have a lot and a lot of people have very little (Barnaby, 1977:122). Finally, the European is pictured as treating the Dene in ways which make them feel inferior, treating them as if they were incompetent to make their own decisions. The last half-century has been a colonial experience for the Dene (Erasmus, 1977:179).

How can all of this be changed? What overall direction must the Dene take to modify the situation defined as problematic? The Dene must be recognized by themselves and the world as a nation, as a self-determining people Just as European countries have European governments and African countries now have African governments, so the native peoples of the new world must have an Amerindian government for the Amerindian peoples. They must have independence and self-determination within the country of Canada, and the challenge for the Dene and the world is how to provide for recognition of the Dene nation (1977:3-4).

The Dene Declaration is described by Erasmus as "...the expression of our collective decision after years of colonialism to resist further assimilation and...to struggle to regain our freedom as people" (1977:179). This involves working on an arrangment "...by which we as a Dene nation can enter the Confederation of Canada with the guarentee that there will be an end to attempts to colonize and assimilate us...(reaching an agreement) with the federal government wherby we, as a self-determining people, become a recognized entity in Canada", and determining what form of government is required for the Dene (1977:77, 79). We must have a political

jurisdiction over a defined land base (1977:180). Thus the land claim is not only a claim for land but for political rights (Barnaby, 1977:120). At present it may be necessary to participate in the whiteman's system "...but this participation is temporary until the right of the Dene to choose their own institutions is recognized (Nahannie, 1977:23).

In spite of defining their problems primarily as Dene problems with the Canadian social system, the Dene also recognize that many other Canadians share their negative experiences with that "system". Such people may well be allies in the process of Dene development (Nahannie, 1977:23) but the Dene themselves must always protect their own interests for no one else will, in spite of the fact they simply seek universal human rights (Erasmus, 1977:181).

Smelser's notion of "value-oriented" exactly fits this movement, although the attempt is not to create new values but rather to protect and reaffirm historic values of the collectivity. Consistent with Smelser's hierarchy, this value-oriented movement includes a major normative component, namely the restructuring of the legal and political relations between the collectivity and the Canadian state. Also consistent with the hierarchy it includes modification of institutions (the mobilization into roles component in Smelser) and one major change in facilities, namely the control of the land. This latter is referred to in the context of aboriginal land claims.

The institutional level involves discussion of two institutions, the government (and implicitly ownership concepts and laws in general), and schools. Included in the notion of land control is a specific economic orientation which may be referred to as the "economic institutions" (the use of the land), and included in the criticisms of "the others" is an unacceptable economic structure (profit, wealth, greed, capitalism) but otherwise the economic institutional framework is not particularly detailed.

These then are the beliefs of the Dene nation as articulated in 1976. From 1969 to 1976 the Indian organization of the Northwest Territories has been transformed from an Indian Brotherhood into the Dene nation. What perhaps began as a norm-oriented movement is now clearly value-oriented, although both those terms will need further discussion in the analysis.

E. Summary and Analysis

The Northwest Territories Indian Brotherhood began in August of 1969. The decision to form it was made suddenly, in response to actions taken by the federal government, and the actions taken by the territorial Indians were strictly speaking uninstitutionalized in that they had no authority to dissolve the advisory board they were attending and form the Brotherhood.

The White Paper on Indian Policy released by the Trudeau government in 1969 clearly functioned as a precipitating event in the formation of the brotherhood, and that interpretation of it was easily spread among leaders as they were meeting together in one place. It was both possible for them to define and communicate the situation in ways which were inimical to the federal government's explicit intentions.

However, this event points to something else which Smelser's original theory would not clearly imply, although it may be implied by the Critical Theory precisely because it demands a more critical look at social control structures. Clearly the federal government is not a single agency acting in consistent ways at this time; one sector of government is actively mobilizing the population for consultation, while another is rewriting the document which they are being consulted about. It may well be that the same thing happened with the Combined Senate and House of Commons Hearings on Indian Affairs in 1928, and with the Indian Act Hearings of 1948, but the mobilization of Indians was on a much smaller scale. It is evident here that the Indians sense of a breach of trust is quite understandable, but the conditions are all present for them to translate their feelings into action.

It is also interesting, and not well predicted by Smelser's theory, that at some levels we could say the major mobilizing agency was the social control structure. In this respect, this case resembles very closely the hostile outburst described in the preceding chapter. However, that mobilizing is in the context of institutionalized equivalents of norm-oriented movements, as the governing agencies seek direction on specific policies. But the conditions are not likely to favour such normative orientation in many respects; the clearest indication of that is the degree to which the two parties talk past each other in the conflict on treaty day at Rae. This also demonstrates, I think, the

extent to which members of opposing cultures must engage inevitably in value-oriented conflict unless the people of one culture are to determine the outcome of the conflict. When two cultures are based on different values and normative patterns "norm-oriented conflict" is of little value to the people of the less powerful culture.

A multitude of factors contributed to the beginning of the Brotherhood and the Dene nation, including the activities of a federal Crown Corporation called The Company of Young Canadians, and the actions of the Indian Affairs Branch. In general, both a community development philosophy in government and the rapid increase in the opportunity for Indian people to meet at government expense seem to have been other major factors. What these organizations did was change structural conduciveness by increasing the interaction amongst the native people, and provide an initial generalized belief which made it possible for such people to act against the government. That is, the philosophy of community development legitimized popular involvement in all political processes, and in this case it came from within the larger legitimized institution of government. However, the nature of this legitimacy is made clear if we note the response of non-Native Northerners to the agitation to get a school at Detah as opposed to their response to agitation associated with the Dene Nation. Clearly the school is fully legitimate,within the normative structure of "Canadian society". The Brotherhood and the Dene Nation are trouble, not appropriate activities for CYC volunteers to be involved in.

To further interpret these actions within the theory, we could say that various mobilizing forces contributed to structural conduciveness and interaction amongst the affected population, and by increasing the population's knowledge of possible organizational patterns available to them (increasing facilities). We might, however, want to argue from the data that much of this mobilizing was oriented at enabling the Native population to communicate with "others", with government structures, which would seem to imply a normative movement should have developed. However, if we again note the inability of the government representatives to comprehend that communication, we can argue that the movement could only become a value-oriented one.

The attitude of the Territorial government, and it would seem other "Whites" in positions of power, towards the Brotherhood was largely hostile. The official policy of both federal and territorial governments was that Indians should lose their special status

and assimilate (or at least integrate) into "mainstream" society. The Brotherhood threatened this vision of the North. But it must have threatened governments and others at deeper levels, for there was irritation and anger with its existance, its positions, and its actions.

The attitude of the Federal government has varied. On the whole it seems to be negative, but core funding has been available from the Secretary of State and funds have been provided for land claims research. (They have also been withheld and withdrawn on occasion). The appointment of a British Columbia justice to hear the Dene concerns about the Mackenzie River pipeline would suggest less hostility, as would the gradual conversion of the Minister of Northern Affairs (Warren Almond) to the Dene cause.

The pipeline hearings, held throughout the Mackenzie and a media event in the rest of Canada, made it possible for the Dene to state their case and to clarify their own position. By the end of the process, the Dene had a very clearly articulated belief system and were prepared to issue a formal declaration of their ideas, The Dene Declaration.

Throughout this whole time period various events have been seen as especially indicative of overall federal governmental hostility...or perhaps hostility in the dominant society. The closing of Indian Affairs Branch offices immediately after the formation of the Brotherhood was seen by members as significant. The death of Eddie Bird was accorded significance, as was the removal of Warren Almond from his cabinet post. Each has functioned as a precipitating event, increasing the strength and determination of the movement. This implies that the image of precipitating event in Smelser is perhaps inadequate, for reoccuring events may be required to keep a social movement going. In fact, we could look at the time period from 1965 to 1975 as a continually developing spiral, as a new plateau is reached and the determinants of social movements recur at another level or are interpreted anew and there is movement towards another level of organization.

We could also describe this situation as one in which a new class of northerners, a well-schooled articulate group of Dene men and women have developed a social movement in their efforts to fend off impending external controls over Dene land and

Dene institutions. They continue to attempt to impact the structures of Canadian political institutions, although it is impossible at this time to know what the final results of their efforts will be. However, the structural conditions can be clearly seen as creating this population group, this "class", which then begins to act as external change agents on the social structure in the sense that Lidz and Lidz imply. The early image of social control is Parsonian, as the Indians are to be assimilated into "Canadian" structures and those structures should brook no expectation of change. The White Paper can also be read this way, although the writers would likely object to such a reading. The organizing activity moves the image of social control into Smelser's model, as controlled norm-oriented activities are encouraged.

Yet, as indicated above, normative change will not do. The demand of this movement is for accomodation at much higher levels, at the level of organizing principles and values. This demand is carried on well after 1976, and the interaction becomes more sharply focussed on the Territorial government. By the end of 1976 the Dene nation had announced the Dene Declaration. They also had proposed an agreement in principal between themselves and the Federal Government, an agreement which would recognize their political claims although not specify how those claims should be worked out. The Dene began to talk to the new Minister of Northern Affairs, Mr. Warren Almond, to try to persuade him of the merits of their case. For the first time in Indian history a Minister seemed to listen to them and hear them, and the media reports of that time period imply that he was largely convinced by their arguments.

The Territorial Government adamantly opposed Dene political claims. In March of 1977 David Searle, the senior member of the territorial council (now called the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories) wrote to Mr. Almond and calls the Agreement in Principal "...totally and completely unacceptable". He goes on in very strong language to condemn the Indian Brotherhood for frittering away tax-payers money and blocking settlement of land claims in the Territories. That same year the Territorial Council issued their public response to the Dene document. It is titled "You've Heard From the Radical Few About Canada's North: Now Hear from the Moderate Many" (Canada:N.W.T.,n.d.).

By the end of the year (1977) Almond had been removed from his cabinet post, apparently over his stance on Native land issues and political claims. Prime Minister Trudea reiterated that he was "against racial states", apparently aiming his remarks at the Dene. Hugh Faulkener was appointed the new Minister of Indian Affairs. The man who has supervised the dismantling of the Company of Young Canadians the previous year (as Secretary of State) he was apparently considered safe from Dene ideas.

Perhaps to clear the air and try to eliminate the label "radical" from their work, the Dene nation dismissed all their "White advisors" in the fall of 1977. But that and following changes in the ministers of Indian and Northern Affairs (and even governments, through a short-lived Conservative administration) have resulted in little obvious change in the Federal position. The Drury report of 1980 recommended against any Dene political claims, and the Federal government seemed, on the whole, to be stone-walling further Dene political development.

However, the Dene changed their strategy within the Territories. They began to work more aggressively to modify their relations with other organized elements of the Mackenzie. A rapprochement was arranged with the Metis Association (as a brother of a man active in the Dene nation was elected to its presidency in 1979) and the potential (and real) conflict between the two organizations seemed to be resolved.

The Dene also decided to revise their electoral strategy. The Dene president ran for a seat in the federal parliament in 1980, losing by a very small margin. Although he lost the election the size of his vote was sufficiently large that it was difficult for others to dismiss him as having no constituency. The Dene also participated in territorial elections. In the spring of 1979 the majority of the seats of the Territorial Assembly were won either by Dene or at least by people not hostile to the Dene. It would be difficult for this Territorial Council to pass a resolution opposing a position of the Dene.

The Dene have since then participated actively in efforts to divide the Northwest Territories into two political units. A vote recommending such a division was carried in the Territories in the winter of 1982. For division to occur it would be necessary for the Federal Government to act, which there is little sign they are willing to do at present, but the general intention of the division would be to create smaller state structures ("provinces") and structures which follow more closely linguistic lines between the Inuit

and Dene.

Finally, the Dene have themselves formulated a proposal for a northern province called Denedah, or our land. This proposal was made public in the fall of 1981, as the Dene continued to try to persuade governments to negotiate the political structure of the northern part of Canada. To date, this is the last attempt of the Dene nation to influence the shape of the territories and perhaps the Canadian nation-state.[129] But all of this could be better analyzed in the next chapter, a chapter which will address the changes in the Northwest Territories state structure. Such changes are generally analyzed within theories such as Smelser's in the context of revolutions. Clearly no revolution has happened here, at least not as that term is generally understood, but has there been a value-change? This question is addressed in the next chapter.

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[129]However, Constitutional Assemblies were created for both the Eastern and Western Arctic. They have been engaging in the difficult task of trying to determine the nature of territorial division. Although an agreement was reached in January of 1987, the changes proposed have not yet been put in place(Roberts, 1987).

VI. The Northwest Territories State and Social Control

A. Introduction

To analyze the development of the Northwest Territories state structure as a case for purposes of this study is to initially present a counter-case, a case study in which collective behavior either does not occur or consists of brief, ill documented episodes. Because of this fact the case should reflect on Smelser's theory and the Critical Theory slightly differently than the previous cases. That is, this case is one in which we may consider social control successful: changes in the state institution occur without uninstitutionalized actions or uninstitionalized actions are held to the normative level. In spite of unrest and the large-scale mobilization associated with the Dene Nation, in spite of what might well be called a "revolutionary climate" at times, there was no revolution.

As described in the previous chapter, until the 1960's, there are very few collective behavior events in the North; that begins to change about the time the seat of government moves to Yellowknife from Ottawa in 1967. After that date the North becomes much more volatile politically, and the Dene Nation movement of the seventies begins to attempt to change Territorial state structures. Thus the initial set of questions for analysis relate to the implications of little or no collective behavior, of the process of maintaining social control in relation to the state, and the extent to which the theory would predict or explain that phenomenon.

However, as the Dene Nation movement and the Territorial state begin to interact, a different political situation develops in the Northwest Territories. Consequently a second set of questions are raised, questions about how the Territorial state structure responds to the pressures from the social movement. The theories will predict or explain certain patterns of interaction between the two, as mobilizers and social controllers respond in specific ways to each other, rather than any particular response from either party. It is this pattern that we can examine to test and clarify aspects of the theories.

The Northwest Territories is a quasi-province in the Canadian Federal state. That is, like the legislatures of the provinces and the Yukon Territory, the Territorial Council

("government") has partial responsibility for the governance of the people and land within its boundaries. The central or Federal government also has set responsibilities for governance of the people of the Territories, responsibilities which in principle complement those of the Territorial Council.

However, unlike the provinces in which the division of responsiblity is formally stated in the Canadian written constitution, the British North America Act of 1867 and the Canada Act of 1982, the Territories have no established status in those acts. Thus the power of Territorial Legislatures to govern is formally at the pleasure of the central government and the responsible minister (currently designated the Federal Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs) may veto any given piece of Territorial legislation.[130]

In tracing the history of this particular unit of the Canadian state we must be aware that its boundaries have changed a number of times, both in strictly state terms and in the pattern of social and economic relations among its people. If we look backwards from the present bounded unit called the Northwest Territories and, for example, describe the Grey Nuns school at Ft. Providence as the first school in the territories, we miss completely the social, political, and economic unit in which that school was established. Similarly, if we speak of the Northwest Territories of 1890 as the historical antecedent of the present Northwest Territories (which it is), we must also recognize that the Territories of 1890 was not merely a much larger unit, but a social and political unit centred at Regina and far removed from northern concerns.

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[130]There are two points that should be highlighted here. First, the British North America Act in distributing certain functions to the sole jurisdiction of the provinces and others to the sole jurisdiction of the Federal Government, grants the provinces an autonomy in a number of areas which is not recognized if one thinks of them merely as lower levels of government. In contrast, the Northwest Territories Act which created the Territorial government is an act of the Federal parliament and therefore the territories is a lower level of government, an extension of the Federal parliament. But the phrase "written constitution" refers to the fact that Canada, in both the British North America Act and the Canada Act of 1982, incorporates much of the British unwritten constitution into its process of governance. It is at least hypothetically possible that the territories could challenge arbitrary actions taken by the central government on the basis of their "unconstitutional" nature, *viz* on the basis that they were outside customarily acceptable actions of governments. This suggests the possibility of more "power" in the Territorial government than the strict interpretation of the British North America Act and Northwest Territories Act would imply.

The watershed year, the point in time at which one can begin to speak of the present Northwest Territories as some kind of political-administrative unit is 1905, the year in which the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan were carved out of the previous Northwest Territories. The borders of that political unit took their present form in 1912, when Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec were extended north, eliminating any Territorial land south of the sub-arctic (60 degrees north).

The history of the old Northwest Territories (1869 to 1905) is a history of constant political agitation and some strife. In relation to Native peoples the events associated with Louis Riel's provisional government in Red River in 1869 are well documented, as are the events associated with the 1885 Northwest Territories Rebellion. These will be briefly described in the data section of this chapter, but the bulk of that data section will describe the more recent Northwest Territories, the geographic unit which fell into place after the borders of the provinces were extended north in 1912.

Briefly,with reference to the more recent Northwest Territories, a simple form of Territorial government was established on paper by the Federal government in Ottawa in 1905, and in actuality in 1921. That government was based in Ottawa and consisted of a six person appointed Council and a Commissioner who reported to the Minister responsible for Northern Affairs. It remained largely unchanged until after World War 2 when the Federal Government started to focus considerable attention on the north. Non-Native northerners began to elect some Councillors (3 of 8) in 1951 and Indians were added to the electoral roll in 1955. Most Inuit did not vote in Territorial elections until 1966. In 1967 the seat of government was moved to Yellowknife and in 1975 the Council became a fully elected body with no appointed members.

There were no Dene elected to that Council until the 1971 election,[131] and as the Dene Nation movement developed it became apparent that the Dene and the Council had quite different perspectives on northern development. The Dene withdrew from involvement in Territorial electoral politics in 1977, returning in 1981. Since that time they have been a dominant force on the Territorial Council, and the Council functions in some ways significantly differently than it did in the 1970's.

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[131]There were Native appointments in the sixties, one Inuit and one Dene.

What would Smelser's theory and the Critical Theory predict about such an interaction? Within Smelser's theory the fact that we are talking about the state is not exceptionally important; rather the category here is a norm or value-oriented social movement. As noted in the previous chapter, for Smelser a norm-oriented social movement is "...an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief"(1962:270) wheras a value-oriented movement is "...a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief" (1962:313). In norm-oriented movements participants may attempt to affect norms directly, by developing particular organizational or institutional forms, or they may agitate to induce some constituted authority to make such changes. In value-oriented movements there is a challenge to the legitimacy of existing political orders, or the development of a collectivity within a existing order which is based on distinct values but does not challenge the order itself. Because the Critical Theory demands that we analyze the control system with the same concepts applied to the social movement, the assumption which underpins this chapter is that we may describe the state as norm or value-oriented.

Again, we do not need to reiterate all of Smelser's structural predictions in detail. They have been described in Chapter Four and Five. However, we did conclude in Chapter Five that the structures of conduciveness and strain are inevitably present when there is a cultural group present which differs from the cultural group which is dominant in the institutional structure. That is, "strain" occurs at all levels (from values to facilities) for a Native population which is being confronted with external social institutions.

We also argued that the particular pattern of social relations which developed ensured role, normative, and value structures which were conducive to the formation of value-oriented social movements. In fact, this may be an inevitable outcome of two different economic structures existing side by side (one in which the relations of production are land-based and tribal; the other in which those relations are those of an industrialized capitalist economic structure). In our previous discussion however, we only argued for its presence, not its inevitability.

In Smelser's theory, all of the structural factors may be present and still no social movement need occur. Smelser would ask what is the precipitating event which results in social movements or other forms of collective behavior? The Critical Theory would also ask, what are the suppressing events which result in no collective behavior events, in no uninstitutionalized reaction from the affected population? The second theory would also require that we ask questions about the actions of mobilizers and controllers which seem to create precipitating or suppressing events. Finally, the Critical Theory requires that we ask what beliefs motivate each of these sets of collective actors in the social situation.

This case has no clear-cut ending, nor point which implies that some non-institutionalized action is under control, for it is more accurate to see control as continuous,at least as Smelser uses that term. (It is possible that we need the concept of social order here rather than social control, if the latter is taken to imply an unchanging social structuree.) The ending point which is taken for this work is 1983. By that date the Dene have returned to electoral politics for four years, holding a number of seats on the Territorial Council. There have been no major changes in their strategies within Council since 1983, and the four year time-period which precedes that date should be long enough for us to determine if changes in the state structure are occurring. As I have argued above (*Supra*, p. 6), the next significant change in the Territorial state structure is likely to be associated with division of the Northwest Territories into two or more units; at that time a more detailed analysis will be called for. However, that has not happened to this date (1987).

In the following pages a brief history of the development of the Northwest Territories as a political unit will be presented. Then, as a means of providing data which will enable us to analyze the process of change in the Northwest Territories state structure, two aspects of that state system will be described.

The first aspect or "social institution" which will be described is the school system in the Northwest Territories. It is widely acknowledged in the literature that, although the school may need to be understood historically as an extension of the family or the church, in this century it is best understood as an extension of the state (Althusser, 1972; Carlton, 1974; Gerth and Mills, 1953). Thus changes in the school

system imply a changing or perhaps developing state system.

The second aspect which will be described is the Northwest Territories Council or legislature. Although this does not represent the state as a whole, for the judicial system, civil service, and other institutions would have to also be described, it may be considered as the central structure of the state (Panitch, 1977:6). In addition, some events which may be considered centred in the civil service will be briefly described, as a source of further insight into the political situation.

B. The Northwest Territories, 1869 to 1905 as Prologue

The Northwest Territories as a political unit formally came into existance with the passage of the Northwest Territories Act of 1875. The significant dates prior to 1912 are reasonably well-known, but will be summarized here. Three years after Confederation, the Canadian government purchased Rupertsland from the Hudson's Bay Company. An 1869 piece of legislation, called "An Act for the Temporary Government of Rupert's Land and the Northwestern Territory when United with Canada" provided for early government. Manitoba was the first province carved out of the territories, in the year Rupertsland was purchased (1870), but its size was much smaller than at present, as it comprised little more than the old Red River settlement. In 1871 British Columbia entered confederation, bringing not only the Crown Colony of British Columbia in as a province but also that part of Rupertsland west of the Rocky Mountains and south of the 60th parrallel.

The 1875 legislation (The "Northwest Territories Act") provided for a Lieutenant-Governor and an appointed Council (of five), but included provisions for the Council to add elected members and evolve into a Legislative Assembly. (When an area of 1000 square miles contained a population of 1000 people, not including Indians or Aliens, it could elect a Council member; when elected Councillors numbered 21, the Council became a Legislative Assembly.) In 1888 the Territorial Council was thereby designated a Legislature, and an 1891 Northwest Territories Amendment Act gave the legislature the power to function virtually as a province. Final authority or responsible government was granted the Legislature in 1897.

During this time, in 1876, the District of Keewatin (land lying north of the existing provinces of Ontario and Manitoba) was removed from Territorial jurisdiction. In 1882 the Provisional Districts of Assiniboia, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Athabasca were designated within the Territories, and in 1885 the Provisional Districts of Yukon, Mackenzie, Franklin, and Ungava. The first four had elected representatives seated in the Territorial Council (from widely dispersed constituencies) but the latter four did not (Rea, 1968; Thomas, 1956).

In 1880 the last British claims to the Arctic Islands were transferred to Canada, a claim not always recognized fully by the United States (*Vide*, Diubaldo, Pharand, and Zaslow, all in Zaslow, 1981), and in 1898 the Yukon Territories was separated from the Northwest Territories administratively. This change was to deal with population surges associated with the Klondike gold rush, and threats of American take-over, and it established a form of government headed by a Commissioner(Morrison, 1968). Finally, in 1905 Alberta and Saskatchewan were formed as provinces taking the bulk of the Territorial population with them, and the extension of other provinces north in 1912 pushed the southern boundary of the territories to its present location. Left in the Northwest Territories were the District of Mackenzie, the District of Franklin, and a reduced Keewatin District. Ungava, formally taken over by Quebec in 1912, remained a Federal administrative district until 1970 (Lisgard, 1946; Rea, 1968; Thomas, 1956).

Prior to 1869 Rupertsland made up the vast empire of the Hudson's Bay Company granted to the trading company by King James in 1670.[132] For almost two hundred years the area draining into the Hudson's Bay had participated, as a fur-bearing area, in the European economy. The primary labour force for that fur-trade were Indian and Metis men and women, with British and French personnel staffing its administrative and ownership structure. Early in the nineteenth century, beginning about 1810, a second economy which was settler-based on small-scale farming, began to develop in the Red River area (now southern Manitoba). Here developed a permanent settlement for Europeans, "Canadians" (people from Upper and Lower Canada) who wished to remain in the west, as well as for the dominant French speaking Metis class (Innes, 1956; Rich, 1954).

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[132]French claims to this land were negated by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

In the nineteenth century there was conflict around fur-trade competition (the Hudson's Bay Co., the Northwest Co, and the short-lived XY Co), conflict between fur-traders and settlers, and conflict related to Metis political claims. [133] When Rupertsland was purchased the residents of the Red River objected on a number of grounds, and formed a provisional government under Louis Riel. Its strongest internal opposition came from "the Canadian party", entrepreneurs defined as English-speaking Protestant Orangemen from Ontario who opposed the Metis, Roman Catholic, and French speaking followers of Riel (Stanley, 1938).

Riel's provisional government was negotiated out of existance, Riel himself firmly declaring his loyalty to the British monarch. The involvement of the Roman Catholic and French elements in Riel's government meant that he had considerable support from the established (Catholic) church and from Quebec. He was able to negotiate most desired provisions, and have them written into the Manitoba Act. These included language rights (French); school rights (Roman Catholic), and Metis aboriginal land rights (individual pieces of land called scrip).

Most of these gains were, however, lost as the Federal Government's immigration policy soon changed the population base in Manitoba and an English language Protestant (or perhaps secular) view of the province came to prevail (Crunciman, 1971). Riel himself was charged with the murder of a Protestant Orangeman, Thomas Scott, and was never able to take the seat to which he had been elected in the House of Commons. He lived in exile in Montana until being summoned back to lead the Metis rebellion in 1885 (Stanley, 1938).

Population increases in the early territories were dramatic after 1881. The total population in 1871 (which would already exclude the new province of Manitoba) was 48,000 and the increase to 1881 was only 8,450 people. These people were primarily Indian; almost 50,000 of the total of 56,500 in the Territories were listed as Indian in 1881. If anything, this underestimates the actual Native population for Inuit were not counted in the Canadian census for another thirty years and Indians were not usually

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[133]This conflict included a "massacre" at Seven Oaks in 1817, turmoil around free-trade in 1847, and attacks on some fur-trading posts (*Vide*, Lussier and Sealey, 1975; Stanley, 1938).

counted directly.[134]

But in the ten year period from 1881 to 1891 the population increased by 75%, and it almost doubled again in the next decade. From 56,000 people in 1881, the population reached 165,000 people in 1901. The Indian proportion was down from 86% to about 20% (Canada Year Book, 1954:119; Canada Statistical Record, 1881:48; Rea, 1968:16). As starvation brought on by the loss of the buffalo and disease decimated the prairie Indian, Clifford Sifton's immigration policy filled the land with "hardy peasants from central Europe" and Scandinavian and American farmers (Dafoe, 1931). Now the majority of the Territorial population were farmers, struggling to achieve responsible government in the Territories. Although large tracts of land remained in the hands of the Hudsons Bay, and others were transferred to the Canadian Pacific Railway, the "homestead", or individually held farmstead, basically replaced the ownership pattern of the Indian. The plains Indian, for the most part quietly, moved to reserves while the northern Indian continued a trapping and hunting existance much as he had during the previous 200 years. The Metis found himself caught in the middle, losing his place as middleman in the fur trade and having his individual "squatters" rights challenged.

From 1870 to 1905 political activity in the west focused on expanding representative and responsible government (Thomas, 1956). But both farmers and settlers formed protest organizations to object to the dominance of outside financial interests and to the Federal Government's land policy. One solution was union with the United States, others included possible armed rebellion (Morton, 1938:94). These groups proved to be forerunners of political movements active in the prairie provinces throughout most of the 20th Century, Farmers' parties, Socialist parties, and the Social Credit Movement (Lipset, 1955; MacPherson, 1954).

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[134] The Statistical Year Book of 1881 (p. 68-69) says:

> "Owing to the impossibility of making the Indian understand the nature of the census, they could not be enumerated in the Territories in the usual way, their suspicious character making it dangerous to run the risk of irritating them by asking too many particulars.... it was decided to make no attempt to enumerate the Indian, and the particulars concerning them were obtained direct from the Department of the Interior."

In the 1880's armed conflict flared, as land held by Metis and other settlers in present day north-central Saskatchewan was being surveyed. The general fear seemed to be that the Dominion Lands Act had not recognized rights of squatters but there was also anxiety about the surveying procedure which replaced the traditional French-Canadian river lot land holding by new square-mile sections. In this case the Metis and non-Native settlers were joined by some restless Indians. These Indians were Big Bear's Crees facing starvation with the disappearance of the buffalo and resisting establishment on an Indian reserve (Morton, 1938:94; Stanley, 1938).

Once the conflict was suppressed, there is little evidence of protest activity amongst the Native people. Many Metis headed north and west after 1870, trying to find the old life. But they did not try rebellion after 1885. Attempts at Metis organizing and the establishment in Alberta of Metis settlements (or colonies) somewhat like Indian reserves were the only sign of public activity directed toward normative change until the 1960's (Lussier and Sealey, 1975). As indicated above Indians (but not Metis) were excluded from voting throughout this time period. Their primary involvement with political structures were treaty negotiations conducted with representatives of the Federal Government from 1875 on. However, they were the objects of Federal Government policy, most clearly stated in the Indian Act of 1875 and Sir John A. MacDonald's Indian policy of 1885. The goals of such policy were the gradual civilization of the Indian, and his assimilation into Canadian society. The means for this civilization and assimilation were Federally administered Indian Reserves for farming, and Federally administered schools.

C. The Northwest Territories, 1905-1981

Once Alberta and Saskatchewan were established as provinces in 1905, and no longer part of the territories, the evolving Territorial government was essentially replaced by provincial governments at Edmonton and Regina. Rea describes the northern lands, the lands of the present Northwest Territories, as remnants in every sense of the word

> ...Canadians (would not) discard them or let some other country use them (but rather set them) aside, presumably in the hope that they would be useful in the future if not in the present (1968:56).

This remnant land mass is over 1.3 million square miles, one/third of Canada's total area. But with the removal of Alberta and Saskatchwan, the population of the Northwest Territories dropped from about 3% of the Canadian total (165,000 in 1901) to less than 1/10 of 1% of that total in 1911 (6,500 people).[135] The new government for this area, created by the Northwest Territories Amendment Act of 1905, was to consist of a Commissioner (as chief executive officer) and four appointed Council members. However, no actual Council members were appointed until 1921,[136] and that year the appointed Council was expanded to six. This Council consisted of senior civil servants and it met only in Ottawa (Rea, 1968).

At the time of the establishment of this N.W.T. Council almost the total population of the territories was Indian and Inuit: a few outsiders were present as Royal Northwest Mounted Police officers, as Hudsons Bay Company employees, or as Anglican or Catholic missionaries (Jenness, 1968). The population gradually increased around resource exploitation; Norman Wells in 1922; Echo Bay Mines in 1934; Yellowknife Gold Mines in 1938; Rankin Inlet Mine in 1955; Pine Point in 1956; and Tungsten Mines in 1958. In the early 1970's oil and mineral activity contributed to further expansion of population from the south.

Until 1954 Rea reports the Native population was at best stagnant and probably declining. After 1954 the Native population began to increase, but the non-Native population increased at a much faster rate, both in association with the primary resource activity noted above and with defense (World War 2 and the D.E.W. line) and with the extension of government services.

As noted above, the recorded population of the territories in 1911 was about 6,500 people. This figure must be treated as conservative, as Inuit were not enumerated and many Indians were likely not counted. However, 20 years later the population as recorded is only 50% higher, at 9,700 people, and only 1000 of these are non-Native. Just over 40% are classified as Indian, just under 50% as "Eskimo", and slightly over 10% as "other". Considering that the other category includes non-status

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[135] Figures for calculating these percentages are from Rea, 1968:16; and Canada:*The Canada Year Book*, 1954:119).

[136] The discovery of oil at Norman Wells in 1920 and the signing of treaty #11 in 1921 were no doubt linked to the decision to formally establish the Territorial Council which had existed only on paper.

Indians ("Metis"), the numbers of non-Native people in the territories is small indeed.

From this point, although the population remains fairly small in absolute number, the percentage increases are large; almost 30% in the ten years to 1941; 33% to 1951; 44% to 1961; and 51% from 1961 to 1971. By 1976 the population is over 42,000, almost triple the figure of 25 years earlier. But of more consequence than the change in absolute numbers is the shift in the Native/ non-Native mix of the Territorial population. Wheras in 1931 only 10% are "others", by 1961 over 42% are so designated. In figures available for 1979, in which the Metis are removed from the "other" category, that category represents slightly less than 38% of the Territorial population. The Status Indian percentage of the population is down proportionately, from 23% in 1961 to just over 18% in 1979.

Although high birth rates and decreasing death rates among the Native population are a factor in this population increase, migration is the main factor in the non-Native population. This shows especially sharply in the young adult cohorts. For example, the 10-19 age group in 1951 numbers 3048; this *cohort* ten years later is one/third larger at 4005. Ten years later it has decreased by about 500 people and is down to 3545. This pattern is consistent, and if five year age cohorts are examined it is demonstrated between the 15-19 year-old age group and the 20-24 year old age group. For example, from June 1966 to June 1971 this cohort (15-19;20-24) increased by almost 40% from 2,454 to 3,432. At the same time the sex-ratio of "others" in these age-groups is sharply skewed. For example, in 1961 there are almost 1500 males to 748 females in the 25-34 year age-cohort. But *net* migration figures are relatively undramatic as in-migrants one year are apparently out-migrants a few years later. The five year period from 1961 to 1966 shows a net in-migration of just over 1100 people, and the 1966-1971 less than 1000.

It seems reasonable to infer that job opportunities for young post-highschool age adults were being largely filled by outsiders, as local Native people have argued. But not only does that appear to be the case, it also appears that for many of these outside young people the north is used for perhaps wealth or experience; it is not a place to make ones home. This, in part, is the difference in the Native and non-Native population reflected in Justice Thomas Berger's 1975 report -*Northern Frontier, Northern*

Homeland.

As the population was changing in the fifties and sixties, so too the occupational structure of the N.W.T. was undergoing a marked change. Whereas in 1931 the majority of the population were hunters and trappers, with a few people employed in the resource industry, and the administrataive and service structure of the north was manned by a few church personnel, the Bay, and the R.C.M.P, by 1961 over one/half of the labour force are "others", outsiders. Of the total labour force in 1961, 15% are at the managerial and professional level; 7% in clerical and sales work; over 14% in recreation; 28% in primary renewable resource areas (trapping, fishing etc), and 7% in the mines. Of the Indians in the labour force .05% are managerial and professional, 1% in the mines, and 55% in the renewable primary resource sector. In specific numbers, of the 548 men working in the mines in 1961 just 10 are Indians.[137] In 1971 the labour force distribution is close to 1961, but an ethnic breakdown is not available. However, by this time the male participation rate in the labour force is down. Wheras 79% of the male population 15 years and over were in the labour force in 1961 only 71% are in the labour force in 1971. Only Newfoundland in Canada is markedly lower, at 65%.

At the same time, the geographical distribution of population in the territories has been changing. In 1951 20% of the population were classified as "urban" (double the 1941 figure); by 1976 the population was almost evenly divided between urban and rural. Urban settlements are those with over 1000 population, and by the end of the 1960's Ft. Smith, Hay River, Yellowknife, and Inuvik in the Mackenzie all qualify. Two of these communities are clearly "government"; Ft. Smith as an administrative centre and Inuvik as a Federal Government "new town" opened in 1959.

Inuvik, as an indicator of the orientation of the Federal government in the late 50's, deserves a paragraph description. It is a modern, high arctic community, built to "replace" Aklavik as the limited availability of building sites precluded its expansion as a government administrative centre. It has all the amenities of a southern town, its sewage and water supply being transported through the community in a heated utility corridor called a "utilidor", to deal with the winters at 68 degrees north. It has a modern

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[137]This figure of 10 likely reflects random rounding on the part of Statistics Canada. The two or three Indian men who worked in the mines at that time are well-known; it is unlikely there were actually ten.

hospital, schools, student residences, churches, hotels, and multi-coloured houses and apartment blocks owned by the government and reminiscent of army Permanent Married Quarters. Unfortunately, the government forgot to plan or build for a Native population. Eventually a number of 570's (frame houses, 570 square feet) were obtained for Inuit, Indian,and Metis families from Aklavik. There was no utilidor, nor indeed any other amenities in the homes in this, the west end of Inuvik. [138] An embarassed Federal Government denied they had ever intended to move "all" of Alkavik (although maps published in 1961 conspicuously lack Aklavik). (For other accounts, *Vide*, Honigman and Honigman, 1966;Mailhot, 1968; Smith, 1975)

Compare Inuvik to one description of MacKenzie communities in the 1950's, and to my own observation of Ft. Providence in the 1960's. Helm, in trying to explain why there was little or no Indian protest activity in the Mackenzie until the 60's and 70's describes the communities she knew in the 50's this way:

> I think what you have to grasp is that until the 1960's there were really few points of pressure coming from the White society. The pressure was there in the larger sense, but the "points" took the form of a once a year harangue by the Indian agent, an occasional investigation by the game warden, the more frequent intervention by priests, but still for the bush Indian something that could possibly only happen once every several months when any one of these white activities contacted Indians. The adult Dene population was illiterate, monolingual (Dogrib speaking), and despite aggravation about pressure points, not faced with any obvious 'oppression'(Personal correspondence, April, 1982).

Helm is describing Dogrib communities, associated with the major centre of Ft. Rae. These people, by the end of the 60's, would face the turmoil of a government decision to "build a new town and move Rae" (to Morphy, later called Edzo), but they retained much of the integrity implied by Helm's description.[139] But June Helm's description of the fifties contrasts sharply with my own contact with Ft. Providence in the sixties. This is not just because of changes through time; the Dene people who Helm knew were still experiencing a largely land-based life-style and economy in the

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[138]There were "service centres", central locations where water could be obtained and sewage dumped.

[139]They also experienced "oppression" in some of its more extreme forms. In the late 60's the most derelict drunken prostitute in Yellowknife was from this town. At age 15, and monolingual, she had accepted an invitation to the highway construction camp near her village. Used sexually by the men, for days or weeks, she never drew a sober breath again if she could help it. She froze to death walking from new town Yellowknife to old town in the early 70's (*Vide*,Assheton-Smith, 1968).

sixties. The Slaveys of Providence, along the MacKenzie River, had experienced a nearby World War Two Army camp, the construction of the MacKenzie Highway at their doorway, and for many families a recent (1958) move from the land into a settled community.

This settlement had nearly 500 Slavey residents in 1969. Resting on the north side of the Mackenzie River, about two miles from the highway the stratification was well reflected in the housing ecology and in the social relations. Strung out along the road and close to the river, were the "White" establishments: a local entrepreneur's motel and store, the R.C.M.P., Forestery, the Hudson's Bay, and the Roman Catholic Church and the school. Central to the settlement and near the Bay were a number of well-kept log homes, chinked with clay. These were the Metis families who made up about seventy people in the settlement. Back a block, in two long rows, were government constructed frame houses for Status Indians. Just behind one of the homes, in the centre of the settlement going east and west, but on its northern edge, was the sewage lagoon which contained effluent from the "White" homes. One of the Indian men complained bitterly that his small children played in this lagoon, unfenced and so close to his backyard.

The social stratification was reflected in a multitude of other ways. Telephones were available to the "Whites" but not the Indians; [140] frame homes were being built "for" the Indians but few local Indian people knew anything of the plans or who would be given the houses. Talk at community club meetings was mostly Whites talking about "the Natives", worrying about "their children" and wondering how to raise money from "the people" (meaning the Native population). The Indian women who worked in the handicraft co-op wanted to take it over from the Roman Catholic Mission, but in spite of promises from the Bishop the Sister in charge always said "next year".

The school was a source of bitter memories for adults and equal misery for children. Established as a residential school in 1867 its last version, an old grey two-storey building, stood at the west end of the settlement. A middle-aged Indian man

[140] Indians were required to pay the $1000.00 to $2000.00 to lay a telephone line from the front to the back of the settlement. No equivalent charges had to be paid by Whites because their homes were at the front of the settlement.

pointed bitterly to this building, recalling the strappings for speaking his language, the constant prayers, and the homesicknesss. He could see his parents from a second-floor window, but he could not visit them for the 10 month school year. His children's teacher, working in a modern school building run by the Territorial Department of Education, told me matter-of-factly "Of course, we strap the children for swearing, chewing gum, and speaking Slavey."

It is hardly accurate to describe a community such as this as feeling few pressure points from the White society. There is little or no employment, only a minimal subsistance from the river and the land, and the week-end brew-pot offers the only source of assured happiness.

This description perhaps represents an extreme of life in the Northwest Territories Indian community in 1969, but it was an extreme shared by people from Hay River, Ft. Resolution, and Ft. Smith. It would be a largely inaccurate picture of communities such as Snowdrift, Ft. Rae, Lac La Martre, and Yellowknife Indian village where a traditional land based economy still had force, and where the hunt and tea-dance provided focal points for community activity much more than the brewpot. A better sense of the life in these communities can be gained from the "Charlie" vignette above (*Supra*,p. 115), but a number of ethnographies provide a more detailed account (see, for example, Helm, 1961; Smith, 1975 ; and biographical accounts in Watkins, 1977).

The Indian population of the territories signed treaty in 1902 (#8) at Ft. Resolution, or in 1921 (#11) along the MacKenzie River and north of Great Slave Lake. Although the treaty stipulates that they thereby gave up their aboriginal land claims and would receive reserves in part compensation, the Indians deny hotly that those were the terms at the time of treaty signing (Fumuleau, 1975; personal papers). A number of Metis were excluded from treaty, apparently because they were somewhat aggressive in the negotiating process (Fumuleau, 1975:272, personal papers), although they would have been included on their own choice elsewhere in Canada (Sealey and Lussier 1975).[141] The Inuit population of the territories has never signed treaty.

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[141] The definition of Indian for treaty signing purposes was not racial but cultural, based on living the life of an Indian. In practise, one brother might decide to take scrip as a "Metis" wheras another would sign treaty as an "Indian", and this posed no problem to the authorities of the day.

Reserves have never been set aside, with the recent exception of the Reserve at Hay River, in spite of the fact they are indicated in the treaties. This may imply that Indians in the Mackenzie have claim to any given piece of land (Morrow Caveat, 1973). However, the band structure of local government specified under the Indian Act developed in a number of Indian settlements, in many cases simply reflecting a legal form for the traditional governmental structures. That is, local traditional Indian governments are possibly centuries old and remained powerful at least among the Dogribs and Slavey until the decade of the seventies. [142]

Land control in the territories, unlike the provinces, is a Federal matter as it is the Federal Government which holds Crown lands. Similarly, unlike the provinces, subsurface mineral rights are held by the Federal Government (as they were for the Western provinces until B.N.A. Act amendments in 1931). One result of this is little independent income for the Territorial Government: liquor taxes provide the major local base wheras Federal Government general revenues provide most of the budget. Another result is that unresolved Indian land issues can be negotiated with one government, a less complicated process than that which must be carried out in the provinces.

As indicated above, changes in the state in the Northwest Territories can be identified by describing changes in two aspects of that state, the school system and the legislature. In the next section changes in the school system will be described, followed by a section documenting changes in the legislature or council.

D. The Northwest Territories State and the Schools: 1905-1981

The first formal schools in the Northwest Territories were brought there by missionaries, Roman Catholic or Anglican. They generally began as residential schools, for this was both church policy and later Federal Government Indian Affairs policy.[143]

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[142]The election of Arrowmaker as chief of the Ft. Rae Dogribs in 1970, to replace Chief Bruneau selected by traditional methods some fourty years earlier, marked the end of strictly traditional local governments along the Mackenzie.

[143] *Vide* Carney, 1971, for a detailed exposition of this schooling. However, it should be noted that other churches elsewhere in Canada, especially the Methodists, seemed to favour day schools and there is considerable evidence that Indians also preferred day schools when they could influence the provision of schools at all. (*Vide* Daniels, 1973, and Graham, 1975.)

There is some evidence that the Anglicans, in collaboration with the Hudson's Bay, began schooling at Ft. Simpson as early as 1861, and that the Roman Catholics had a day school at Ft. Norman about the same time. However, what is generally considered the first Anglican school was the residential school at Ft. Resolution, opened in the seventies, and the first Roman Catholic school the one at Ft. Providence in 1867. The Simpson, Resolution, and Providence schools were the only ones in the present Northwest Territories eligible for governmental grants in 1891 (Carney, 1971:55, 118) and probably the only ones extant in the Mackenzie. As implied in the introduction above these schools were part of the Roman Catholic and Anglican efforts at proselytization within a much differently bounded Northwest Territories, a social space much closer to Ft. Chipewyan, Lac La Biche, and other settlements of the fur trade era rather than the Central or Eastern Arctic. Not until 1912 could one call them "the first" schools in the present Northwest Territories.

The addition of new schools in the territories was slow, even more so in the Inuit part of that land than the Indian.[144] By 1921 there were six schools, two at Ft. Simpson as a result of competition between Anglican and Roman Catholic churches. Twenty years later there were only three more in the Mackenzie, now two at Aklavik and a second at Ft. Smith as a result of Catholic-Anglican competition. The first school had also, by this date, been established among the Inuit in the Eastern Arctic, an Anglican school at Pangnirtung. The period of rapid school expansion was the fifties, as the number of schools in the territories increased from about 18 in 1951 to 45 in 1961 and 58 in 1971. Of these almost all (14 of 18) in 1951 were in that part of the Mackenzie populated primarily by Indians or Dene, wheras just over half were in Dene territory in 1961 (24 of 45) and slightly under half by 1971 (27 of 58).(Carney, 1971; Canada Year Book, 1954:319; Canada:N.W.T., 1973; N.W.T. Commissioner's Reports, 1961 and 1971).

As indicated the first schools were initiated by missionaries. Nevertheless, a 1942 document reports 232 Indian children "in Federal Schools" in the Northwest

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[144]This may be because there was considerable competition for Indian souls among the Anglicans and Roman Catholics. On the other hand, the Anglicans had been early granted supremacy in relation to the Inuit (conversation with R. Carney).

Territories (Elementary and Secondary Education in Canada, 1942:77). Although these schools were staffed and administered by church bodies (teachers were advised to apply to the Anglican or Roman Catholic Bishops for employment during the 20's and 30's, Carney, 1971:163), they did receive Federal Government (Indian Affairs Branch) per capita grants and sometimes Federal monies for capital expansion.[145] By 1954 however Federal schools are distinguished from Indian schools, they are schools in communities "...where the inhabitants are predominantly white and of mixed blood" (Canada Year Book, 1954:319). They were however also being built in Inuit communities.

A 1967 report describes these as government schools, saying: "The first goverment school in the north was opened at Tuktoyaktuk (a predominantly Inuit settlement in the Mackenzie delta) in 1947" (Canada.DIAND, 1967:10). In fact these were schools provided by the Federal Department responsible for Northern development at that time, the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs of the Department of Mines and Resources. By policy White, Metis, and Inuit (since 1928) in the Northwest Territories were the responsibilitiy of this Bureau or its line antecedents; Indians were the responsibility of the Indian Affairs Branch of the same department until 1950. Thus the Federal "Bureau" in the Northwest Territories was carrying the functions of a provincial government, wheras Indian Affairs Branch carried the Federal responsibility to Indians. The inclusion of Inuit in the northern Bureau's responsibilities simply reflects the paradoxical consitutional and administrative position of this, largely ignored, population in Northern Canada. [146]

Thus wheras in 1921 there were only missionary schools in the north, known as Indian schools, by 1951 there were Federal Government (mission, Indian) schools and Federal Government (Territorial, non-Indian) schools. But there were also now two new types of schools associated with mining communities. Yellowknife established a public school board in 1939 and a Roman Catholic separate school board in 1951, following the pattern of religiously dual public schooling practised in Alberta. Discovery Mines and

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[145]These monies depended on the pupils being "really Indian", i.e. having Indian status in law. See Carney, 1971 and Daniels, 1972.

[146]It is difficult to keep this description from becoming very confusing. This suggests a certain absence of ideological, and related, administrative uniformity.

Port Radium had also added schools as "company schools" in which teachers were hired by mine officials (Canada Year Book, 1954:319).

The school population in the presently bounded Northwest Territories increased very slowly from the 1860's to the 1940's. Carney reports there were probably never more than 30 children enrolled in the three schools in the territories prior to 1899. By 1910 there were perhaps 100 (Carney, 1972:55), and by 1942 there were just 232 children enrolled in Federal Day Schools (Elementary and Secondary Education, Canada, 1942:77). Carney estimates over 1000 school-age children in 1942, or about a 20% enrollment figure (1972:234). However, 1949 figures for Status Indians show over 400 children enrolled, or about 60% if the 5-14 year old age group is taken as the base population.

As schools were being added in the territories, in the pattern described above, school enrolment was also expanding. But this pattern was more complex than simply the addition of schools to Native communities and an associated increase in participation by Native children. Although this did occur, especially in Inuit settlements from 1951 to 1971 [147] the changes in Dene area schools and school enrollment were more clearly associated with non-Indian in-migration and an increasing Dene population resulting from a high birth rate, not increased schooling *qua* schooling to the Dene. There were about 1175 pupils in Territorial schools in 1951; just over 5000 in 1961; and almost 12,000 in 1971. But as a proportion of school age population in school, the Dene figures change but little (from 66% down to 60% and back up to 66%). As a proportion of Dene to other, the figure continually decreases as 32% of 1951 students are Status Indian, 22% of those in 1961, and less than 16% of those in 1971. Because of the influence of Inuit enrolment on these figures, they are less dramatic if only the Mackenzie is taken into account, and the Dene birth rate almost keeps pace with the continuing in-migration of whites. The Dene to other ratio in the Mackenzie schools dropped from slightly more than 50% to slightly less than 50% in the twenty years from 1951 to 1971.

But this influx of outsiders was not widely felt by the Dene child in elementary school, for he attended *de facto* segregated schools. The first Northwest Territories Commissioner's report which presents data on community school enrollment

[147]The number of schools in Inuit communities in 1951 was 5; in 1971 36.

categorized in terms of ethnicity was the report of 1963-64. Of the twenty-four schools not in strictly Inuit communities in the Mackenzie, four enrol only Indian pupils and two only others. Of the other eighteen five enroll less than ten percent of the minority (Indian or other). These elementary schools account for less than one-fifth of the status Indians but over one/third of the non-Native students. In most of the rest of the schools which report relatively large numbers of non-Indian students many of these students are in fact Metis rather than non-Native (Canada, N.W.T.:1964).

The religious aspect of schooling was clear in the very bricks and mortar of the north. The school population was Native/White, or company town/public school board, but it was primarily Roman Catholic or Anglican. Of the Indian population in the Northwest Territories, 83% were Roman Catholic in 1939 and the rest Anglican; of the Inuit population 86% were Anglican and the rest Roman Catholic (Carney, 1971:139,141). As the Federal Government established its new town in the Mackenzie delta, Inuvik to replace the old Aklavik, the school residences were Anglican and Roman Catholic. The utilidor which carried utilities to the essentially non-Native townspeople through a heated pipe neatly divided the school yard into a Roman Catholic and Anglican side. The competition for Native souls which had created two schools at Ft. Simpson, Ft. Smith, and Aklavik [148] was carried forward into the sixties as dual school residences. Changes were occurring, and the dual religious schooling would in future be more clearly associated with public school boards and parental elections. But the so-called government schools, or state-operated schools, could not escape the religious history of the missions in the North. In 1971 all student residences in the Northwest Territories remained church-operated except Yellowknife's Akaitcho Hall and the residence in Churchill, Manitoba.[149]

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[148]This competition also created two hospitals at most of these locations, even though there were none in other settlements.

[149]*Vide* Carney, 1971, for a detailed description of Roman Catholic church and state relations around schools in the north. Note especially the eventual identification of Roman Catholic schools with "Indian" schools and the greater willingness of Anglicans to convert their mission schools to "secular" schools, in this case schools more often run by the Territorial Department of Education than by local School Boards. Carney does not make this aspect of northern schooling central to his analysis but it is clear from his description that religion, ethnicity, and state interactions mingle in complex ways around schooling.

In a sense this church involvement could be seen as a historical remnant in the North. Both Indian Affairs Branch and the Territorial government had policies aimed at reducing church involvement in schooling. Since 1951 the Indian Affairs Branch had had a policy of integrating Indian children into local non-Indian schools across Canada (which would imply secular or denominational schooling, depending on the local context) and the elimination of residential schools (a school in which the residence administrator and school administrator were one and the same person; this person was generally a cleric but a layman in educational terms). Both of these were associated with a much expanded state involvement in the process of schooling itself. Resistance by the Roman Catholic Church proved to be, on the whole, ineffectual but did delay policy implementation into the sixties and seventies (*Vide* Daniels, 1973).[150]

This history resulted in separate schools for Anglicans and Roman Catholics, but separate services in education for Indians and non-Indians, and even the concept of Status Indian, have been more weakly developed in the Northwest Territories than elsewhere in Canada. Separate services existed, but they seemed more like geographical accidents than ideologically justified phenomena. In the early part of this century the Territorial Council, and the Government of Canada, seemed most concerned with "protecting" the Indian and Metis from the deleterious effect of White encroachment and White competition in trapping (Rea, 1968:55). In the postwar years as schools and hospitals were extended into the north there were Federal services to Native communities and local services to larger White communities: the geographical separation meant almost no development of "dual" services in the same settlement. It was relatively easy for the Territorial Government to take over all educational facilities and develop a "non-segregated" school system.

This they did formally in 1955 when all these schools were brought under Territorial jurisdiction. This was associated with the Northern Development policies of

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[150] There was often conflict associated with shifting responsibilities at this time. Daniels describes reasonably well the conflict at Blue Quills Indian school in Alberta, in which the local Indian population prevented the school from being transferred from the church to the department, and managed to get it transferred to a local Indian school board. There is no public documentation, to my knowledge, of the "food strike" and highway barricade by the students of the Edmonton Indian residential school in about 1968. The result was closing of the school, and elimination of the United Church from Indian schooling in the area.

the Liberal government of the early 50's, and the determination of Jean Lesage (Federal Minister responsible for Northern Affairs) to convert schooling into an active agent of change in the North. No longer were the Native children to be seen as ideally hunters and trappers but rather people to be transformed and incorporated into the Canadian mainstream. In Carney's words, following the Moore Report of 1945 and Lesage in 1955:

> The new social order...was henceforth to be determined by the state, whose ambitions in terms of the outcomes of school programmes were far more messianic and chiliastic in tone than that ever envisaged by its former agents (the church) (1971:4).

Yet, in spite of the fact the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories had *de jure* responsibility for the education of Indian (as well as all other) children after 1955 (Carney, 1971:377), formal documents continued to display earlier divisions of the population for some years. The Study of Elementary and Secondary Education of 1958 to 1963 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1963) reports figures for Western Arctic Public Schools (meaning Yellowknife public and separate schools), for Federal schools in the Northwest Territories (meaning schools under the jurisdiction of the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources in the Western Arctic, the Eastern Arctic, and Northern Quebec and Ungava, *sic*), and for Indian schools. Status Indian children in the territories are apparently included in the latter category, along with Status Indian children in the rest of Canada. Children in schools in company towns in the Northwest Territories are not reported at all in this document. Similarly the 1961-1962 annual report of the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories reports on the schooling of "Whites" only; Indian and "Eskimo" education are described as a Federal, not a Territorial, responsibility.[151]

A new governmental ideology of schooling for Natives was, however, clearly in place. It was now to be an essential means of modernizing and transforming a Native population. This represented a significant change from what Carney called the "Native-wilderness" equation, in which the Native people were to be left as hunters and trappers in the wilderness. Prior to the 1950's attendance at school was expected and to some degree promoted, but it was not expected to change the Indian's economic

[151]One interviewee suggested these divisions likely represent a kind of cost-accounting, as each school category was funded through a different channel.

role. Schools had historically been part of "changing the Native" but in a religious sense, not an economic or national sense (Carney, 1971; Hobart and Brandt, 1964).

The administrative structure associated with this school experience has already been partially presented in describing the various types of schools in the north. Legislatively this education was "...carried on under authority of the Northwest Territories Act, the School Ordinance and the Regulations thereunder, and the Indian Act and the Regulations thereunder (Canada, 1951:319). Administratively however such schools were operated by the Department of Resources and Northern Development, churches, local school boards, and mining companies. The same report quoted above lists all the schools in the District of Mackenzie, and all the schools operated by the Federal Departments Northern Administration Branch, whether in the Western or Eastern Arctic or Arctic Quebec. It then adds "These churches (Anglican and Roman Catholic) and other mission organizations also conduct schools for Eskimos at a number of points in the Eastern Arctic and Quebec (Canada, 1954:319).

This reflects then the administrative structure of schooling of that day, and in that respect the ideological structure of the northern map. The Northwest Territories had a Council and a territory designated on a map, but the Mackenzie District was administered out of Ft. Smith, and the Keewatin, Eastern Arctic and Arctic Quebec from Ottawa. Other Federal Departments, such as Indian Health Services, had their own administrative districts which did not necessarily coincide with the Northern Administration Branch. [152] Although a political territory had been legally defined since 1912, the boundaries had little meaning.

In 1955, when the Territorial government took all schooling under its jurisdiction it made little difference except that Ft. Smith began to expand as an administrative centre. It had been the centre for the Mackenzie since 1921, and it was widely held at that time that it would one day be the capital of the territories. By 1961 the administrative structure had changed little, and as noted above the Commissioner reports on schooling only for Whites, for Indians and "Eskimos" are a Federal responsibility.

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[152]Indian and Northern Health Services, for example, had a similar pattern; the Mackenzie and the province of Alberta made up Foothills Region administered from Edmonton; the Keewatin, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan Central Region administered from Winnipeg; and the Eastern Arctic and Arctic Quebec were in Eastern Region, administered from Ottawa.

The winds of administrative, and clearly associated ideological change, began to blow about that time. Although nurses and teachers were still sent preferably to a Native settlement of the "right" religion [153], they were no longer hired or paid by church bodies. Northwest Territories Commissioner reports, from 1963 onwards, present data on the total Northwest Territories population.

E. The Northwest Territories Government, 1905 to 1981

As noted above, the Northwest Territories Act of 1905 provided for a Territorial Council of 4, but no Councillors were appointed until 1921. At that time the membership was expanded to six. This Council consisted of senior civil servants and met only in Ottawa (Rea, 1968). There was no provision in this Act for the automatic election of Council members once an area reached a certain population, as there had been in the original Northwest Territories Act of 1875.

Unlike schooling, which largely came to the territories as a result of church and government decisions, the gradual development of representative government in the territories was in response to pressures deriving from a disenfranchised non-Native population. The residents of the Mackenzie first participated in the election of a Federal Member of Parliament in the 1947 election (as part of the Yukon constituency), and were granted their own Federal constituency in 1952. Not until 1966 was the Eastern Arctic added to the Territorial constituency so the 1967 Federal election was the first to enfranchise most Canadian Inuit (as well as non/Native Eastern Arctic residents; Rea, 1968).

In 1951, shortly after electing their first member to the Federal Parliament Mackenzie residents first participated in elections to the Territorial Council. The Council was expanded that year from six to eight, and three of the eight were to be elected rather than appointed. The franchise was extended to include Indians in 1955, with neither the request nor consent of those Indians. In 1954 four members were elected and five appointed but not until 1975 was the Northwest Territories Council fully

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[153]The Foothills regional nursing officer, a staunch Anglican, advised me in 1966 that this was necessary so that nurses and other whites could "set examples for the Natives by going to church".

elected. The first Eastern Arctic Territorial constituency was established in 1966, and only then were the majority of Inuit enfranchised Territorially.

Although the Council now sits in Yellowknife, has a fully elected membership of eighteen, and has a quasi-cabinet structure, the head of the Northwest Territories government remains an appointed Commissioner, and the Council continues to be formally responsible to the Minister of Northern Affairs (Devine, 1981; Rea, 1968, Robertson, 1987).

As the Council gradually added more electoral representatives, it created constituencies in which Native people either had the majority or could swing the vote for or against a candidate. In 1968 the sitting member for Yellowknife (David Searle) campaigned actively among the Dogrib communities. In the Federal election that year a Liberal candidate won over the Conservative and his win was largely attributed to the Native vote. (The candidate, Bud Orange, had been a Federal administrator and was well known in the Native community). In the following Federal election a Loucheux man ran for the NDP and handily won the seat, again apparently because the Native population came out to vote for him.

In the previous chapter we noted that the Dene campaigned in the 1971 Territorial elections and won a number of seats. However, the Territorial Government did not markedly change with these members on it. When the Dene Nation was actively working to delay pipeline construction in the North, the N.W.T. Council released the official document referred to previously which challenged the Dene Nation's involvement in Territorial politics: "You've Heard from the Radical Few...Now Hear from the Moderate Many" (N.W.T. Council, c1977). The Dene members withdrew from the Territorial Council, arguing that they were unable to influence its decisions and that by remaining on it they seemed to be simply legitimizing something they disagreed with.

Carrothers, referring in the 1960's to the development of the Territorial government as a "slow process" goes on to comment that this slowness in development is reflected even more markedly at the level of Local Government in the Territories. Carrothers says

> ...the franchise has come to northern peoples in the reverse order to that by which governments historically have grown. Northern residents have for some time had a vote in Federal elections (sic) . The Territorial franchise was not extended to all residents until 1966....In most settlements...there is not

> yet established a form of local government in any sense in which the term is used in the south (1966:189).

One of the recommendations of the Carrothers Commission report was that a Department of Local Government be established, and that it encourage the development of local government structures. This was done in 1968 and the department exists through to the present. Local government of one type or another now exist in virtually every northern settlement, from the City of Yellowknife to the hamlet of Snowdrift.

The assumption of this extension of local government was that communities did not have local government forms, so settlement Councils should be elected and the people should be taught how to make local government work. This however created considerable confusion in communities with existing Band Councils. As noted above (*Supra*, p. 150), a CYC volunteer wrote to me in 1969 that villagers were confused about the relationship between Hamlet and Band Councils, and consequently Hamlet elections were ruined.

But in the 1970's personnel involved with the Department of Local Government were anxious to develop governmental forms which would enable traditional governmental structures to exist at the local level. The Department of Local Government became a suspect agency within the Territorial Civil Service.In 1977 the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories suddenly cancelled Local Government workshops to be held at Baker Lake, catching many of the Native people who were to attend en route from their homes throughout the Keewatin. The "radicals" were purged from the department, and the Territorial Government attempted to return to their previous path of change (Stiles, 1977).

The Dene returned aggressively to electoral politics in 1980 and 1981, contesting the Federal seat and winning a number of seats on the Territorial Council. From that date, the Council has functioned as a much different body. There are a number of areas where this difference has been displayed. Although the Council had not had party politics, this was seen as a stage in its development which would eventually change. The Council now agreed to formally eschew party politics, and to try to operate on a consensus model of decision-making rather than a conflict one. There was a greater committment to using the indigenous languages of the Northwest

Territories in Council debates ; translators were trained and a system was established for simultaneous translation during session.

About the same time, serious debate began to occur about the division of the Territories into two or more governing units. Although this has not yet happened (to 1987) the process of debating it has included the establishment of Eastern and Western constitutional forums and a public vote. This too implies significant changes in the process of government, changes which neither resemble the first Northwest Territories nor the Territories as they seemed to be developing in the 1960's.

F. Summary and Analysis

The early N.W.T. (1875-1905) presents a taken-for-granted political patterning in which votes will be extended to populations once a certain population density is achieved. This density is not particularly high; as 1000 people would likely mean about 500 adults, and 500 adults might mean 250 men, and only the adult men would be voting.

But also taken-for-granted was the exclusion of "Indians and Aliens" from this voting pattern. Thus the value-system or system of political legitimacy clearly bounded the Territorial population in such a way that Indians were not political members of the society. We can only speculate on the differences an alternative definition might have made, for Indians made up 80% of the population until the 1880's.

In contrast, the Metis were voting members, a relatively powerful social class in the nineteenth century. As their position was threatened by Canada's purchase of Rupertsland they engaged in a classical social movement, demanding political recognition. Whether these actions were norm or value-oriented is open to debate; Stanley argues that the actions of the Riel government were all legal in international law, but the Canadian government and Ontario population clearly saw them as a challenge to the legitimacy of the established Canadian state. Nevertheless, the Metis managed to negotiate significant normative changes in the Manitoba Act.

But they did not control migration and as the settler population became dominant in the West the Metis continually lost ground. Much less powerful, much more cut off from influence with governing authorities, they engaged in a series of hostile outbursts

and a value-oriented rebellion. They clearly challenged the legitimacy of the Canadian state in 1885, were easily defeated, and some were hanged as traitors. The few Indians who joined in this protest also paid heavily for their activity.

As the new Northwest Territories formed, there was no assumption of political rights for the predominantly Native population. There was the graduale extension of schools, and something of a religious committment to change the Native, but overall this committment seems weak. For the most part the Native is to be left alone in his "wilderness" existence.

At the same time the N.W.T. itself can hardly be called a state structure or a clearly identifiable political unit, or a social system. Different services are provided by different branches of the Federal Government (health, education), and each branch has its own organizational structure. Relevant offices may be in Edmonton, or Ft. Smith, or Ottawa; it would be difficult to know who to object to if one sought to protest anything. There is, in Smelser's terms, maximum disaggregation of interest articulation and interest aggregation.

For the Native people protest was, in any case, not very likely. In large measure they continue to live on the land in a fur-trading economy, and to feel little direct "oppression" or strain or challenge to their way of life. It is a kind of social control, but the term seems too generous. More accurately, a multitude of social systems exist with some overlapping boundaries; the concept of social control which applies to maintenance of a single social system can hardly be applied.

However, an in-migrant population has a different world-view and a different attitude toward the political process. They soon establish for themselves local government structures and local school systems, following the pattern of the south. They turn to the larger political systems, Territorial and Federal, and demand participation there also. This is quickly granted to them, but not the full control of the Northwest Territories. Rather, appointed Council members remain for many years, ensuring a point of political tension between the non-Native northerners and the government.

Early in the process of granting voting rights to residents there is one other major difference between the old and the new Northwest Territories. Soon after non-Indians had the vote, the vote was also given to Indians. This is of small

consequence, as the majority of Territorial Councillers were appointed, but this fact created new social control needs.

Thus, almost the same time Indians were granted the vote there was a major redefinition of the purpose of schooling, and the beginning expansion of that institution. In Lesage's vision schooling would transform the North, modernize it, prepare Native peoples to take employment in the new North. Schooling became defined in a way which closely resembles Parsons' theory of social control, for it was to incorporate Native peoples into social structures. But the nature of this social control is quite different than Parsons seems to imply. This is not "maintenance of a value-pattern" but extension of a value pattern from one society into another. Messianic and chiliastic, the school will assimilate Native peoples into developing southern structures. [154]

There is no evidence of organized resistance to this schooling, although there were individual and family attempts to avoid it and few Native students remained in school for many years. School expansion was enhanced by an increasing non-Native population, for whom schooling was not intended to be a transformative experience. But Native schools, primarily residential schools, were far removed from parents and communities and a kind of control was easily maintained.

Thus the virtually complete "social control" in the Territories until the sixties is relatively easy to explain. The Territories is in fact a geographic unit with little binding the people together, least of all common institutional structures. Only the non-Native population have sufficient committment to the developing political system to begin to demand changes, and they slowly achieve them.

The 1960's represents the period of change, but we can no longer say absolute control is maintained. In fact, as we noted in the previous chapter, the 1960's changes the situation from one of a multitude of disaggregated interests in the Native community to a relatively single articulated and aggregated system. This happens from two directions; the Territorial Commissioner seeks to impose a definition on the situation which says "we are all northerners", and considerable organizing begins to be done in the Indian community. The demand now is that the Native people really do assimilate to externally based social structures, not only in the form of schools but in local and

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[154]These terms, messianic and chiliastic, are taken from Carney's 1971 study of state/school relations in the Northwest Territories.

Territorial government as well.

In this sense, the 1960's represents a considerable effort on the part of the Commissioner to create a situation of social control. However, he does so in a way which assumes Smelser's model, not Parsons. That is, he assumes that Native people have the same right to demand normative changes as anyone else. Although he is uncomfortable with "demands", such as a demand for a school at Detah, he quickly acquiesces to it. Similarly, there is considerable satisfaction with locally elected settlement Councils and Indian members of Council. There is concern when these phenomena are seen as being interfered with, or "messed up" in some way.

But when the Native demands and expectations take a different turn, when they are no longer fully normative, there is considerable resistance from the Territorial government. Now the term "radical" is used to delegitimize the social actors, and the government attempts to use repressive measures to stop such change. In fact, we do indeed get the Territorial government functioning as a value-oriented institution, but it seeks to protect the values of a southern-based institutional system. The Dene Nation too becomes more and more clearly value-oriented, seeking to protect and affirm historic Dene values. [155]

Again, as with the Akaticho Hall incident, although Smelser's theory would predict much of the behavior of both parties based on the actions of the social control body, it breaks down in one significant way. The assumption that the agencies of control are above the conflict and can disengage from the issues simply proves untenable. The Territorial government engages head to head in value-conflict with the Dene Nation but now there is no obvious external structure which can mediate that conflict. To some degree, the Berger enquiry established by the Federal Government, may be seen as such a mediating body, but in the process it greatly strengthens the Dene Nation.

In fact, the resolution to the conflict turn out to be normative within the external system; it is the return to electoral politics by the Dene. Through this institutionalized process they were able to become a major force on the Territorial Council, and to bring

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[155]In principal, "agitation and organizing" are fully normative activities within the political democracy which Canada claims. I think the overall analysis in these chapters demonstrates why they they are not considered normative when engaged in by some people (Indians, or young adults), or when they have certain goals such as recognition of full political rights for such people.

at least some of their values into that arena.

There is no place in Smelser's theory for this kind of revolution, any more than there is a recognition that "norm-oriented" activities may be those which support one pattern of social organization over another pattern. Yet, if the Lidz and Lidz contribution is recognized, it would imply that it should be possible to extensively reorganize social institutions ("schemata") when the external forces require such reorganization. The Northwest Territories until the 1960's shows a clear pattern of dual development, even though there is little duplication of services (Native; non-Native) in communities. (There is duplication of Roman Catholic / Anglican social services, but both are directed to a Native population.) The duality is based on a geographical separation of peoples who have different economic (or "occupational") patterns. The Native population are land-based hunters, trappers, and fisherman. Some of the non-Native population are in mining or resource occupations, or secondary and tertiary economic activities related to resource settlements. There is little interaction between these two, and little daily pressure on the Indian person. The rest of the non-Native population are in the employ of government, or as members of religious groups. In either case their principal concern, their "economy", is the Native people themselves.

But as government becomes a larger unit in the Northwest Territories more and more Whites are employed in tasks directly related to Native peoples. Schools, hospitals, the various tasks of civil service administration all shift from religious hands to state hands, and by the 1960's many of the "outsiders" in the north are employed in "government" jobs. Both the job market and the school population greatly expand (in gross numbers) but it appears that outsiders fill many of the newly developing jobs. As the economy expands, whether as a result of mining or expansion of the state, the number of outsiders also expand.

At the same time schooling incorporates more and more Native children, and fewer of them retain their family language or return to the trap-line. In fact this change is associated with a marked change in beliefs at the "government" level; Indians are no longer to be "protected" in order to maintain them on the trapline but incorporated into "mainstream" society through schools. Where the goals of schooling have previously been ideological (religious) transformation but economic stasis, the object now is

ideological (National) and occupational transformation. Clearly, if employment or other "roles" in the Territorial society do not open as people are "transformed", a major tension must develop.

But there is another ideological change, at least by the sixties. As outsiders come into the north as visitors, academics, even civil servants in large numbers, the North's quasi-religious world-view (held by local whites) is challenged. Not only are outsiders in specific jobs (teaching, nursing) no longer hired on the basis of their religion, but moral judgments of Native behavior transferred into quasi-judicial decisions are strongly opposed by the legal system (Morrow, 1968; Schmeiser, 1974). The world-view clearly begins to shift in the sixties from a centrality of the church and morality, to a notion of "civil justice". At the same time the belief that "Northerners" have a shared identity, a shared membership in a political community, becomes explicitly stated over and over again by senior government personnel. The government attempts to become, at this time, an active agent of change in the north.

The state enters the north as an alien institution, slowly replacing the Bay and the Church as the dominant force. It is of little interest to the Native population, although people associated with the mines and small businesses recognize it as "their own" and demand representation. Unlike the situation in the Yukon fourty years earlier, these demands are low-key and quickly met. [156] But like the Yukon, demands for state involvement came from the incoming Whites, not the Native population. The Native population were added as voters in the N.W.T. apparently because of needs for ideological consistency amongst Whites, not demands from the Natives. In the 1960's outside "state processes" began to extend into Indian communities, as traditional systems of selecting local governments gave way to "southern" electoral systems. A Territorial Department of Local Government works aggressively to hasten this process. But in the 1960's also, both local level protests and large-scale Native organizations develop - collective behavior including at least one social movement begins in the north.

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[156]The type of mineral acivity in the Yukon, as well as the more "American" (Alaskan) composition of the population, may have been a factor in the major differences between these two territories. Yukon mineral activity at the turn of the century was get-rich-quick placer gold-mining; Northwest Territorial activity was large-scale corporate underground mining.

In the 1970's it may be argued that the Norwest Territories was at time close to revolution, although there was little talk of violence. In every area the Territorial Council were under seige for their view of appropriate Native/non-Native relations and appropriate governmental actions. The Department of Education incorporated Dene languages, the Department of Local Government proved to be "full of radicals", the Dene Nation was also defined as "radical" and was clearly threatening to those in power. The decision of the Dene to actively participate in Territorial Council seems to have stopped this period of crisis, but the goals and aspirations of the Dene are now present at the table of the Northwest Territories Legislature itself. Change, both normative and value-oriented, continues with the Territorical Council actively involved rather than functioning as a social control or oppositional structure.

VII. Analysis and Conclusions

A. Introduction

In the previous six chapters two types of material have been presented. The first two chapters discussed theoretical issues associated with collective behavior theory, and especially with Neil Smelser's theory as prototypical. In this material fundamental issues in sociology, issues related to the nature of social order, social control, and social change, and issues related to belief systems and authority were introduced. Social Action Theory as the foundation of Smelser's work was used to criticize Smelser and possible modifications to his theory were identified. These included a reconceptualization of social control and social change associated with the Lidz brother's work on "the Behavioral System" (1978), and incorporation of a modified version of Talcott Parsons' description of social control, but a number of other modifications were suggested. It was proposed that the theory which resulted from this criticism and modification of Smelser be called a Critical Theory of collective behavior.

The three chapters which followed were data chapters on collective behavior events. They consisted of three case studies of political-administrative systems, imbricated systems [157] from a high-school student residence to the Northwest Territories state. They also represented three types of event, a hostile outburst, a social movement, and state-formation as a non-revolutionary process.

Although the data chapters include analyses, the overall analysis will be done in this chapter. The theoretical issues will be restated, but at the general rather than specific level (as specific predictions have been addressed in the analyses in the data chapters). The conclusions reached in each case study will then be summarized together with some additional analysis. Finally, a section on conclusions and further research will compare and contrast the results of the three case studies in order to address the major theoretical problems. Suggestions will be made for additional research which might fill in a number of lacunae that have not been considered in this project.

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[157]The term imbricated implies overlapping systems, so that any one system cannot easily be separated from others for analysis.

B. Theoretical Issues

The collective behavior literature was introduced as a literature which should enable one to address theoretical issues of social control, social order, and social change. However, precise definitions of each of these concepts were not presented. Rather the introduction discussed alternative definitions which distinguished between social control as socialization to conformity, as repressive, and as a mechanism for maintaining order while social change was occurring in a society. Neil Smelser's theory was taken as prototypical of a mainstream theoretical structure whichs underlies much of the writing in the collective behavior field, and a theory which explicitly poses the problem of relations between social change and social control. This theory, grounded in Parsons' Social Action Theory, treats societies as bounded and analytically composed of values, norms, mobilization into roles and facilities. It then proposes six determinants which would result in a collective behavior event in any social order. These determinants are structural conduciveness, structural strain, the spread of a generalized belief, a precipitating event, mobilization, and social control. Depending on what value each of these determinants take, any one of five different types of collective behavior may occur: a panic, a craze, a hostile-outburst or a norm or value-oriented social movement.

The overall causal structure in Smelser includes three crucial elements. First, the nature of the social structure must be such that some population is "under strain", that is some people feel structural problems to such an extent that they may be energized to act in ways that are not fully institutionalized or legitimized in their society. Secondly, a variety of structural conditions must be present for that potential to be transformed into collective behavior types of action, or uninstitutionalized action oriented towards changing the situation.[158] Thirdly, collective behavior will take whichever form is most easily available to people, from a panic to a value-oriented social movement (and the actions of social control agents largely determines what is "easily available").

From this third proposition we can infer a fourth, not always explicit in Smelser, which is that there will not only be a population mobilized for change in collective behavior but also a population mobilized for control. In general, these people are

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[158]Smelser's master proposition most clearly incorporates the first of these two elements, "People under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief" (1962:385).

presented in Smelser's theory as agents of control, or authorities, rather than as mobilizing populations.

It seems reasonable to infer that once a "social control population" is clearly identified, it is possible to treat the determinants in the theory as applying to both the groups mobilizing for change (as Smelser does) and the people moblizing for control (which Smelser does not do). Consequently all explanatory factors in the theory need not only concepts which account for "mobilization" of the population under strain, but also mobilization or actions of the social control system and suppression of the population under strain. Of course, the reciprocal actions of the two are critical, as Smelser indicates.

In an attempt to clarify Smelser's use of the term social control, a number of social control writings of Talcott Parsons were surveyed and summarized. This was done under the assumption that it would be possible to more fully understand Smelser's use of the term, as he does not explain it well in his theoretical elaboration. The overall statement from Parsons linked social control to maintaining the identity of a system, by retaining core values and determining membership, and maintaining the boundary between the social system and the environment. Parsons' complete statement detailed types of social relations and belief patterns which were consistent with his definition of social control; as such these statements were used to further specify some of Smelser's social structural constraints.

Finally, the overall problem was posed by Victor and Charles Lidz, as they argued for a convergence between the concepts of control and conditions in Social Action Theory and the concepts of assimilation and accommodation in Piaget's theory of cognitive development. In Piaget's theory if the internal structure ("schemata") completely determine the shape of external images, it assimilates those images; if the schemata change to reflect those external images it accommodates them. If the schemata are simply transformed to be the same as external items, imitation has occurred (or reverse assimilation). Bringing these two sets of ideas together (Parsons and Piagets) would imply that social system "control" could be interpreted as assimilation, wheras a responsiveness to external "conditions" could be interpreted as accommodation.

The case studies should enable us to determine whether or not Smelser's theory, or the Critical Theory as developed in this work, can adequately predict and explain collective behavior. But they should also, more importantly, make it possible to determine whether or not the Lidz brother's analysis does indeed provide us with further tools for social analysis. In that context they should enable us to reflect back on Smelser's theory in particular and Social Action Theory in general in ways which may suggest further modifications to those theories. Finally, the whole process may lead to a number of possible directions for further research, which will be enumerated.

C. Analysis of the Data: the Three Case Studies

As noted earlier, in every case the specifics have been analyzed in the chapter in which the case was presented. I will briefly review these findings here, but the focus of the presentation will be to emphasize those findings which make it possible to shift to a higher level of generality for purposes of comparsion and theoretical conclusions.

(1) If we review the Akaitcho Hall incident against either Smelser's theory or the Critical Theory the theories predict well in some areas and rather poorly in others. Although the elements of structural conduciveness are present, strain would appear not to be. However, this conclusion depends on accepting the administrator's social control definition of the situation, a definition which follows Parsons' account in almost every detail. The social structure of the residence is fully consistent with such a definition.

Strain, in the sense that alternative views of the situation are held by some students, can be inferred initially only from student grumbling. This latent strain comes fully into play as Iveson presents an alternative view of "the nature" of student residences. Now strain can be present at all levels of the components of action, for Iveson's view is posited on totally different values or principles of organization. However, student attempts to mobilize around this generalized belief are blocked, as the administrator refuses to deal with them and maintains control by coercive measures. These attempts by the students would be interpreted as institutionalized in much of the society, but they are clearly seen as uninstitutionalized and threatening by the administrator, which justifies his anger and reaction.

Smelser's theory would predict that students should (or could) move from these efforts to a lower level response, to a panic, a craze, or hostile outburst. However, the alternative in which complete social control is maintained seems to be what happens, and no form of collective behavior occurs.

Smelser's theory would also seem to imply that collective behavior determinants build up within a social system until some people within that system take action; in fact what happens in this case is a larger social system comes into play. A question raised in the House of Commons and media interest function like reality tests, confirming Iveson's view of reality and legitimizing student grumbling. However, the students still do not mobilize. This fact would not in itself challenge the validity of Smelser's theory, for other determinants may not yet be in place in the residence. Specifically, there does not appear to be a generalized belief which presents a clear pattern of action in the situation.

Further analysis of Akaitcho Hall as a system, indicates that it is the agent of social control who is mobilized by the news story. Given that the Critical Theory developed in this thesis would imply that social control personnel should be analyzed in the same way as mobilizing populations, this would suggest that conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief should be in place before mobilization. The question in the House in Ottawa either confirms the social control agent's beliefs or heightens strain in the control subsystem. The first is a reasonable interpretation of the event, as the fear of chaos and loss of control would be stengthened by the public attention. The second suggests that the social control beliefs (values, patterns) held by the administration were not widely supported in the larger social system, that in spite of verbal support from senior personnel he felt severe strain as he attempted to uphold his view of necessary social arrangements in the hostel. One must consider this conclusion somewhat speculative, as more data would be needed to fully support it; it is however the direction for data-collection which would be implied by the Critical Theory, and not implied by Smelser's theory.

Finally, if we focus on the smaller system, Akaitcho itself, and observe the administration (and to some degree the larger systems of social control),Smelser's theory becomes highly predictive. That is, control agents act precisely in ways that

Smelser would say they should not, and eventually create the riot which Smelser would predict. One aspect of control that Smelser would not predict was the intense effort of the administrator to mobilize students on his behalf. Although this may fit partly the administrator's particular version of Parsons' social control model (in that it may be important that the students "love" the father), it otherwise contradicts his pattern of control. This behavior would also not be predicted by the Critical Theory.

The situation is settled when a higher level of control enters, in the form of the Regional Director of Education and then the Commissioner; they follow Smelser's recommended pattern for control. Again, we would have to note the predictive power of Smelser in this case, for control at this level works.

However, it is evident through analysis of this case that Parsons' and Smelser's definitions of social control are different. Parsons demands assimilation of other structures (or people) to an existing structure; Smelser requires that the existing structure at least modify itself in normative ways to accommodate external conditions or forces of change. It is this overall difference in the two theories of social control which may enable us to more clearly incorporate the Lidz brothers into the theory, but further discussion of this will be delayed until the other two case studies are presented.

One final point should be noted before moving on. The hostile outburst, if analyzed in strictly functional terms, has an interesting consequence. It is this event (plus the somewhat wider hysteria of the town and the involvement of the media) which finally forces more senior administration to act and set aside the power of the hostel administrator. Forcing the action to wider systems (systems which did not fully condone the social control practises of the residence) and the occurance of a quasi-violent act, results in some kind of interventionist response. The calculated reports of academics, the reports of Katz and Hobart, had produced no such reaction. Thus the "peculiar logic" of collective behavior may well demonstrate itself: the action may seem illogical, hysterical, irrational, but if all else fails it may work.

(2)The Dene nation movement, as the second case study, gradually emerges as a value-oriented social movement. Structural conduciveness and strain at all levels appear inevitable when one culture or social system is being incorporated into another, for quite different values, norms, role mobilization, and facilities will exist within each culture.

However, the phrase "being incorporated" is crucial here, for an alternative social arrangement in which the two cultures simply go their separate ways would imply no such strain. In that case there might be conflict when the two groups come into competition, as for example competing for resources or land use, but the concept "strain" would not apply. Initially it seems inappropriate to think of the Dene as a group created by this strain, as Smelser's theory implies. That is, Smelser's theory assumes a pre-existing social system with some level of shared values, norms, etc. and that strain develops among these elements. In contrast, the Dene seem to be better described as a different culture, put under strain by the encroachment of another culture.

But the Dene are partially formed by the interaction, as the various Native peoples of the Mackenzie did not historically see themselves as a single people. Rather, they defined themselves as people of different places and languages, and at times they engaged in armed conflict. Their conflict with an invading cultural group contributes to (or results in) them redefining themselves as a nation, a group of people with a shared history and sense of people-hood. A new and larger group is created by the conflict, but it does not seem to be created by the process which Smelser describes.

Although the orientation to incorporating Dene into southern social institutions developing in the North begins with Federal Government changes in schooling policy in the 1950's, it is most clearly assumed by the new Commissioner in 1966. He is the first Commissioner to insist that "we are all northerners" and thus to demand/expect Dene participation in the newly developing social structure. As schooling is the most significant element in this assimilation program, the population most caught up in the strain between the two cultures is the well-educated young Dene adults. Still fluent in their family language but schooled to grade 12 and beyond, they have difficulty surviving in the roles of their parents socio-economic structure (trapping) and difficulty obtaining employment in the roles supposedly proferred by the incoming economic structure. In this sense the developing social structure <u>does</u> create the group most subject to mobilization, as Smelser's theory would claim.

Although these young adults can be interpreted as experiencing strain at all levels, it is most obvious on the mobilization series, that determinant Smelser calls mobilization into roles. They have spent twelve years being mobilized into jobs that do

not seem to become available to them. Thus they form a new class in the North, one with a foot in each of the opposing cultures. It is this new class which becomes politically organized and seeks to change the southern institutions entering the North, especially the state. It also would have been possible to predict that this "class" was most likely to mobilize, as the group most sharply under strain, simply by using Smelser's theory.

But during the time period the "old class" of Indians is also sharply under seige. They are being numerically displaced by inmigrant whites; they are being institutionally pushed aside as Band Councils are challenged by Hamlet Councils and mines replace trap-lines; and they are constantly having their definition of the situation challenged. That is, at the level of value-orientations the two groups of people, the inside Native peoples and the in-migrant non-Natives, live in different worlds. It follows within the theory that they have different patternings of social interaction, different processes of role mobilization, and different views of facilities (such as land).

It does not seem adequate to describe the Native people simply as "low on facilities" in Smelser's theory. It is true they are low on "power" to influence the incoming social structure, and that is certainly one definition of facilities. Internally they do not lack communicative structures (although they do not have them throughout all of the Mackenzie), but it is not easy for them to communicate with non-Natives. There is both a linguistic and a social barrier, the latter being partly implied when one speaks of them as "different social systems". That is they can perhaps best be understood as an alternative social system with the incoming or intruding social system including elements which will eventually incorporate (or more accurately assimilate) the Native peoples.

The movement which then develops is more value-oriented than norm-oriented, more based in affirming historic values of the traditional culture than demanding normative changes in the new culture. Given the response of the Territorial Government to the movement (and as with the Akaitcho Hall crisis the social control structure engages intensely in the issues rather than standing apart from them), Smelser would again predict accurately this value-oriented direction. However, Smelser's implicit assumption that value-oriented movements should be redirected towards normative change, and his assumption that such movements arise when social control agents

respond in particular ways, seem inadequate in this case. On the one hand, to the extent that this new class is based in their historic culture, they must make demands which are value-oriented. On the other hand, to the extent that they are delegitimized as social actors because they are Indian, whatever demands they make on their own behalf are likely to be interpreted as uninstitutionalized and contesting legitimacy (i.e. value-oriented). In particular this happens as they assert their rights to organize as Indians (in the Brotherhood) or to forcefully argue an Indian point of view in conflict (in the case of the treaty strike). It does not happen in the same way when they demand participation in southern institutions, as in the case of the school at Detah.

There was passing reference in the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two to an observation of Turner and Killians about social movement membership. They note that if a social movement recruits from people affected by whatever is defined as the problem it is likely to become value-oriented or revolutionary. In spite of the existance of the preconditions which Smelser specifies (conduciveness and strain) it is possible the Dene movement would have taken a different direction if the CYC had not recruited Native young people for its organizing work in the Native community.

In the actual mobilization a number of factors appear to be at work, some predicted by Smelser and others not. The Territorial Government plays the role of "control agents" who break Smelser's control rules and thus contribute to mobilization. The Federal Government, however, displays something quite different, a contradictory pattern of conscious normative mobilization on the one hand and attempts to control on the other. The monolithic image of a consistent control structure breaks down in this larger sphere, a phenomenon also demonstrated by Sally Weaver in her analysis of events at the centre (Ottawa) from 1968 to 1970 (Weaver, 1980).

The overall effect of the Federal Government was to be a major mobilizer of the Dene movement. To some degree this was clearly intended by government agents, as they define their work as community development or community organizing. This fact is difficult to interpret within Smelser's theory or any of the modifications. An internally consistent theoretical interpretation of these actions of government personnel would be that their mobilization was intended to be normative, intended to resolve the stress and strains engendered by incorporating northerners into southern institutions without

challenging the basic legitimacy of those institutions.

However, there was another sense in which the agencies of control mobilized the Dene and that was by providing frequent occurrances which could be interpreted as evidence of the untrustworthiness of these agencies and therefore as evidence for the need of a strong Dene movement. The White Paper was the first, the closing of Indian Affairs Branch offices was the second, and the killing of Ed Bird by an RCMP officer was the third...each added to the energy of the movement. The implication is that Smelser's use of the term precipitating event needs further specification. Perhaps it should be conceptualized as an ampiflying event, as something which magnifies the problem or stressful situation so that further mobilizaton occurs. It is possible that in any long-term movement, that is one which covers a number of years as this one does, there needs to be not just one event which starts the action but others which keep that action rolling. Such was clearly the case for this movement.

The description of this case ends soon after the decision of the Dene to participate again in electoral politics both Territorially and Federally. Both moves seem to have increased their legitimacy, and the large-scale successes in territorial politics to have partly withdrawn their energy from the Dene Nation movement and redirected it into institutionalized political structures. This could lead to the gradual demise of the Dene Nation organization, unless new structural conditions occur to revitalize it. But that does not ensure the demise of the Dene Nation as a movement. That is, the incorporation into the existing state would seem at first sight to be a powerful weapon of social control, but it does not quite match Smelser's analysis of control. The move to electoral politics may channel the discontent into institutionalized patterns, but to the extent that control system is the state and its agencies, it raises the possibility of "taking control" of the control system itself. An analogy to the Akaitcho case would have been the students electing a hostel Board of Directors and this Board both firing the administrator and insisting on new patterns of organization in Akaitcho Hall. It does not seem reasonable to interpret this as social control in Smelser's sense (much less Parsons). Perhaps the third case study will throw further light on the events, for in it we look at the development of the territorial state itself.

3) The formation of the territorial state is the third case study. The development of the early territorial state(prior to 1905) presents a clear picture of a social system with institutionalized patterns of action and defined membership. However, the system of political legitimacy recognizes the Metis as members of that society, but not the Indian; it is the Metis who are politically active seeking to change the social system to accommodate their land and language institutions. In spite of their numerical superiority (or perhaps because of it) Indians are excluded from membership in this newly developing state system.

There is a Metis "rebel" movement in 1869, but overall the formation of the Territorial state is clearly not linked to popular agitation, much less revolution. In fact, the state is best seen as an alien institution gradually extending its domain over the various territories purchased by Canada from the Hudsons Bay Company. However, during the first period of this state extension, 1870 to 1905,popular agitation and a legislative process which assumes gradual evolution to elected government lead to representative government (at Regina) by 1897. The agitation is associated primarily with migration into the Northwest Territories by farmers from Eastern Canada and the United States as well as Western Europe, not Native peoples. In fact what this description suggests is that Parsons' general concept of social system must indeed be taken into account; that social actors must first see themselves as in some sense "members" before they will act to change a social structure. In the early Territories, "Indians and aliens" are excluded by definition from "the state". They do not merely lack facilities, they lack the minimum criterion for consideration in state activities, and to the degree state and societal boundaries are shared, they lack the minimum criterion for participation in social activities.

In contrast, the Metis are members of the state, and make a claim to preexisting rights of citizenship. During the brief period of Metis agitation in 1869, the Metis attempt to appropriate the new state (Manitoba) as thier own. As a class not lacking facilities, but in fact the existing dominant class in Rupertsland with communicative and social relations with Quebec, they react when others ("the Canadian party") attempt to project their definition of the state and society onto the situation. The Metis are largely successful, and a full-scale accommodative process would seem to be operating.

But in this case, the land is part of a larger state structure, a larger system which sees the territories as beneficial to it. Therefore large-scale immigration places farmers on the land and *de facto*, a new social system, a new "patterning of relationships" occurs. These are consolidated by social-movement type activities (as in the Manitoba School question of 1891, farmers and political movements). It now appears there is no room for accommodative processes, or more accurately accommodation is in fact transforming the social order to the patterns of the in-migrant population. In fact, it may be more accurate to call this not accommodation but a process analagous to imitation in Piaget, as the external system determines the internal one.

The Metis, much less powerful now, make one more attempt to modify the situation in the 1885 rebellion, a hostile outburst. We have not presented enough data on this event to be able to test the theoretical propositions as to why it occurs but one obvious factor in comparsion to 1869 is the fact that the Metis are now much weaker, they lack "facililities". A result of these actions is that the generalized beliefs of the non-Natives are confirmed as the rebellion functions as a reality test for them. Thus the rebellion confirms and consolidates a clear-cut form of Parsons' social control beliefs, and the state for many years adopts policy which reflects such beliefs.

For the most part the Metis withdraw from collective behavior and head north and west. That is, they seek to escape the social situation rather than change it. The Metis attempt to create Metis colonies in Alberta should perhaps be understood this way too. It is a collective "panic", a search for safe haven. It partially takes the form it does because with it goes a governmental definition of the situation which is a Parsonian social control definition. For the government of Alberta a Metis colony is not a location where Metis can be assured of minimal facilities for survival, but where they can eventually be "rehabilitated", transformed.

In the Territories as bounded after 1912, again the most adequate imagery is one of state extension over a land and people, but virtually no reaction from those people. The social unit is defined as the Northwest Territories, but administrative structures divide it in various ways. In-migrants assume the developing social structure should be the one they know, as do people in the institutions of the Canadian political system. There is no clear-cut single structure (as a "Territorial Government") to which Native or

in-migrant people can orient. This is not "differentiation of the components of action" but a particular type of role structure, one in which there is maximum differentiation of interest articulation. This seems, as Smelser's theory would predict, to contribute to "social control" (although the concept is operationalized here as role structure, which is difficult to infer from Smelser). Social control is not so much a pattern of maintaining a social system as maintaining a level of peace and quiet while an outside group of people slowly move into the territory inhabited by the Dene. During this time the church, but perhaps even more so the school, function as small bridgeheads for the incoming society.

But at the governmental level, until after World War II, there is also no clear-cut "control" ideology. That is, there is no attempt to resocialize Indians and incorporate them into roles in southern Canada, or even southern roles being established in the north. The assumption is that they will remain as they have for years, on the trapline. This lack of interest in incorporating Indians into the political system would seem to be a second element of successful social control, contradictory as it may seem. As with the earlier Northwest Territories this could perhaps be described by saying Indians are not seen as "members" of some society which is extending into the north, even though the government sees as one of its tasks the protecting of the Native.

The other two social groups developing in the territories are the mine population and the small business and professional class. The mine population even more than the Indian, is not much involved with Territorial Government structures. The government does not even include mine children in their school statistics. There is no sign of social movements or collective behavior events developing in this group.

The third group, the small business people in towns like Yellowknife, are the only ones to seem to want to participate in governmental structures. Like the Metis of Ruptersland in 1869 and the Ontario and American immigrants to the Northwest Territories to 1897, they see the government as rightfully theirs. However, they acquire the vote so easily one can hardly speak of political agitation. Thus it would seem they simply fit into an existing model of appropriate state/population relations. Although it is some years before Territorial Councillors are fully elected (which represents the outside pattern), when they are it is Northwest Territories business-men

who are elected to Council. Rightly or wrongly, they apparently see the government as "theirs".

The changes which peak in the Territories in the sixties and which seem to finally lead to a social movement are myriad. A social control ideology of "we are all northerners" comes into place among governmental representatives. For the first time there is an explicit demand that Native peoples assimilate to a recognized social pattern. This is a pattern of specific occupational roles, political participation, and rejection of cultural differences. This ideology also becomes expressed as Federal government policy in the 1969 White Paper on Indian Affairs.

At the same time the Territorial government itself becomes much more sharply defined, clearly identifiable as an "object", and moves into the north as a powerful institutional structure close to the MacKenzie population. That is, the structure of role differentiation changes, as churches begin to lose their place in schooling and the Territorial government takes more and more responsibility from the Federal government. At the same time, although there is an attempt to create more local governments, this attempt is not fully successful as Hamlet Councils remain closely tied to the Territorial structure. In Smelser's terms the articulation of interests is undifferentiated, but as in the above case this is fully describable within role terms, as the Critical Theory would imply.

Means for the articulation of interests of the Indian population are difficult to identify. There is no clear-cut body which speaks for the Native people. There are Council members whom they elect, and they are "differentiated" from the Native population (i.e., they are Whites). But if one looks at the issue of differentiation between aggregation and articulation of interests it seems they are not differentiated; rather at the state level non-Indian interests are articulated. One is likely to miss this with Smelser's theory, for one would only notice the differentiation between aggregation of Indian interests and their articulation by non-Indian peoples in government. But if one looks at groups in interaction, as the Critical Theory demands, it is apparent that this community was in fact polarized structurally even as the Commissioner was saying, "We are all northerners".

The other element of conduciveness, communication structures, also changes markedly in the sixties. Radio (in English and local languages) becomes widespread and communicative networks began to develop through government meetings. Thus, at two levels, the formal media level and the informal interpersonal level, the communicative structure changes. At the first level because of its centralized nature and its domination by national networks, it would seem not to favour "the construction of an alternative definition of the situation" by Native peoples. It is informal networks which do this, enabling Indian people to talk with each other.

But at the media level, and amongst some of the non-Indians, an ideological change also seems to be occurring. Although it includes the homogenous doctrine ("we are all the same"), it also includes a notion of social justice. Thus historic morally based control patterns are under challenge, challenge from the outside. Isolation from a larger social system at the community level is no longer possible, and ideational elements from the outside system begin to invade the north.

As mentioned in relation to the Dene Nation, there is also one clear-cut example of strain. Although schools and media expressions of ideology and government statements of policy all say that Indians are to be mobilized into occupational roles, it is not happening. Large numbers of outside Whites are filling available jobs. In this case strain can clearly be interpreted as a disjunction between culturally prescribed values and structurally available roles. However it is best understood within Smelser's theory as strain at the level of role mobilization - but both sides of the coin should be clear. It is not only the unavailability of jobs, it is a whole process of mobilizing young Indian people into those jobs which generates strain. If we drew on Smelser alone, we would miss this fact.

In the 1950's, the developing state structure in the Northwest Territories had begun to operate within a theory of social control which closely resembles Parsons' theory. [159] Again, the notion of social control as integration or maintaining a social system seems totally inadequate; what is sought in this case is assimilation, or reverse assimilation of Dene people and structures to Euro-Canadian structures. The pace of this process is speeded up in the sixties with the move of a major social institution, the

[159]It should be no surprise that the administrator of Akaitcho Hall also follows this model, for he is from this time period in the Territories.

government itself, into Yellowknife. But now a change occurs in the type of social control, it is not Parsons but Smelser's which is assumed. Normative agitation from the Dene is acceptable and to some degree encouraged, value agitation is not.

Given that the overall social process here is of one culture incorporating another, it would seem that this progression of social control models is not only logical but perhaps necessary. Until there is at least minimal recognition of, and committment to, the incoming social system people are not likely to place demands on that system to change. Young adults, mobilized into the new system through schooling, are the ones most likely to want changes, although if the new social system was fully successful in its assimilation processes they would presumably be content with existing social patterns.

If we now think of this society as being somewhat bounded and as consisting of social institutions which bind both Dene and Euro-Canadian to it, we can identify Smelser's causal structure which will lead to a social movement. If we think of these institutions as analogous to Piaget's schemata, we can see that demands for institutional change are demands for accommodative responses.

However, the response of the Territorial government was two-fold. On the one hand there was a demand for a solution which assumes Parsons' control, or complete assimilation of the Dene. As long as this set of interaction principles was being acted upon members of the Territorial government break Smelser's social control rules (for they are posited on different principles). They also attempt to deny Dene claims and delegitimize the institutional structure which carries those claims into the public arena.

It is in fact the larger system, the Canadian government, which recognized the normative organizing of the Dene and contributes to their mobilization (although not in a monolithic way). At the same time the Territorial Legislature is becoming more and more an elected body, presumably fitting more closely the values and norms of the larger political system. Even as it does so it eventually provides a platform for Dene involvement in the state control structure.

The nature of changes in the state are clearest when viewed against two actions of the Dene nation. The first is the decision to withdraw from institutionalized political participation, a refusal which makes the nature of the Territorial state much more transparent. The second is the decision to return to electoral politics, and to begin then

to actually make changes in that government.

The consequence of the latter decision was that a number of Dene who had been active in the Dene nation movement were elected to the legislature, and elected non-Dene members seemed less hostile to Dene issues. Following this election a series of changes occured in the territorial state. For example, although there had been no party structure, it was now agreed to formally eschew such structure and attempt to work using a consensus model of decision-making, the languages of the Northwest Territories became official languages of the assembly, and Dene members of the assembly took cabinet and other leadership positions. At the same time, the Dene agreed to negotiate and contract with outside oil companies and to participate in other economic activity in the north.

A major accommodative process would appear to be in place in relation to the state institution. It might be argued that this is at a value level, for the basic principles of British parliamentary democracy, which underlie the Canadian state, are not being adhered to (in particular, the structure of a party in power and a loyal opposition). In fact, the structure is more like the one-party state which tends to evolve following revolutionary movements, but in this case it follows upon a similar state structure which preceded it as part of a colonial government.

However, many of the major issues of discontent are not resolved, particularly land issues, as they are considered the responsibility of a different government, the Federal Government. It is much more difficult for the Dene to have an equivalent impact on this government, for the power of numbers is simply not available to them. Nor are existing provinces anxious to give further provincial powers to the territories... it would seem that Smelser's differentiation of aggregation of interests makes it difficult or impossible for the Dene to impact on the national political system.

D. Conclusions and Further Research

In relation to Smelser's theory it becomes apparent from these case studies that at the most general level, the first condition for collective behavior is that particular patterns of structural strain will either create populations which will act back upon the

structure in uninstitutionalized ways or that such strain will be created by the attempts of social actors of one social structures to incorporate the social actors of another culture. This would suggest that Smelser's value-added process has the ordering of strain and conduciveness reversed, for without strain elements of conduciveness will affect no one. In fact the only way that conduciveness could logically precede the other determinants is if it is interpreted as structures which permit each of the other determinants to occur.

It may be that in many situations the strain actually generates new population groupings, or people who redefine themselves as a group for political purposes, but in the cases presented here those groupings are at least partially pre-existing (as cultures). It is their pre-existing reality on a collision course with the realities of externally developing social structures which creates the strain.

However, the case studies also imply an element of validity in this part of Smelser's theory in that it is the young adults who are most engaged in the leadership of this movement. It is they who could be defined as "created" by the intersection of the two cultures, and in that sense created at the centre of the structural strain that occurs as one of these cultures incorporates the other.

That incorporation is initially most easily understood not in terms of Smelser but in terms of Parsons' model of social control, which raises a series of questions. The obvious one for this theory would be....if the members of the incoming culture were in fact prepared to fully accept the Dene men and women as they completed schooling would there have been strain? Did the strain per se really arise from the interaction of the two cultures or from the contradictory patterns within the more powerful culture? If actors in that culture (Euro-Canadian society) had both decided in the 1950's to assimilate the Dene through schooling and had proferred employment immediately to every student who completed grade five or six, would there have been strain? We cannot know the answer from this research, but the overall model would suggest that we should be able to locate societies which have done this and in which neither strain nor social movements develop.[160]

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[160]It would perhaps be useful to look at the development of the Red River Colony from about 1812 to 1869 with this theoretical question in mind. Schooling appears to have functioned somewhat differently at that time, and

The second set of questions which flows from the application of Parsons' social control theory is the obverse of the first. What happens if Parsons' theory is the basis for practise but the more powerful group does not accept the people being changed? That is, if the population of the more dominant culture sees the Native people not as malleable through education but in fact stigmatized, marked from birth, then population mobilized through schooling or any other process can face nothing but frustration. It is possible that a model such as this would elucidate much of the history of Native schooling in Canada, from at least the eighteenth century to the present.

Finally, the Parsons and Smelser social control models together do at least partially explain the legitimacy issue. To the extent that Parsons' model of change is held by powerful actors, the population subject to change has only one responsibility: to concentrate on changing themselves to meet the demands of the external cultural system. They do not have mature political rights within that system, rights to challenge and change it. Thus, whether they be the Metis of 1885, or the Dene of the 1960's and 1970's, or the students of Akaitcho Hall in 1969, any actions they take, or demands they place, on their own behalf will be seen as illegitimate and threatening.[161] But this implies that such actors cannot act legitimately in the political arena, or at least the sphere of legitimate action for them is greatly reduced. That is institutionalization itself ensures that almost any action taken by such people will be uninstitutionalized, and will be interpreted in collective behavior terms.

Smelser's theory of control would imply that such people 'should' be able to make collective norm-oriented demands on a social system, but should not raise legitimacy or value issues. It is possible to infer from the double-bind outlined above that such actions are impossible for delegitimzied (or stigmatized) populations. They must challenge the legitimacy structure of a "Parsonsian" social control system, for no other form of collective action is available to them. They must challenge it in a logical sense, as is implied above, but they also must challenge it in an empirical sense if the

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[160](cont'd) Metis protests centred around land control and control of trade.
[161]There is some suggestion in this work that they are most threatening when supported by people from the other culture, and it is these people who most draw the ire of control agents (The CYC, the "white radicals"). The reasons for this are not fully clear from this theory, although Parsons' notion that the people who are to change are not held fully responsible for their own actions wheras other actors are, may partially account for it.

social structure is mobilizing them for roles on the one hand and not providing access to those roles on the other, for that particular strain can only be resolved by changing the social structure. Thus the "peculiar logic" of collective behavior actors fits well within the overall logic of Social Action Theory, as it follows an action path laid out by constraints and opportunities. It also fits well the logic of Smelser's theory, which implies the same type of action path, except that carried to its logical end, value-oriented movements will be unavoidable within many social systems.

The clearest example of strain which presented itself in the case studies was the strain in relation to the mobilization series. It would suggest that strain can be defined as Smelser does (impairment of the relations among components of action, 1962:47). However, the analysis above implies that such norms may well be embedded in values which must also change if congruency is to be achieved, which again challenges Smelser's limited address to value-oriented change.

However, it was also possible in this work to identify something like strain at the value level, as a conflict of values between two cultures and as a conflict of values at AKaticho Hall. Even if Smelser dealt in more detail with value issues, his definition would not seem to account for this, although his operationalization of that definiton clearly does (1962:62). It is apparent from this work that such differences become strain only as the activities of members of one culture work towards incorporating the other culture, and as part of that process of incorporation demand that the incoming culture changes.

As far as Social Action Theory as a whole is concerned, there are implications from this study for the theory. Again, to present a brief outline of that theory, it begins with the proposition that a social system can be conceptualized in any situation where two or more persons interact. The core of that system is a "pattern", a consistency in interaction expectations which makes it possible for member actors to predict (within limits) each others behavoir. That pattern is partly created by, partly justified by, and partly understood or interpreted by the value-orientations or world-views which actors bring to the situation. It is maintained by the processes wherby actors learn and become motivated to play their part ("role") in the pattern, and the processes which provide (allocate) necessary resources (facilities) to those actors in roles. As larger and larger

social systems are analyzed it may be useful to conceptualize collectivities (population groupings or institutional structures) rather than individuals as actors, but the same descriptive categories are nevertheless applied.

The pattern may be described as the organization of a social system, or the role structure of a social system (including relations between roles), or the normative structure of a social system. If we imagine it as unchanging, as stable though time, and then try to identify the mechanisms which maintain its stability we are identifying social control mechanisms. If we imagine it as undergoing change and then try to identify the mechanisms which produce that change, we are identifying social change mechanisms. We may wish to consider some aspect of the patterning of any system as crucial to its identity, as determining its essential nature. Social control and social change in relation to this aspect are of particular importance, for changing it will transform the system.

Any given social system can also be conceptualized as having internal and external dimensions, or being bounded in some sense. The Lidz and Lidz analogy to Piaget would then suggest that change can occur in two ways. The internal patterns may be conceptualized as a number of inter-related schemata. If these become related to each other in new ways, or combined into new and slightly different patterns, change has occurred. In Piaget's theory this is "reciprocal assimilation".

Alternatively, external "conditions" or elements from outside the system, may impinge upon it. The system may respond by modifying (or interpreting) those external conditions in such a way that they can simply be taken into the system without any system change ("assimilation"), or it may respond by undergoing modifications so that it will be possible to incorporate the external factors without markedly modifying them ("accommodation").

Parsons' model of social control is a process whereby people who have lost (or never had) appropriate motivational committment to a pattern become remotivated to "play their role". Within Social Action Theory it is acting upon the "mobilization into roles" component of action so that the individual is changed motivationally to fit the existing social patterning. If the Lidz and Lidz analogy is applied linguistically it is assimilation, but this should be understood very specifically as incorporation into existing role patterns in a social order. It should *not* be given the exact meaning it is given in

race relations, although the concepts are very close.

Smelser's theory of collective behavior is (at least potentially) something slightly different. In the first place it tries to describe certain kinds of social patterning which will generate, or create, actors who motivationally do not wish to follow existing patterns (i.e. who are prepared to act in "uninstitutionalized" ways). This patterning is called strain or a system under strain by Smelser. He also tries to describe the conditions which will result in these actors forming collectivities and attempting to act back upon the system in certain ways (his other five determinants).

Thus his overall theory attempts to specify those circumstances under which a system will generate its own "external forces of change", forces to which that system must respond. But his theory also implies (although it does not clearly specify this), that under some circumstances the system also generates "external" forces of control which act both upon the system itself and upon forces mobilizing for change.

In Smelser's theory the "external sources of control" are treated as legitimate, as agents acting on behalf of the existing patterns and within norms established by those patterns. They thus act as defenders of those patterns and they act from institutionalized positions of authority. But they don't necessarily act to assimilate mobilizing groups perceived as external challengers to the system; ideally they act to ensure that such groups will focus at the normative level of change.

Thus in Smelser's theory ideal social control is not a mechanism of assimilation but one of accommodation, of adjusting the social system so that the external impinging factors (mobilizing groups) can be incorporated within it. However, such adjustment is limited: one failed form of social control results in external agents focusing on values, on the core of social patterning, so they threaten to transform the very system. Another failed form of social control results in mobilizing groups engaging in hostile outbursts, or perhaps panics and crazes.

The relationship between Parsons' theory of social control and Smelser's theory of social control should now be clear. It is apparent in this analysis that "institutionalized" action in some social systems (systems which operate on the basis of Parsons' social control model) implies accepting a definition of the situation which makes the goal of changing one actor paramount. That is, institionalized action is action oriented towards

"assimilation" in the Lidz brother's terminology; action oriented towards "accommodation" (changing the pattern or system) is by its very nature uninstitutionalized. In such a case not even norm-oriented change efforts will be acceptable: Smelser's theory would imply that only panics, crazes, hostile-outbursts or value-oriented movements are possible. However, Smelser himself seems to explicitly deligitimize value-oriented movements (as well as panics, crazes, and hostile outbursts) so that one is left with the position that such social systems "should" be left intact. Presumably a transformation of such a system would result in precisely a new value-orientation, one which did not require the "assimilation" of specific actors.

It is also apparent from the reanalysis of Parsons that one of the factors which will lead to social actors refusing to "assimilate" is a definition of the situation which denies that they need to change. That is, the very basis of this pattern of social control is challenged as soon as the targets of social control or assimilation take that position. In the case presented here, this most obviously occurs as the Brotherhood develops. They do not assume a stance in which "Indians" will be changed but rather one in which outside structures must change. For Parsons the maintenance of a control definition is associated with certain types of social patterns (isolation, insulation, social distance from agents of assimilation). A change in these such as occurs with "community organizing" may result in a changed "shared definition of the situation."

Unlike Parsons, Smelser's theory can then be read as a further specification of those conditions which result in control as an accommodative rather than assimilative process. However, Smelser's theory *cannot* be read as a means for moving from assimilative to accommodative systems, for he assumes agents of social control are intrinsically legitimate in a system. "Agents" of control are, by definition, those who support the existing pattern of social relations, and if that pattern is assimilative in relation to external "objects" or actors then that is what they will support. In the above cases, the administrator of Akaitcho Hall most obviously represents this pattern, but actions of the Northwest Territories Legislative Assembly in the 1970's are similar in nature.

One can assume that if social systems are accommodative, prepared to adapt to the 'nature' of external actors impinging upon them, that one process of

accommodation might be what Parsons calls value generalization. That is, old patterns of interaction and new patterns of interaction are understood or interpreted at more general levels, so that a new system of values emerges which accommodates both systems. Although individuals committed to the old system of values may see this as a betrayal of those values, and may seek a return to previous values (Parsons concept of "fundamentalism"), Parsons clearly sees this as a transformative process which incorporates old and new patterns and values. It is precisely analagous to Piaget's notion of "reciprocal assimilation" in that a new schemata emerges as a result of connections being established between existing schemata (Lidz and Lidz, 1978:211).

At least in principal Smelser's theory would permit such social change, if the social control system is accommodative rather than assimilative. But at the level of social interaction such a possibility would seem to require interaction between individuals (or more accurately collectivities) who represent each pattern, rather than isolation or interaction based on assimilative processes. That is, Smelser's description of structural conduciveness which imply particular patterns of intra and intergroup communication and interaction would seem to be an essential social structural component of such change.

There is another concept in Piaget which seems relevant to this discussion; the concept of imitation. This, like accommodation, is a reponse to an external object but a response of a type that previous schemata are totally transformed to "fit" the object. Thus it is the opposite of assimilation, as the existing schemata are absorbed into the external pattern of relations. It is possible that "fundamentalism" in fact interprets value-generalization in this way, as "the others" values (and patterns of interacting) are seen as replacing the previous patterns. That is four patterns of relating to external objects (or external social systems or patterns of interaction) are possible: assimilation (Parsons' view of social control);imitation or reverse assimilation (changing to the other or external system); or accommodation (Smelser's view of social control); or reciprocal assimilation (the Critical Theories approach to social control). Of course, what is assimilation from the perspective of one social system is imitation from the perspective of the other.

This overall analysis does leave a number of conceptual problems unresolved. It has been possible to formulate Smelser's theory as closely representing Lidz and Lidz's

position, as change (or condition) and control are a function of social actors mobilizing to act upon each other and to act upon a social system. It then is possible, and I think it has been demonstrated that it is heuristically useful, to apply the other major concepts from Piaget (assimilation, accommodation, imitation, and reciprocal assimilation).

But it is also possible to argue from the discussion so far that the social system defined by Parsons as a control system ("assimilative"), and the social system defined by Smelser as a control system ("accommodative") include elements other than the two mobilizing collectivities, elements which have different values in the two societal types. Although there are a myriad of differences in these two systems, it is possible to encapsulate those differences by saying they have different fundamental values or principles of organization, at least as these principles apply to intergroup relations. One of the conceptual difficulties is that the concept social control would seem to apply to different phenomena; that problem is somewhat alleviated by using some language like control system or control principles and identifying assimilative and accommodative systems.

This leaves unaddressed the possibility that a social system with an imitative or reciprocal assimilation control principle might look quite different than either assimilative or accommodative systems. Imitation seems relatively easy to handle, because it is the reverse of assimilation, but it assumes a social control structure which gives way and permits a social structure to be totally incorporated by another. Although it seems useful to recognize the imitative process at work as people move into Western Canada in the nineteenth century, it cannot truly be considered imitative unless the preexisting social structures are transformed and incorporated. It is difficult to see the Native peoples in the west as completely fitting this model, as many remain as pockets of untransformed or only partially changed societies. In fact, it would be necessary to identify in a detailed way the social structure that makes imitation possible or likely, but adequate data is not available in this work for such analysis. Immigrant populations which are described in the literature as "easy to assimilate", such as the Scandinavians in Canada, may provide insight into this process. The western Natives are perhaps better described as resistant to assimilation rather than imitative in these structures.

What of reciprocal assimilation? The implication would be that two interacting collectivities or social systems are both changed and merged to create a new system. (The phrase reciprocal accommodation would seem more appropriate, rather than reciprocal assimilation). To some degree that could be the process occurring in the Northwest Territories state,as no party structure, consensus decision-making, and language pluralism all suggest significant changes. Yet, at a more general level, one could not claim a completely new form, for the Northwest Territories state is still clearly recognizable as an institution much like other state structures in Canada.

We again do not have data to fully interpret a control system which might be called equivalent to Piaget's type four, or reciprocal "accommodation". Such change implies a change to new values, new principles of organization, which are somehow derived from the interaction of the old principles. Presumably social systems subject to this kind of change would have organizational principles quite different from the accommodative and assimilative ones identified here. We might ask, what is the nature of two societies, or two social institutions, that leads them to interact in a way which creates a new society or institution? What values do each hold? What image of each other? What kind of social relationships? It is not possible to know from this work.[162]

The implications of this are that the Piagetian notions are useful and applicable to social structure or social systems analysis, especially in relation to social control, but a great deal of research and theoretical work would need to be done to fully flesh out that theory. However, as has been frequently noted in relation to Social Action Theory, this thesis too has had difficulty adequately broaching the issue of fundamental change. It could be argued, of course, that in some sense change occurs in assimilative, accommodative, and imitative systems but in every case change occurs only within unchanging principles of organization (at least, unchanging for one of the two social systems in interaction). In the case of an assimilative control system, it has not been possible to identify a mechanism even for changing to an accommodative system, except to have a larger or more powerful accommodative system intervene. In other cases means or mechanisms for getting from one control system to another have not

[162]Marx's notion of class conflict leading to new social formations would seem to be equivalent to this view of reciprocal assimilation. Perhaps drawing on Marxist literature would make it possible to answer the questions raised here.

been displayed through the data.

Clearly a major direction for future research would be identifying these mechanisms of change, or change systems which make it possible for social actors to generate fundamental change, to move a social system from one control system or system of integration to another. It is possible that even as the control system is different for each case, so the change system would be different for each case, although it may be possible to interpret it with a single set of concepts from the overall theory.

It would appear that Piaget's concepts applied by analogy to social systems do indeed open up Social Action Theory to the possibility of becoming a theory of change as well as control. Although there is still a great deal of conceptual work to be done (as is suggested by parallel usage of terms which are not semantically parallel, such as conditions and control), looking at a theory of change within Social Action Theory (Smelser's theory) has made it possible to clarify many of the problems and theoretical relationships. The efforts at modifying Smelser's theory were attempts to shift his theory from a technology for social control agents to a theory which would explain the actions of mobilizers and controllers in the same way and on the same dimensions. Fully incorporating Piaget into the theory requires more than that, for it requires that societies be analyzable as including particular structures or mechanisms of both control and change, structures which propel control or change along specific paths.

Thus incorporating Piaget's concepts into Social Action Theory makes it possible to develop a truly Critical Theory of collective behavior. In this thesis the "Critical Theory" has been developed primarily as a result of a critique of Smelser; it is for the most part critical only in the simplest meaning of that term.

However, if we were able to identify the four types of social systems described above, including their control and change mechanisms, would it not lead to something more elaborate? Would we perhaps not only understand "the conditions for the possibility of knowledge" (Grathoff, 1978:xii) but the conditions for the possibility of social action leading to social structural change. Such a theory would truly be a Critical Theory of collective behavior, and indeed perhaps what Thompson (1981) would call a Critical Theory of social action itself.

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